

M. TULLI CICERONIS

LAELIUS DE AMICITIA

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

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TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

American Edition Revised

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Boston
ALLYN AND BACON
1889

University Press:
John Wilson and Son, Cambridge.

INTRODUCTION.

I. ORIGIN, SCOPE, AND PERSONAGES OF THE LAELIUS.[1]

1. Date of Composition.

The Laelius was probably composed in June of the year 44 B. C. From *De Divinatione* 2, 1, 3 it is clear that when that work appeared the Laelius had not yet been written, while the Cato Maior had already been published. In the *De Officiis*, which is not mentioned in the passage referred to above, there is a reference to the Laelius. Now the Cato Maior was composed in the spring of 44 B. C., and the *De Officiis* in the following November.[2] As Cicero was travelling during July and August, while September and October were occupied by the *De Officiis*, we may suppose that the Laelius was written in June of the same year.[3]

2. Greek Sources.

There is a statement by Aulus Gellius[4] that Cicero in writing the Laelius took for his model a book of Theophrastus, entitled Περὶ Φιλίας, which appears to have been the most famous of the many treatises on the subject. The imitation was, however,

[1] On Cicero's philosophical views and writings see Introduction to Cato Maior, pp. i.–v.; on the form of the dialogue see ibid. pp. ix., x.

[2] See Ad Att. 16, 11.

[3] On Cicero's state of mind at the time and the attendant circumstances see Introduction to Cato Maior, pp. vi., vii.

[4] *Noctes Atticae*, 1, 3, 10 *et seq.*

according to Gellius, exceedingly free. Theophrastus stated simply his own views and wrote for philosophers; Cicero wrote for general readers, and put his statements into the mouth of Laelius, who, as a distinguished Roman general and statesman, would not be expected to go very deeply into philosophical questions. Besides this general following of Theophrastus there are one or two direct imitations of a discourse of Socrates on Friendship recorded by Xenophon in the *Memorabilia*.[1] In § 3 there is a slight reference to the *Theaetetus* of Plato.[2] Beyond these no distinct adaptation of Greek originals can be traced. It is extremely doubtful whether Cicero in making this treatise used the *Nicomachean Ethics*, though he knew of its existence[3] and had perhaps read it. Several points of resemblance between that work and the Laelius can be accounted for by the fact that many of Aristotle's ethical utterances had passed into commonplaces. Cicero was probably acquainted with Plato's *Lysis*, but no direct imitation of it can be pointed out. Undoubtedly he read and used here and there other Greek treatises on Friendship which are not now extant. In § 45 he adapts some lines of Euripides which Plutarch says were commented on by Chrysippus in the book Περὶ Φιλίας; the verses were so well known, however, that there is no ground for suspecting imitation.

3 Scope of the Laelius.

The Laelius belongs to the ethical works of Cicero. While the *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum* contains Cicero's views of the principles of morality, the other ethical writings are concerned with the applications of those principles to actual life. The subject of Friendship, to which the Laelius is devoted, though very little elaborated by modern philosophers, held an

[1] See notes on § 62.

[2] See notes. It is commonly but erroneously said that Cicero was not familiar with the *Theaetetus*. See for example Orelli, *Onomasticon Tullianum* v. Tullius.

[3] See *De Finibus*, 5, 5, 12.

important place in the moral systems of the ancients. In post-Platonic times especially, after the freedom of Greek political life was extinguished and men of culture had to find private outlets for their energy, was Friendship brought into prominence. Numerous treatises were specially devoted to it.[1] A separate dialogue was given to it by Plato, viz. the *Lysis*, and two whole books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (VIII. and IX.) by Aristotle. In the Laelius, however, the range of questions discussed is far narrower than was commonly the case with the Greek philosophers who wrote on the subject. The Greek *φιλία* included every form of association, even the relations of man to man, of citizen to citizen, of purchaser to buyer, and the like. Cicero, however, uses *amicitia* in a sense which is almost exactly that of the English '*friendship*'. Nor does he attempt that exhaustive discussion of all questions which had been raised or might be raised touching Friendship in this narrower sense, which we find in the two above-mentioned books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The practice of friendship is discussed almost to the exclusion of its theory. Cicero's treatise is indeed a kind of popular essay, dealing with those aspects of the subject which could best be made interesting to readers in general. Again and again during the course of the dialogue he emphasizes the practical character of the treatise. Indeed to have made it highly speculative would have ill suited the characters of the interlocutors.

4. Personages of the Laelius.

A. *The Scipionic Circle.*

The age of the younger Africanus was remarkable for the rapid spread of Hellenism among the educated Romans. Scipio formed the centre of a large and influential circle, composed partly of Roman admirers of Greek art and literature, partly of

[1] Merely taking the catalogues in Diogenes Laertius we find separate works on the subject by Crito, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Aristotle.

Greek and Roman men of letters. Hellenism had been powerful for several generations in Latin literature and social life. In the Hellenism of the Scipionic circle, however, not only were old tendencies quickened, but a new and important influence was added, that of the Greek philosophy. Although the wisdom of the Greeks was known in part to the Romans at a much earlier time, its practical power over them dates from the famous Athenian embassy of 155 B.C. composed of the three great philosophers, Carneades the Academic, Diogenes the Stoic, and Critolaus the Peripatetic. After this time all the Greek systems struck root at Rome, but by far the greatest influence was exerted by Stoicism, of which nearly all the members of Scipio's society had a tincture more or less strong. Thus Scipio himself was devoted to the society of the Stoic philosopher Panaetius; Laelius had learned Stoicism from both Panaetius and Diogenes. There are many tinges of Stoicism traceable in our dialogue. These noble Romans, however, adopted the Stoic philosophy more on account of its utility in supplying a foundation for theories of law and government than as a form of faith. The Stoicism they professed was also a Stoicism deprived of its paradoxes and specially adapted to Roman tastes. In this form it ultimately exercised a profound influence on the national life of Rome.

Though the prevalent bent of the Scipionic circle was towards Stoicism, it was far from rejecting the society of those who adhered to other systems. Thus Clitomachus, the New Academic, was the friend of many Romans of high station in his time.

On the literary side the circle of Scipio and Laelius was strong. To it belonged Polybius, the great historian, Lucilius the satirist, and the dramatists Terence and Pacuvius, with many others scarcely less distinguished. We cannot here give any detailed account of the persons who formed this brilliant society, but must confine ourselves to such information as is necessary to illustrate the Laelius.

(1.) *Scipio.*[1]

[1] On Scipio see Introd. to Cato Maior, pp. xxi.–xxiii.

(2.) *Philus.* Several friends of Scipio are mentioned in the dialogue. Chief of these is L. Furius Philus,[1] consul of the year 136, a man of great knowledge and high character, and a friend and patron of Greek literati. He is thought worthy by Cicero to rank beside Cato and Laelius,[2] and is one of the interlocutors in the *De Re Publica.*

(3.) *Rupilius.* P. Rupilius[3] was consul in 132, and exercised great severity against the partisans of Ti. Gracchus. His consulship is said to have been due to the aid of Scipio. He commanded in Sicily against the insurgent slaves and established a code of laws for the administration of that province.

(4.) *Manilius.* M'. (or M., the *praenomen* is uncertain) Manilius,[4] consul in 149, commanded in Africa for some time against the Carthaginians with Scipio as one of his officers. He was a very eminent lawyer, and a close friend of Laelius and Scipio, appearing in the *De Re Publica* along with them.

(5.) *Mummius.* Spurius Mummius[5] seems to have been a very different man from his brother, the destroyer of Corinth. He had both wit and literary ability, which recommended him to the very intimate friendship of Scipio, with whom he is joined in Cicero's *De Re Publica.*[6] When, to secure Scipio's safety, the senate despatched him on an embassy to Asia, Mummius was his companion. Mummius spent some time in Achaia as *legatus* to his brother, and thence sent witty epistles in verse to his friends at home.[7] As a politician he was apparently unpopular and unsuccessful; and devoting himself to study he became a strong Stoic. We hear of him that he was particularly noted for his detestation of the teachers of Rhetoric.

B. *The Interlocutors in the Dialogue.*

The conversation is supposed to take place at the house of Laelius a few days after the death of Africanus the younger, in

[1] §§ 14, 21, 69, 101.

[2] Leg. Agr. 2, 64 *Phili Catones Laelii.*

[3] Lael. §§ 37, 69, 101.

[4] Lael. § 14.

[5] §§ 69, 101.

[6] §§ 1, 12, 18; 3, 35, 47, etc.

[7] Att. 13, 6, 4.

129 B.C.,[1] between Laelius and his sons-in-law, Scaevola and Fannius.

(1.) *Laelius.* The chief speaker is Gaius Laelius, the friend of the younger Africanus.[2] Laelius, distinguished as statesman, soldier, and man of letters, was born about 186 B.C. He was plebeian tribune in 151, performed heroic exploits as an officer of Scipio in the Third Punic War, was praetor in 145,[3] and commanded an army against Viriathus with success. He presented himself as candidate for the consulship in 141, but though supported by Scipio[4] he failed of election; the next year, however, he succeeded. He also held the office of augur.[5] During the greater part of his life he was a strong supporter of the aristocratic party. In his later days he sternly opposed the schemes of Ti. Gracchus.[6]

Laelius was not only one of the greatest patrons of literature Rome ever saw, but was himself a man of high culture and great ability as a speaker and writer. He was widely read in philosophy, particularly the Stoic. His Latin style was so good that the plays of his friend Terence, admired for the purity of their Latinity, were by many ascribed in whole or in part to him.[7] Some of his speeches were extant in Cicero's time, and were, on the whole, admired by him.[8]

Cicero everywhere speaks in the most eulogistic terms of Laelius' character. All authorities were unanimous as to his unswerving rectitude.[9] His self-control and moderation were remarkable.[10] Like Socrates, throughout life he never showed in his face the effect produced on his mind by changes of fortune.[11]

[1] See § 5.

[2] His father, C. Laelius, was the friend of the elder Africanus. See note on C. M., § 77.

[3] See note on Laelius 96 *praetore me*.

[4] Laelius 77, 96 etc.

[5] Lael. 7; Phil. 2, 83.

[6] Lael. 36–39.

[7] Ad Atticum, 7, 3, 10.

[8] Cicero speaks of one speech as *aureola oratiuncula*, but of another as *vetustior et horridior*. See N. D. 3, 17, 43; Brut. 21, 83.

[9] Cic. Topica 78; Lael. *passim*.

[10] Arch. 7, 16.

[11] Off. 1, 26, 90.

His gentleness and affability were great.[1] His cheerfulness and humorousness were famous.[2]

During his life and after his death Laelius bore the title *sapiens* or 'the wise',[3] a title which implies more of practical than of intellectual wisdom, though it would not have been given to any one who was destitute of culture and literary excellence. Altogether Laelius is Cicero's typical example of the best results of cultivation acting on a character which exhibited in their fullest extent the ideal Roman virtues. He is introduced as an interlocutor into two other dialogues, the *Cato Maior* with Scipio, and the *De Re Publica* along with Scipio, Fannius, and Scaevola.

The friendship of Laelius and Scipio was one of the most famous in antiquity. Laelius, says Cicero, reverenced Scipio as a god; Scipio looked up to Laelius, his senior, as a parent.[4] The views of friendship which Laelius gives in the dialogue are said by him to be mainly those of Scipio.

(2.) *Scaevola.*[5] Scaevola belonged to a family of lawyers,[6] and was himself exceedingly distinguished for his knowledge of the law. He was born about 157, and lived till 88 B.C. In 121 he was praetor, and governor of Asia. On his return a malicious prosecution was set on foot against him on a charge of malversation (*repetundarum*), but on this he was acquitted. Soon afterwards he was elected consul for the year 117. He seems to have had but little political ambition, though owing to his high character and his freedom from partisanship he exercised in the senate and in private a great political influence. His house was daily thronged by the leading men of Rome.[7]

[1] Mur. 31, 66; cf. Horace's *mitis sapientia Laeli*, Sat. 2, 1, 72.

[2] Off. 1, 108; De Or. 2, 22.

[3] In addition to the passages in the Laelius, cf. Off. 2, 40 *Laelius is qui sapiens usurpatur*, also Brut. 213; Tusc. 4, 5. Plutarch, life of Ti. Gracchus, c. 8, has the unlikely story that the title *sapiens* was given to Laelius, because having proposed an agrarian law while tribune in 151 he had the good sense to withdraw it in order to prevent civil discord.

[4] De Re Publica, 1, 18.

[5] *augur* not *pontifex;* see § 1 and nn.

[6] De Or. 1, 39 *iura civilia in nostra* (*Scaevolarum*) *familia diu versata sunt.*

[7] De Or. 1, 200; Phil. 8, 31.

The wit as well as the learning of Scaevola was renowned,[1] and he was noted for sweetness and affability of demeanor.[2] Cicero, who was in early life, along with Atticus, placed under his guardianship, always speaks of him with great affection and admiration. Scaevola appears also as one of the interlocutors in the *De Oratore* and in the *De Re Publica*.

(3.) *Fannius*. Gaius Fannius served with distinction under Scipio in the Third Punic War. He and Tiberius Gracchus were the first to mount the walls of Carthage when it was stormed. He served again in Spain, but seems to have been unsuccessful in political life. He was a man of considerable cultivation and literary activity, and wrote a history, the style of which is very faintly praised by Cicero though its accuracy was highly estimated by Sallust. His character seems to have been somewhat severe.[3] He appears with Scipio and Laelius and Scaevola as one of the interlocutors in the *De Re Publica*.

II. SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE LAELIUS.

1. General View.

The Laelius, like the Cato Maior, consists of three parts: —

Preliminary, dedication to Atticus, §§ 1–5.
Introductory Conversation, 6–16.
The Discourse of Laelius on Friendship, 17–104.

2. Analysis.

Preliminary, dedication to Atticus . . . . §§ 1–5.

Cicero gives an account of his acquaintance with the Scaevolae (1), and explains how Scaevola, the augur, happening one day to speak of a quarrel between P. Sulpicius and Q. Pompeius, formerly friends (2), came to report a conversation between Lae-

[1] Att. 4, 16, 3.
[2] De Or. 1, 234.
[3] Brut. 101, where Cicero speaks of a coolness between Fannius and Laelius.

lius, himself, and Fannius on Friendship. This conversation Cicero has freely rendered (3). He states why he has dedicated the work to Atticus, his reasons for making Laelius the most prominent character in the dialogue (4), and the circumstances of the supposed conversation (5).

Introductory Conversation . . . . 6–16.

Fannius opens the conversation with an allusion to Scipio Africanus, and remarks that people are wondering how Laelius, whom they call 'wise,' bears the death of his friend (6, 7). Scaevola speaks to the same effect (8). Laelius, although alleging ill-health as the cause of temporary retirement, acknowledges that he has been deeply moved by the loss of Scipio (8–10). He finds consolation, however, in the reflection that Scipio is better off than he (10), because, after having enjoyed the highest esteem and honors, Scipio has passed away by a painless death, and no doubt to a happy immortality (11–14), while he, older in years, is left behind. But still the greatest solace is the remembrance of the close friendship between himself and Scipio (15). The subject of Friendship having thus been touched upon, Fannius and Scaevola unite in asking Laelius to express his views upon it (16).

The Discourse of Laelius on Friendship . . 17-104.

This discourse of Laelius comprises five distinct portions. In two instances the transitions are gracefully made through remarks by Fannius and Scaevola (§§ 25, 32).

(1) Remarks upon the Nature and Value of Friendship 17–25. Friendship is to be prized above all other things (17), but can exist only among the good, — good not in the Stoic, but in the ordinary sense (18), — and is something deeper and stronger than natural association (19). Friendship is defined, with the statement that virtue is its essential condition (20, 21), and its

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LAELIUS

DE AMICITIA.

I. Q. Mucius augur multa narrare de C. Laelio 1 socero suo memoriter et iucunde solebat nec dubitare illum in omni sermone appellare sapientem. Ego autem a patre ita eram deductus ad Scaevolam sumpta virili toga, ut, quoad possem et liceret, a senis latere numquam discederem. Itaque multa ab eo prudenter disputata, multa etiam breviter et commode dicta memoriae mandabam, fierique studebam eius prudentia doctior. Quo mortuo me ad pontificem Scaevolam contuli, quem unum nostrae civitatis et ingenio et iustitia praestantissimum audeo dicere. Sed de hoc alias, nunc redeo ad augurem. Cum saepe multa, tum me- 2
mini domi in hemicyclio sedentem, ut solebat, cum et ego essem una et pauci admodum familiares, in eum sermonem illum incidere, qui tum fere multis erat in ore. Meministi enim profecto, Attice, et eo magis, quod P. Sulpicio utebare multum, cum is tribunus plebis capitali odio a Q. Pompeio, qui tum erat consul, dissideret, quocum coniunctissime et amantissime vixerat, quanta esset hominum vel admiratio vel querella. Itaque tum 3
Scaevola, cum in eam ipsam mentionem incidisset, ex-

posuit nobis sermonem Laeli de amicitia habitum ab illo secum et cum altero genero C. Fannio, Marci filio, paucis diebus post mortem Africani. Eius disputationis sententias memoriae mandavi, quas hoc libro exposui arbitratu meo: quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentis, ne 'inquam' et 'inquit' saepius interponeretur atque ut tamquam a praesentibus coram haberi sermo videretur.
4 Cum enim saepe mecum ageres, ut de amicitia scriberem aliquid, digna mihi res cum omnium cognitione tum nostra familiaritate visa est; itaque feci non invitus ut prodessem multis rogatu tuo. Sed ut in Catone maiore, qui est scriptus ad te de senectute, Catonem induxi senem disputantem, quia nulla videbatur aptior persona quae de illa aetate loqueretur, quam eius, qui et diutissime senex fuisset et in ipsa senectute praeter ceteros floruisset; sic, cum accepissemus a patribus maxime memorabilem C. Laeli et P. Scipionis familiaritatem fuisse, idonea mihi Laeli persona visa est quae de amicitia ea ipsa dissereret, quae disputata ab eo meminisset Scaevola. Genus autem hoc sermonum positum in hominum veterum auctoritate et eorum illustrium plus nescio quo pacto videtur habere gravitatis. Itaque ipse mea legens sic afficior interdum, ut Catonem, non
5 me, loqui existimem. Sed ut tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic hoc libro ad amicum amicissimus scripsi de amicitia. Tum est Cato locutus, quo erat nemo fere senior temporibus illis, nemo prudentior: nunc Laelius et sapiens, sic enim est habitus, et amicitiae gloria excellens de amicitia loquetur. Tu velim a me animum parumper avertas, Laelium loqui ipsum putes. C. Fannius et Q. Mucius ad socerum veniunt post mortem Africani: ab his sermo oritur, respondet Laelius, cuius

tota disputatio est de amicitia, quam legens te ipse cognosces.

II. Fannius. Sunt ista, Laeli; nec enim melior vir 6
fuit Africano quisquam nec clarior. Sed existimare debes omnium oculos in te esse coniectos unum; te sapientem et appellant et existimant. Tribuebatur hoc modo M. Catoni, scimus L. Acilium apud patres nostros appellatum esse sapientem, sed uterque alio quodam modo, Acilius quia prudens esse in iure civili putabatur, Cato quia multarum rerum usum habebat: multa eius et in senatu et in foro vel provisa prudenter vel acta constanter vel responsa acute ferebantur, propterea quasi cognomen iam habebat in senectute sapientis. Te 7
autem alio quodam modo non solum natura et moribus, verum etiam studio et doctrina esse sapientem, nec sicut volgus, sed ut eruditi solent appellare sapientem, qualem in Graecia reliqua neminem — nam qui septem appellantur, eos qui ista subtilius quaerunt in numero sapientium non habent — Athenis unum accepimus et eum quidem Apollinis oraculo sapientissimum iudicatum: hanc esse in te sapientiam existimant, ut omnia tua in te posita esse ducas humanosque casus virtute inferiores putes. Itaque ex me quaerunt, credo ex hoc item Scaevola, quonam pacto mortem Africani feras, eoque magis quod proximis Nonis, cum in hortos D. Bruti auguris commentandi causa, ut assolet, venissemus, tu non affuisti, qui diligentissime semper illum diem et illud munus solitus esses obire.

Scaevola. Quaerunt quidem, C. Laeli, multum, ut 8
est a Fannio dictum, sed ego id respondeo, quod animum adverti, te dolorem quem acceperis cum summi viri tum amicissimi morte ferre moderate; nec potuisse

non commoveri, nec fuisse id humanitatis tuae: quod autem Nonis in collegio nostro non affuisses, valetudinem respondeo causam, non maestitiam fuisse.

Laelius. Recte tu quidem, Scaevola, et vere: nec
enim ab isto officio, quod semper usurpavi cum valerem,
abduci incommodo meo debui, nec ullo casu arbitror
hoc constanti homini posse contingere, ut ulla intermis-
9 sio fiat offici. Tu autem, Fanni, quod mihi tantum tri-
bui dicis, quantum ego nec agnosco nec postulo, facis
amice, sed, ut mihi videris, non recte iudicas de Catone.
Aut enim nemo, quod quidem magis credo, aut, si quis-
quam, ille sapiens fuit. Quo modo, ut alia omittam,
mortem fili tulit! Memineram Paulum, videram Gal-
lum; sed hi in pueris, Cato in perfecto et spectato viro.
10 Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem
ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit:
huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem,
ut iam cum utroque vestrum loquar, sic habetote.
III. Ego si Scipionis desiderio me moveri negem, quam
id recte faciam viderint sapientes, sed certe mentiar.
Moveor enim tali amico orbatus, qualis, ut arbitror,
nemo umquam erit, ut confirmare possum, nemo certe
fuit. Sed non egeo medicina: me ipse consolor et
maxime illo solacio, quod eo errore careo, quo amico-
rum decessu plerique angi solent. Nihil mali accidisse
Scipioni puto: mihi accidit, si quid accidit; suis autem
incommodis graviter angi non amicum, sed se ipsum
11 amantis est. Cum illo vero quis neget actum esse prae-
clare? Nisi enim, quod ille minime putabat, immor-
talitatem optare vellet, quid non adeptus est, quod
homini fas esset optare, qui summam spem civium,
quam de eo iam puero habuerant, continuo adulescens

incredibili virtute superavit; qui consulatum petivit
numquam, factus consul est bis, primum ante tempus,
iterum sibi suo tempore, rei publicae paene sero; qui
duabus urbibus eversis inimicissimis huic imperio non
modo praesentia, verum etiam futura bella delevit?
Quid dicam de moribus facillimis, de pietate in ma-
trem, liberalitate in sorores, bonitate in suos, iustitia in
omnis? Nota sunt vobis. Quam autem civitati carus
fuerit, maerore funeris indicatum est. Quid igitur hunc
paucorum annorum accessio iuvare potuisset? Senec-
tus enim quamvis non sit gravis, ut memini Catonem
anno ante, quam est mortuus, mecum et cum Scipione
disserere, tamen aufert eam viriditatem, in qua etiam
nunc erat Scipio. Quam ob rem vita quidem talis fuit 12
vel fortuna vel gloria, ut nihil posset accedere; mori-
endi autem sensum celeritas abstulit. Quo de genere
mortis difficile dictu est; quid homines suspicentur
videtis: hoc vere tamen licet dicere, P. Scipioni ex
multis diebus, quos in vita celeberrimos laetissimosque
viderit, illum diem clarissimum fuisse, cum senatu di-
misso domum reductus est ad vesperum a patribus con-
scriptis, populo Romano, sociis et Latinis, pridie quam
excessit e vita, ut ex tam alto dignitatis gradu ad supe-
ros videatur deos potius quam ad inferos pervenisse.

IV. Neque enim adsentior eis, qui nuper haec dis- 13
serere coeperunt, cum corporibus simul animos interire
atque omnia morte deleri. Plus apud me antiquorum
auctoritas valet, vel nostrorum maiorum, qui mortuis
tam religiosa iura tribuerunt, quod non fecissent pro-
fecto, si nihil ad eos pertinere arbitrarentur, vel eorum
qui in hac terra fuerunt magnamque Graeciam, quae
nunc quidem deleta est, tum florebat, institutis et prae-

ceptis suis erudierunt, vel eius, qui Apollinis oraculo sapientissimus est iudicatus, qui non tum hoc tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed idem semper, animos hominum esse divinos eisque, cum ex corpore excessissent, reditum in caelum patere optimoque et iustissimo cuique expedi-
14 tissimum. Quod idem Scipioni videbatur, qui quidem, quasi praesagiret, perpaucis ante mortem diebus, cum et Philus et Manilius adesset et alii plures, tuque etiam, Scaevola, mecum venisses, triduum disseruit de re publica, cuius disputationis fuit extremum fere de immortalitate animorum, quae se in quiete per visum ex Africano audisse dicebat. Id si ita est, ut optimi cuiusque animus in morte facillime evolet tamquam e custodia vinclisque corporis, cui censemus cursum ad deos faciliorem fuisse quam Scipioni? Quocirca maerere hoc eius eventu vereor ne invidi magis quam amici sit. Sin autem illa veriora, ut idem interitus sit animorum et corporum nec ullus sensus maneat, ut nihil boni est in morte, sic certe nihil mali. Sensu enim amisso fit idem, quasi natus non esset omnino, quem tamen esse natum et nos gaudemus et haec civitas, dum erit, laeta-
15 bitur. Quam ob rem cum illo quidem, ut supra dixi, actum optime est, mecum incommodius, quem fuerat aequius, ut prius introieram, sic prius exire de vita. Sed tamen recordatione nostrae amicitiae sic fruor, ut beate vixisse videar, quia cum Scipione vixerim, quocum mihi coniuncta cura de publica re et de privata fuit, quocum et domus fuit et militia communis et, id in quo omnis vis est amicitiae, voluntatum studiorum sententiarum summa consensio. Itaque non tam ista me sapientiae, quam modo Fannius commemoravit, fama delectat, falsa praesertim, quam quod amicitiae nostrae memoriam

spero sempiternam fore, idque eo mihi magis est cordi, quod ex omnibus saeculis vix tria aut quattuor nominantur paria amicorum, quo in genere sperare videor Scipionis et Laeli amicitiam notam posteritati fore.

FANNIUS. Istuc quidem, Laeli, ita necesse est. Sed 16
quoniam amicitiae mentionem fecisti et sumus otiosi, pergratum mihi feceris — spero item Scaevolae — si, quem ad modum soles de ceteris rebus, cum ex te quaeruntur, sic de amicitia disputaris quid sentias, qualem existimes, quae praecepta des. SCAEVOLA. Mihi vero erit gratum, atque id ipsum cum tecum agere conarer, Fannius antevertit: quam ob rem utrique nostrum gratum admodum feceris.

V. LAELIUS. Ego vero non gravarer, si mihi ipse 17
confiderem, nam et praeclara res est et sumus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosi. Sed quis ego sum aut quae est in me facultas? Doctorum est ista consuetudo eaque Graecorum, ut eis ponatur de quo disputent quamvis subito. Magnum opus est egetque exercitatione non parva. Quam ob rem quae disputari de amicitia possunt, ab eis censeo petatis, qui ista profitentur: ego vos hortari tantum possum, ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis; nihil est enim tam naturae aptum, tam conveniens ad res vel secundas vel adversas. Sed hoc 18
primum sentio, nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse: neque id ad vivum reseco, ut illi, qui haec subtilius disserunt, fortasse vere, sed ad communem utilitatem parum; negant enim quemquam esse virum bonum nisi sapientem. Sit ita sane: sed eam sapientiam interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus; nos autem ea, quae sunt in usu vitaque communi, non ea, quae finguntur aut optantur, spectare debemus. Numquam

ego dicam C. Fabricium, M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium,
quos sapientis nostri maiores iudicabant, ad istorum
normam fuisse sapientis. Qua re sibi habeant sapien-
tiae nomen et invidiosum et obscurum, concedant ut
viri boni fuerint. Ne id quidem facient; negabunt id
19 nisi sapienti posse concedi. Agamus igitur pingui, ut
aiunt, Minerva. Qui ita se gerunt, ita vivunt, ut eorum
probetur fides integritas aequitas liberalitas, nec sit in
eis ulla cupiditas libido audacia, sintque magna constan-
tia, ut ei fuerunt, modo quos nominavi, hos viros bonos,
ut habiti sunt, sic etiam appellandos putemus, quia se-
quantur, quantum homines possunt, naturam optimam
bene vivendi ducem. Sic enim mihi perspicere videor,
ita natos esse nos, ut inter omnis esset societas quae-
dam, maior autem, ut quisque proxime accederet.] Ita-
que cives potiores quam peregrini, propinqui quam
alieni; cum his enim amicitiam natura ipsa peperit, sed
ea non satis habet firmitatis. Namque hoc praestat
amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benevo-
lentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim
benevolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur, propinquitatis
20 manet. Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit ex hoc intellegi
maxime potest, quod ex infinita societate generis hu-
mani, quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est
et adducta in angustum, ut omnis caritas aut inter duos
aut inter paucos iungeretur. VI. Est enim amicitia
nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum
cum benevolentia et caritate consensio, qua quidem haud
scio an excepta sapientia nil quicquam melius homini
sit a dis immortalibus datum. Divitias alii praeponunt,
bonam alii valetudinem, alii potentiam, alii honores,
multi etiam voluptates. Beluarum hoc quidem extre-

mum, illa autem superiora caduca et incerta, posita non
tam in consiliis nostris quam in fortunae temeritate.
Qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt, praeclare
illi quidem, sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et
continet, nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest.
Iam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae nostrae sermonisque 21
nostri interpretemur nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum
magnificentia metiamur, virosque bonos eos qui haben-
tur numeremus, Paulos Catones Gallos Scipiones Philos
—his communis vita contenta est—eos autem omitta-
mus, qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur. Talis igitur 22
inter viros amicitia tantas opportunitates habet, quantas
vix queo dicere. Principio qui potest esse vita vitalis,
ut ait Ennius, quae non in amici mutua benevolentia
conquiescit? Quid dulcius quam habere quicum omnia
audeas sic loqui ut tecum? Qui esset tantus fructus in
prosperis rebus, nisi haberes qui illis aeque ac tu ipse
gauderet? Adversas vero ferre difficile esset sine eo,
qui illas gravius etiam quam tu ferret. Denique ceterae
res, quae expetuntur, opportunae sunt singulae rebus
fere singulis; divitiae, ut utare; opes, ut colare; hono-
res, ut laudere; voluptates, ut gaudeas; valetudo, ut
dolore careas et muneribus fungare corporis: amicitia
res plurimas continet; quoquo te verteris praesto est,
nullo loco excluditur, numquam intempestiva, numquam
molesta est. Itaque non aqua, non igni, ut aiunt, plu-
ribus locis utimur quam amicitia. Neque ego nunc de
volgari aut de mediocri, quae tamen ipsa et delectat et
prodest, sed de vera et perfecta loquor, qualis eorum,
qui pauci nominantur, fuit. Nam et secundas res splen-
didiores facit amicitia, et adversas, partiens communi-
cansque, leviores. VII. Cumque plurimas et maximas 23

commoditates amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum praestat omnibus, quod bonam spem praelucet in posterum, nec debilitari animos aut cadere patitur. Verum etiam amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui. Quocirca et absentes adsunt et egentes abundant et imbecilli valent et, quod difficilius dictu est, mortui vivunt; tantus eos honos memoria desiderium prosequitur amicorum, ex quo illorum beata mors videtur, horum vita laudabilis. Quod si exemeris ex rerum natura benevolentiae coniunctionem, nec domus ulla nec urbs stare poterit, ne agri quidem cultus permanebit. Id si minus intellegitur, quanta vis amicitiae concordiaeque sit, ex dissensionibus atque discordiis percipi potest. Quae enim domus tam stabilis, quae tam firma civitas est, quae non odiis et discidiis funditus possit everti? Ex quo, quantum boni sit in amicitia, iudicari
24 potest. Agrigentinum quidem doctum quendam virum carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent quaeque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam. Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales et intellegunt et re probant. Itaque, si quando aliquod officium exstitit amici in periculis aut adeundis aut communicandis, quis est qui id non maximis efferat laudibus? Qui clamores tota cavea nuper in hospitis et amici mei M. Pacuvi nova fabula, cum ignorante rege uter Orestes esset, Pylades Orestem se esse diceret, ut pro illo necaretur, Orestes autem, ita ut erat, Orestem se esse perseveraret! Stantes plaudebant in re ficta: quid arbitramur in vera facturos fuisse? Facile indicabat ipsa natura vim suam, cum homines, quod facere ipsi non possent, id recte fieri in altero iudicarent.

Hactenus mihi videor de amicitia quid sentirem potuisse dicere; si quae praeterea sunt — credo autem esse multa — ab eis, si videbitur, qui ista disputant, quaeritote.

FANNIUS. Nos autem a te potius: quamquam etiam 25
ab istis saepe quaesivi et audivi non invitus equidem, sed aliud quoddam filum orationis tuae.

SCAEVOLA. Tum magis id diceres, Fanni, si nuper in hortis Scipionis, cum est de re publica disputatum, affuisses. Qualis tum patronus iustitiae fuit contra accuratam orationem Phili!

FANNIUS. Facile id quidem fuit iustitiam iustissimo viro defendere.

SCAEVOLA. Quid? amicitiam nonne facile ei, qui ob eam summa fide, constantia iustitiaque servatam maximam gloriam ceperit?

VIII. LAELIUS. Vim hoc quidem est afferre: quid 26
enim refert qua me ratione cogatis? Cogitis certe. Studiis enim generorum, praesertim in re bona, cum difficile est tum ne aequum quidem obsistere.

Saepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum videri solet, utrum propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis, quod quisque minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio vicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa. Amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad benevolentiam coniungendam. Nam utilitates quidem etiam ab eis percipiuntur saepe, qui simulatione amicitiae coluntur et observantur temporis causa; in amicitia autem nihil fictum, nihil simulatum est et, quid-

27 quid est, id est verum et voluntarium. Quapropter a
natura mihi videtur potius quam ab indigentia orta
amicitia, applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu
amandi, quam cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis
esset habitura. Quod quidem quale sit, etiam in bestiis
quibusdam animadverti potest, quae ex se natos ita
amant ad quoddam tempus et ab eis ita amantur, ut
facile earum sensus appareat. Quod in homine multo
est evidentius, primum ex ea caritate quae est inter
natos et parentis, quae dirimi nisi detestabili scelere
non potest, deinde cum similis sensus exstitit amoris,
si aliquem nacti sumus, cuius cum moribus et natura
congruamus, quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis
28 et virtutis perspicere videamur.] Nihil est enim virtute
amabilius, nihil quod magis alliciat ad diligendum:
quippe cum propter virtutem et probitatem etiam eos,
quos numquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus. Quis
est qui C. Fabrici, M'. Curi non cum caritate aliqua
benevola memoriam usurpet, quos numquam viderit?
Quis autem est qui Tarquinium Superbum, qui Sp.
Cassium, Sp. Maelium non oderit? Cum duobus du-
cibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum, Pyrrho et
Hannibale; ab altero propter probitatem eius non
nimis alienos animos habemus, alterum propter crudeli-
tatem semper haec civitas oderit.

29 IX. Quod si tanta vis probitatis est, ut eam vel in
eis, quos numquam vidimus, vel, quod maius est, in
hoste etiam diligamus, quid mirum est, si animi homi-
num moveantur, cum eorum, quibuscum usu coniuncti
esse possunt, virtutem et bonitatem perspicere videan-
tur? Quamquam confirmatur amor et beneficio accepto
et studio perspecto et consuetudine adiuncta, quibus

rebus ad illum primum motum animi et amoris adhibitis
admirabilis quaedam exardescit benevolentiae magni-
tudo. Quam si qui putant ab imbecillitate proficisci,
ut sit per quem adsequatur quod quisque desideret,
humilem sane relinquunt et minime generosum, ut ita
dicam, ortum amicitiae, quam ex inopia atque indigentia
natam volunt. Quod si ita esset, ut quisque minimum
esse in se arbitraretur, ita ad amicitiam esset aptissimus;
quod longe secus est. Ut enim quisque sibi plurimum 30
confidit et ut quisque maxime virtute et sapientia sic mu-
nitus est, ut nullo egeat suaque omnia in se ipso posita
iudicet, ita in amicitiis expetendis colendisque maxime
excellit. Quid enim? Africanus indigens mei? Minime
hercule! Ac ne ego quidem illius, sed ego admiratione
quadam virtutis eius, ille vicissim opinione fortasse non
nulla quam de meis moribus habebat, me dilexit; auxit
benevolentiam consuetudo. Sed quamquam utilitates
multae et magnae consecutae sunt, non sunt tamen ab
earum spe causae diligendi profectae. Ut enim benefici 31
liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam — neque
enim beneficium faeneramur, sed natura propensi ad
liberalitatem sumus — sic amicitiam non spe mercedis
adducti, sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore
inest, expetendam putamus. Ab his, qui pecudum ritu 32
ad voluptatem omnia referunt, longe dissentiunt, nec
mirum; nihil enim altum, nihil magnificum ac divinum
suspicere possunt, qui suas omnis cogitationes abiece-
runt in rem tam humilem tamque contemptam. Quam
ob rem hos quidem ab hoc sermone removeamus, ipsi
autem intellegamus natura gigni sensum diligendi et
benevolentiae caritatem facta significatione probitatis,
quam qui appetiverunt, applicant sese et propius ad-

movent, ut et usu eius, quem diligere coeperunt, fruantur et moribus, sintque pares in amore et aequales propensioresque ad bene merendum quam ad reposcendum, atque haec inter eos sit honesta certatio. Sic et utilitates ex amicitia maximae capientur, et erit eius ortus a natura quam ab imbecillitate gravior et verior. Nam si utilitas amicitias conglutinaret, eadem commutata dissolveret; sed quia natura mutari non potest, idcirco verae amicitiae sempiternae sunt. Ortum quidem amicitiae videtis, nisi quid ad haec forte voltis.

FANNIUS. Tu vero perge, Laeli! Pro hoc enim, qui minor est natu, meo iure respondeo.

33 SCAEVOLA. Recte tu quidem: quam ob rem audiamus.

X. LAELIUS. Audite vero, optimi viri, ea quae saepissime inter me et Scipionem de amicitia disserebantur. Quamquam ille quidem nihil difficilius esse dicebat quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae diem permanere: nam vel ut non idem expediret incidere saepe, vel ut de re publica non idem sentiretur; mutari etiam mores hominum saepe dicebat, alias adversis rebus, alias aetate ingravescente. Atque earum rerum exemplum ex similitudine capiebat ineuntis aetatis, quod summi puerorum amores saepe una cum praetexta toga depo-
34 nerentur; sin autem ad adulescentiam perduxissent, dirimi tamen interdum contentione vel uxoriae condicionis vel commodi alicuius, quod idem adipisci uterque non posset. Quod si qui longius in amicitia provecti essent, tamen saepe labefactari, si in honoris contentionem incidissent; pestem enim nullam maiorem esse amicitiis quam in plerisque pecuniae cupiditatem, in optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriae, ex

quo inimicitias maximas saepe inter amicissimos exstitisse. Magna etiam discidia et plerumque iusta 35
nasci, cum aliquid ab amicis quod rectum non esset postularetur, ut aut libidinis ministri aut adiutores essent ad iniuriam, quod qui recusarent, quamvis honeste id facerent, ius tamen amicitiae deserere arguerentur ab eis, quibus obsequi nollent; illos autem, qui quidvis ab amico auderent postulare, postulatione ipsa profiteri omnia se amici causa esse facturos. Eorum querella inveterata non modo familiaritates exstingui solere, sed odia etiam gigni sempiterna. Haec ita multa quasi fata impendere amicitiis, ut omnia subterfugere non modo sapientiae, sed etiam felicitatis diceret sibi videri.

XI. Quam ob rem id primum videamus, si placet, 36
quatenus amor in amicitia progredi debeat. Numne, si Coriolanus habuit amicos, ferre contra patriam arma illi cum Coriolano debuerunt? Num Vecellinum amici regnum appetentem, num Maelium debuerunt iuvare?
Tiberium quidem Gracchum rem publicam vexantem 37
a Q. Tuberone aequalibusque amicis derelictum videbamus. At C. Blossius Cumanus, hospes familiae vestrae, Scaevola, cum ad me, quod aderam Laenati et Rupilio consulibus in consilio, deprecatum venisset, hanc ut sibi ignoscerem causam afferebat, quod tanti Ti. Gracchum fecisset, ut quidquid ille vellet sibi faciendum putaret. Tum ego 'etiamne,' inquam, 'si te in Capitolium faces ferre vellet?' 'Numquam voluisset id quidem, sed, si voluisset, paruissem.' Videtis, quam nefaria vox. Et hercule ita fecit, vel plus etiam quam dixit: non enim paruit ille Ti. Gracchi temeritati, sed praefuit, nec se comitem illius furoris, sed ducem prae-

buit. Itaque hac amentia, quaestione nova perterritus, in Asiam profugit, ad hostis se contulit, poenas rei publicae gravis iustasque persolvit. Nulla est igitur excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris: nam, cum conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est
38 amicitiam manere, si a virtute defeceris. Quod si rectum statuerimus vel concedere amicis quidquid velint vel impetrare ab eis quidquid velimus, perfecta quidem sapientia si simus, nihil habeat res viti; sed loquimur de eis amicis, qui ante oculos sunt, quos videmus aut de quibus memoriam accepimus, quos novit vita communis. Ex hoc numero nobis exempla sumenda sunt, et eorum quidem maxime, qui ad sapientiam proxime
39 accedunt. Videmus Papum Aemilium C. Luscino familiarem fuisse: sic a patribus accepimus, bis una consules, collegas in censura; tum et cum eis et inter se coniunctissimos fuisse M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium memoriae proditum est. Igitur ne suspicari quidem possumus quemquam horum ab amico quidpiam contendisse, quod contra fidem, contra ius iurandum, contra rem publicam esset. Nam hoc quidem in talibus viris quid attinet dicere, si contendisset impetraturum non fuisse, cum illi sanctissimi viri fuerint, aeque autem nefas sit tale aliquid et facere rogatum et rogare? At vero Ti. Gracchum sequebantur C. Carbo, C. Cato, et minime tum quidem Gaius frater, nunc idem acerrimus.

40 XII. Haec igitur lex in amicitia sanciatur, ut neque rogemus res turpis nec faciamus rogati. Turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda cum in ceteris peccatis, tum si quis contra rem publicam se amici causa fecisse fateatur. Etenim eo loco, Fanni et Scaevola,

locati sumus, ut nos longe prospicere oporteat futuros
casus rei publicae. Deflexit iam aliquantulum de
spatio curriculoque consuetudo maiorum. Ti. Gracchus 41
regnum occupare conatus est, vel regnavit is quidem
paucos menses. Num quid simile populus Romanus
audierat aut viderat? Hunc etiam post mortem secuti
amici et propinqui quid in P. Scipione effecerint, sine
lacrimis non queo dicere. Nam Carbonem, quocumque
modo potuimus, propter recentem poenam Ti. Gracchi
sustinuimus. De C. Gracchi autem tribunatu quid
exspectem non libet augurari: serpit deinde res, quae
proclivis ad perniciem, cum semel coepit, labitur. Vi-
detis in tabella iam ante quanta sit facta labes, primo
Gabinia lege, biennio autem post Cassia. Videre iam
videor populum a senatu disiunctum, multitudinis ar-
bitrio res maximas agi. Plures enim discent, quem ad
modum haec fiant, quam quem ad modum his resistatur.
Quorsum haec? Quia sine sociis nemo quicquam tale 42
conatur. Praecipiendum est igitur bonis, ut, si in eius
modi amicitias ignari casu aliquo inciderint, ne existi-
ment ita se alligatos, ut ab amicis in magna aliqua re
publica peccantibus non discedant; improbis autem
poena statuenda est, nec vero minor eis qui secuti erunt
alterum, quam eis qui ipsi fuerint impietatis duces.
Quis clarior in Graecia Themistocle, quis potentior?
Qui cum imperator bello Persico servitute Graeciam
liberavisset propterque invidiam in exsilium expulsus
esset, ingratae patriae iniuriam non tulit, quam ferre
debuit: fecit idem quod viginti annis ante apud nos
fecerat Coriolanus. His adiutor contra patriam inven-
tus est nemo; itaque mortem sibi uterque conscivit.
Qua re talis improborum consensio non modo excu- 43

satione amicitiae tegenda non est, sed potius supplicio
omni vindicanda est, ut ne quis concessum putet ami-
cum vel bellum patriae inferentem sequi. Quod quidem,
ut res ire coepit, haud scio an aliquando futurum sit:
mihi autem non minori curae est, qualis res publica
post mortem meam futura sit, quam qualis hodie sit.

44 XIII. Haec igitur prima lex amicitiae sanciatur, ut
ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta
faciamus, ne exspectemus quidem dum rogemur, stu-
dium semper adsit, cunctatio absit, consilium verum
dare audeamus libere, plurimum in amicitia amicorum
bene suadentium valeat auctoritas, eaque et adhibeatur
ad monendum non modo aperte, sed etiam acriter, si
45 res postulabit, et adhibitae pareatur. Nam quibusdam,
quos audio sapientes habitos in Graecia, placuisse opi-
nor mirabilia quaedam — sed nihil est, quod illi non
persequantur argutiis — partim fugiendas esse nimias
amicitias, ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro
pluribus; satis superque esse sibi suarum cuique rerum,
alienis nimis implicari molestum esse; commodissimum
esse quam laxissimas habenas habere amicitiae, quas
vel adducas cum velis vel remittas; caput enim esse
ad beate vivendum securitatem, qua frui non possit
46 animus, si tamquam parturiat unus pro pluribus. Alios
autem dicere aiunt multo etiam inhumanius, quem
locum breviter paulo ante perstrinxi, praesidi adiu-
mentique causa, non benevolentiae neque caritatis
amicitias esse expetendas: itaque ut quisque minimum
firmitatis haberet minimumque virium, ita amicitias
appetere maxime: ex eo fieri ut mulierculae magis am-
icitiarum praesidia quaerant quam viri, et inopes quam
47 opulenti, et calamitosi quam ei qui putentur beati. O

praeclaram sapientiam! Solem enim e mundo tollere videntur ei, qui amicitiam e vita tollunt, qua nihil a dis immortalibus melius habemus, nihil iucundius. Quae est enim ista securitas? Specie quidem blanda, sed reapse multis locis repudianda. Neque enim est consentaneum ullam honestam rem actionemve, ne sollicitus sis, aut non suscipere aut susceptam deponere. Quod si curam fugimus, virtus fugienda est, quae necesse est cum aliqua cura res sibi contrarias aspernetur atque oderit, ut bonitas malitiam, temperantia libidinem, ignaviam fortitudo. Itaque videas rebus iniustis iustos maxime dolere, imbellibus fortis, flagitiosis modestos. Ergo hoc proprium est animi bene constituti, et laetari bonis rebus et dolere contrariis.
Quam ob rem si cadit in sapientem animi dolor, qui 48
profecto cadit, nisi ex eius animo exstirpatam humanitatem arbitramur, quae causa est cur amicitiam funditus tollamus e vita, ne aliquas propter eam suscipiamus molestias? Quid enim interest motu animi sublato, non dico inter pecudem et hominem, sed inter hominem et truncum aut saxum aut quidvis generis eiusdem? Neque enim sunt isti audiendi, qui virtutem duram et quasi ferream esse quandam volunt: quae quidem est cum multis in rebus tum in amicitia tenera atque tractabilis, ut et bonis amici quasi diffundatur et incommodis contrahatur. Quam ob rem angor iste, qui pro amico saepe capiendus est, non tantum valet, ut tollat e vita amicitiam, non plus quam ut virtutes, quia non nullas curas et molestias afferunt, repudientur.

XIV. Cum autem contrahat amicitiam, ut supra dixi, si qua significatio virtutis eluceat, ad quam se similis animus applicet et adiungat, id cum contigit,

49 amor exoriatur necesse est. Quid enim tam absurdum
quam delectari multis inanibus rebus, ut honore,
ut gloria, ut aedificio, ut vestitu cultuque corporis:
animante virtute praedito, eo qui vel amare vel, ut
ita dicam, redamare possit, non admodum delectari?
Nihil est enim remuneratione benevolentiae, nihil vicis-
50 situdine studiorum officiorumque iucundius. Quid? si
illud etiam addimus, quod recte addi potest, nihil esse
quod ad se rem ullam tam illiciat et tam trahat quam
ad amicitiam similitudo, concedetur profecto verum
esse, ut bonos boni diligant asciscantque sibi quasi
propinquitate coniunctos atque natura. Nihil est enim
appetentius similium sui nec rapacius quam natura.
Quam ob rem hoc quidem, Fanni et Scaevola, constet,
ut opinor, bonis inter bonos quasi necessariam bene-
volentiam, qui est amicitiae fons a natura constitutus.
Sed eadem bonitas etiam ad multitudinem pertinet.
Non enim est inhumana virtus neque immunis neque
superba, quae etiam populos universos tueri eisque
optime consulere soleat, quod non faceret profecto, si
51 a caritate volgi abhorreret. Atque etiam mihi quidem
videntur, qui utilitatis causa fingunt amicitias, amabilis-
simum nodum amicitiae tollere. Non enim tam utilitas
parta per amicum quam amici amor ipse delectat, tum-
que illud fit, quod ab amico est profectum, iucundum,
si cum studio est profectum, tantumque abest ut amici-
tiae propter indigentiam colantur, ut ei, qui opibus et
copiis maximeque virtute, in qua plurimum est praesidi,
minime alterius indigeant, liberalissimi sint et bene-
ficentissimi. Atque haud sciam an ne opus sit quidem
nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis. Ubi enim studia
nostra viguissent, si numquam consilio, numquam opera

nostra nec domi nec militiae Scipio eguisset? Non
igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam secuta
est.

XV. Non ergo erunt homines deliciis diffluentes 52
audiendi, si quando de amicitia, quam nec usu nec
ratione habent cognitam, disputabunt. Nam quis est,
pro deorum fidem atque hominum! qui velit, ut neque
diligat quemquam nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere
omnibus copiis atque in omnium rerum abundantia
vivere? Haec enim est tyrannorum vita, nimirum in
qua nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis benevolen-
tiae potest esse fiducia, omnia semper suspecta atque
sollicita, nullus locus amicitiae. Quis enim aut eum 53
diligat, quem metuat, aut eum, a quo se metui putet?
Coluntur tamen simulatione dumtaxat ad tempus. Quod
si forte, ut fit plerumque, ceciderint, tum intellegitur
quam fuerint inopes amicorum. Quod Tarquinium
dixisse ferunt, tum exsulantem se intellexisse, quos
fidos amicos habuisset, quos infidos, cum iam neutris
gratiam referre posset. Quamquam miror, illa superbia 54
et importunitate si quemquam amicum habere potuit.
Atque ut huius, quem dixi, mores veros amicos parare
non potuerunt, sic multorum opes praepotentium ex-
cludunt amicitias fidelis. Non enim solum ipsa fortuna
caeca est, sed eos etiam plerumque efficit caecos, quos
complexa est. Itaque efferuntur fere fastidio et contu-
macia, nec quicquam insipiente fortunato intolerabilius
fieri potest. Atque hoc quidem videre licet, eos, qui
antea commodis fuerint moribus, imperio potestate
prosperis rebus immutari, sperni ab eis veteres amici-
tias, indulgeri novis. Quid autem stultius quam, cum 55
plurimum copiis facultatibus opibus possint, cetera

parare, quae parantur pecunia, equos famulos vestem egregiam vasa pretiosa: amicos non parare, optimam et pulcherrimam vitae, ut ita dicam, supellectilem? Etenim cetera cum parant, cui parent nesciunt nec cuius causa laborent; eius enim est istorum quidque qui vicit viribus; amicitiarum sua cuique permanet stabilis et certa possessio, ut etiam si illa maneant, quae sunt quasi dona fortunae, tamen vita inculta et deserta ab amicis non possit esse iucunda. Sed haec hactenus.

56 XVI. Constituendi autem sunt, qui sint in amicitia fines et quasi termini diligendi. De quibus tris video sententias ferri, quarum nullam probo: unam, ut eodem modo erga amicum affecti simus quo erga nosmet ipsos; alteram, ut nostra in amicos benevolentia illorum erga nos benevolentiae pariter aequaliterque respondeat; tertiam, ut, quanti quisque se ipse facit, tanti fiat ab
57 amicis. Harum trium sententiarum nulli prorsus assentior. Nec enim illa prima vera est, ut, quem ad modum in se quisque, sic in amicum sit animatus. Quam multa enim, quae nostra causa numquam faceremus, facimus causa amicorum! Precari ab indigno, supplicare, tum acerbius in aliquem invehi insectarique vehementius, quae in nostris rebus non satis honeste, in amicorum fiunt honestissime; multaeque res sunt, in quibus de suis commodis viri boni multa detrahunt detrahique patiuntur, ut eis amici potius quam ipsi
58 fruantur. Altera sententia est, quae definit amicitiam paribus officiis ac voluntatibus. Hoc quidem est nimis exigue et exiliter ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum. Divitior mihi et affluentior videtur esse vera amicitia nec observare

restricte ne plus reddat quam acceperit: neque enim verendum est ne quid excidat aut ne quid in terram defluat aut ne plus aequo quid in amicitiam congeratur.
Tertius vero ille finis deterrimus, ut, quanti quisque se 59
ipse faciat, tanti fiat ab amicis. Saepe enim in quibusdam aut animus abiectior est aut spes amplificandae fortunae fractior. Non est igitur amici talem esse in eum, qualis ille in se est, sed potius eniti et efficere, ut amici iacentem animum excitet inducatque spem cogitationemque meliorem. Alius igitur finis verae amicitiae constituendus est, si prius, quid maxime reprehendere Scipio solitus sit, dixero. Negabat ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse reperiri quam eius, qui dixisset ita amare oportere, ut si aliquando esset osurus; nec vero se adduci posse, ut hoc, quem ad modum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum crederet, qui sapiens habitus esset unus e septem; impuri cuiusdam aut ambitiosi aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis esse sententiam. Quonam enim modo quisquam amicus esse poterit ei, cui se putabit inimicum esse posse? Quin etiam necesse erit cupere et optare ut quam saepissime peccet amicus, quo pluris det sibi tamquam ansas ad reprehendendum: rursum autem recte factis commodisque amicorum necesse erit angi dolere invidere. Qua re hoc 60
quidem praeceptum, cuiuscumque est, ad tollendam amicitiam valet: illud potius praecipiendum fuit, ut eam diligentiam adhiberemus in amicitiis comparandis, ut ne quando amare inciperemus eum, quem aliquando odisse possemus. Quin etiam si minus felices in diligendo fuissemus, ferendum id Scipio potius quam inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum putabat.

XVII. His igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut, cum 61

emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum consiliorum voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas, ut etiam si qua fortuna acciderit ut minus iustae amicorum voluntates adiuvandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne summa turpitudo sequatur; est enim quatenus amicitiae dari venia possit. Nec vero neglegenda est fama, nec mediocre telum ad res gerendas existimare oportet benevolentiam civium, quam blanditiis et assentando colligere turpe est: virtus, quam
62 sequitur caritas, minime repudianda est. Sed — saepe enim redeo ad Scipionem, cuius omnis sermo erat de amicitia — querebatur quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent: capras et ovis quot quisque haberet dicere posse, amicos quot haberet non posse dicere; et in illis quidem parandis adhibere curam, in amicis diligendis neglegentis esse nec habere quasi signa quaedam et notas, quibus eos, qui ad amicitiam essent idonei, iudicarent. Sunt igitur firmi et stabiles et constantes eligendi, cuius generis est magna penuria; et iudicare difficile est sane nisi expertum, experiendum autem est in ipsa amicitia: ita praecurrit amicitia
63 iudicium tollitque experiendi potestatem. Est igitur prudentis sustinere ut cursum, sic impetum benevolentiae, quo utamur, quasi equis temptatis sic amicitia, aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum. Quidam saepe in parva pecunia perspiciuntur quam sint leves; quidam autem, quos parva movere non potuit, cognoscuntur in magna. Sin vero erunt aliqui reperti qui pecuniam praeferre amicitiae sordidum existiment, ubi eos inveniemus, qui honores magistratus imperia potestates opes amicitiae non anteponant, ut, cum ex altera

parte proposita haec sint, ex altera ius amicitiae, non multo illa malint? Imbecilla enim est natura ad contemnendam potentiam: quam etiam si neglecta amicitia consecuti sint, obscuratum iri arbitrantur, quia non sine
magna causa sit neglecta amicitia. Itaque verae ami- 64
citiae difficillime reperiuntur in eis, qui in honoribus reque publica versantur. Ubi enim istum invenias, qui honorem amici anteponat suo? Quid? haec ut omittam, quam graves, quam difficiles plerisque videntur calamitatum societates, ad quas non est facile inventu qui descendant. Quamquam Ennius recte:

amicus certus in re incerta cernitur;

tamen haec duo levitatis et infirmitatis plerosque convincunt, aut si in bonis rebus contemnunt aut in malis deserunt. Qui igitur utraque in re gravem constantem stabilem se in amicitia praestiterit, hunc ex maxime raro genere hominum iudicare debemus et paene divino.

XVIII. Firmamentum autem stabilitatis constan- 65
tiaeque est eius quam in amicitia quaerimus fides. Nihil est enim stabile, quod infidum est. Simplicem praeterea et communem et consentientem, id est, qui rebus isdem moveatur, elegi par est; quae omnia pertinent ad fidelitatem. Neque enim fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium et tortuosum, neque vero, qui non isdem rebus movetur naturaque consentit, aut fidus aut stabilis potest esse. Addendum eodem est, ut ne criminibus aut inferendis delectetur aut credat oblatis, quae pertinent omnia ad eam, quam iam dudum tracto, constantiam. Ita fit verum illud, quod initio dixi, amicitiam nisi inter bonos esse non posse. Est enim

boni viri, quem eundem sapientem licet dicere, haec duo tenere in amicitia: primum, ne quid fictum sit neve simulatum; aperte enim vel odisse magis ingenui est quam fronte occultare sententiam: deinde non solum ab aliquo allatas criminationes repellere, sed ne ipsum quidem esse suspiciosum, semper aliquid existimantem
66 ab amico esse violatum. Accedat huc suavitas quaedam oportet sermonum atque morum, haudquaquam mediocre condimentum amicitiae. Tristitia autem et in omni re severitas habet illa quidem gravitatem, sed amicitia remissior esse debet et liberior et dulcior et ad omnem comitatem facilitatemque proclivior.

67 XIX. Exsistit autem hoc loco quaedam quaestio subdifficilis, num quando amici novi, digni amicitia, veteribus sint anteponendi, ut equis vetulis teneros anteponere solemus: indigna homine dubitatio; non enim debent esse amicitiarum, sicut aliarum rerum, satietates; veterrima quaeque, ut ea vina quae vetustatem ferunt, esse debent suavissima, verumque illud est, quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse,
68 ut amicitiae munus expletum sit. Novitates autem, si spem afferunt, ut tamquam in herbis non fallacibus fructus appareat, non sunt illae quidem repudiandae, vetustas tamen suo loco conservanda; maxima est enim vis vetustatis et consuetudinis. Ipso equo, cuius modo feci mentionem, si nulla res impediat, nemo est quin eo, quo consuevit, libentius utatur quam intractato et novo; nec vero in hoc, quod est animal, sed in eis etiam, quae sunt inanima, consuetudo valet, cum locis ipsis delectemur, montuosis etiam et silvestribus, in quibus diutius commorati sumus.

69 Sed maximum est in amicitia superiorem parem

esse inferiori. Saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege. Numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis. Q. vero Maximum fratrem, egregium virum omnino, sibi nequaquam parem, quod is anteibat aetate, tamquam superiorem colebat suosque omnis per se posse esse ampliores volebat. Quod faciendum imitandumque 70
est omnibus, ut, si quam praestantiam virtutis ingeni fortunae consecuti sunt, impertiant ea suis communicentque cum proximis; ut, si parentibus nati sint humilibus, si propinquos habeant imbecilliore vel animo vel fortuna, eorum augeant opes eisque honori sint et dignitati: ut in fabulis, qui aliquamdiu propter ignorationem stirpis et generis in famulatu fuerunt, cum cogniti sunt et aut deorum aut regum filii inventi, retinent tamen caritatem in pastores, quos patres multos annos esse duxerunt. Quod est multo profecto magis in veris patribus certisque faciendum. Fructus enim ingeni et virtutis omnisque praestantiae tum maximus capitur, cum in proximum quemque confertur.

XX. Ut igitur ei, qui sunt in amicitiae coniunctionis- 71
que necessitudine superiores, exaequare se cum inferioribus debent, sic inferiores non dolere se a suis aut ingenio aut fortuna aut dignitate superari. Quorum plerique aut queruntur semper aliquid aut etiam exprobrant, eoque magis, si habere se putant quod officiose et amice et cum labore aliquo suo factum queant dicere: odiosum sane genus hominum officia exprobrantium, quae meminisse debet is, in quem collata sunt, non commemorare qui contulit. Quam ob rem, ut ei, qui 72
superiores sunt, submittere se debent in amicitia, sic

quodam modo inferiores extollere. Sunt enim quidam, qui molestas amicitias faciunt, cum ipsi se contemni putant: quod non fere contingit nisi eis, qui etiam contemnendos se arbitrantur, qui hac opinione non modo
73 verbis, sed etiam opere levandi sunt. Tantum autem cuique tribuendum, primum quantum ipse efficere possis, deinde etiam quantum ille, quem diligas atque adiuves, sustinere. Non enim neque tu possis, quamvis excellas, omnis tuos ad honores amplissimos perducere, ut Scipio P. Rupilium potuit consulem efficere, fratrem eius Lucium non potuit. Quod si etiam possis quidvis deferre ad alterum, videndum est tamen quid ille possit
74 sustinere. Omnino amicitiae corroboratis iam confirmatisque et ingeniis et aetatibus iudicandae sunt, nec, si qui ineunte aetate venandi aut pilae studiosi fuerunt, eos habere necessarios, quos tum eodem studio praeditos dilexerunt. Isto enim modo nutrices et paedagogi iure vetustatis plurimum benevolentiae postulabunt. Qui neglegendi quidem non sunt, sed alio quodam modo aestimandi: aliter amicitiae stabiles permanere non possunt. Disparis enim mores disparia studia sequuntur, quorum dissimilitudo dissociat amicitias, nec ob aliam causam ullam boni improbis, improbi bonis amici esse non possunt, nisi quod tanta est inter eos, quanta maxima potest esse, morum studiorumque dis-
75 tantia. Recte etiam praecipi potest in amicitiis, ne intemperata quaedam benevolentia, quod persaepe fit, impediat magnas utilitates amicorum. Nec enim, ut ad fabulas redeam, Troiam Neoptolemus capere potuisset, si Lycomeden, apud quem erat educatus, multis cum lacrimis iter suum impedientem audire voluisset. Et saepe incidunt magnae res, ut discedendum sit ab

amicis: quas qui impedire volt, quod desiderium non facile ferat, is et infirmus est mollisque natura et ob eam ipsam causam in amicitia parum iustus. Atque in 76
omni re considerandum est, et quid postules ab amico, et quid patiare a te impetrari.

XXI. Est etiam quaedam calamitas in amicitiis dimittendis non numquam necessaria: iam enim a sapientium familiaritatibus ad volgaris amicitias oratio nostra delabitur. Erumpunt saepe vitia amicorum tum in ipsos amicos, tum in alienos, quorum tamen ad amicos redundet infamia. Tales igitur amicitiae sunt remissione usus eluendae et, ut Catonem dicere audivi, dissuendae magis quam discindendae, nisi quaedam admodum intolerabilis iniuria exarserit, ut neque rectum neque honestum sit nec fieri possit ut non statim alienatio disiunctioque facienda sit. Sin autem aut morum 77
aut studiorum commutatio quaedam, ut fieri solet, facta erit, aut in rei publicae partibus dissensio intercesserit — loquor enim iam, ut paulo ante dixi, non de sapientium, sed de communibus amicitiis — cavendum erit ne non solum amicitiae depositae, sed etiam inimicitiae susceptae videantur. Nihil enim est turpius quam cum eo bellum gerere, quocum familiariter vixeris. Ab amicitia Q. Pompei meo nomine se removerat, ut scitis, Scipio; propter dissensionem autem, quae erat in re publica, alienatus est a collega nostro Metello: utrumque egit graviter ac temperate et offensione animi non acerba. Quam ob rem primum danda opera est ne 78
qua amicorum discidia fiant: sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut exstinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae esse videantur. Cavendum vero ne etiam in gravis inimicitias convertant se amicitiae, ex quibus iurgia maledicta

contumeliae gignuntur. Quae tamen si tolerabiles erunt, ferendae sunt et hic honos veteri amicitiae tribuendus, ut is in culpa sit qui faciat, non is qui patiatur, iniuriam.

Omnino omnium horum vitiorum atque incommodo-
rum una cautio est atque una provisio, ut ne nimis
79 cito diligere incipiant neve non dignos. Digni autem
sunt amicitia, quibus in ipsis inest causa cur diligantur:
rarum genus; et quidem omnia praeclara rara, nec
quicquam difficilius quam reperire quod sit omni ex
parte in suo genere perfectum. Sed plerique neque in
rebus humanis quicquam bonum norunt nisi quod
fructuosum sit, et amicos tamquam pecudes eos potis-
simum diligunt, ex quibus sperant se maximum fructum
80 esse capturos. Ita pulcherrima illa et maxime naturali
carent amicitia per se et propter se expetita, nec ipsi
sibi exemplo sunt, haec vis amicitiae et qualis et quanta
sit; ipse enim se quisque diligit, non ut aliquam a se
ipse mercedem exigat caritatis suae, sed quod per se
quisque sibi carus est; quod nisi idem in amicitiam
transferetur, verus amicus numquam reperietur: est
81 enim is, qui est tamquam alter idem. Quod si hoc
apparet in bestiis volucribus nantibus agrestibus, cicuri-
bus feris, primum ut se ipsae diligant, id enim pariter
cum omni animante nascitur, deinde ut requirant atque
appetant ad quas se applicent eiusdem generis animantis,
idque faciant cum desiderio et cum quadam similitudine
amoris humani, quanto id magis in homine fit natura,
qui et se ipse diligit et alterum anquirit, cuius animum
ita cum suo misceat, ut efficiat paene unum ex duobus!

82 XXII. Sed plerique perverse, ne dicam impudenter,
habere talem amicum volunt, quales ipsi esse non pos-

sunt, quaeque ipsi non tribuunt amicis, haec ab eis
desiderant. Par est autem primum ipsum esse virum
bonum, tum alterum similem sui quaerere. In talibus
ea, quam iam dudum tractamus, stabilitas amicitiae
confirmari potest, cum homines benevolentia coniuncti
primum cupiditatibus eis quibus ceteri serviunt impera-
bunt, deinde aequitate iustitiaque gaudebunt omniaque
alter pro altero suscipiet neque quicquam umquam nisi
honestum et rectum alter ab altero postulabit, neque
solum colent inter se ac diligent, sed etiam verebuntur.
Nam maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit, qui ex ea
tollit verecundiam. Itaque in eis perniciosus est error, 8
qui existimant libidinum peccatorumque omnium patere
in amicitia licentiam. Virtutum amicitia adiutrix a
natura data est, non vitiorum comes, ut, quoniam soli-
taria non posset virtus ad ea quae summa sunt per-
venire, coniuncta et consociata cum altera perveniret.
Quae si quos inter societas aut est aut fuit aut futura
est, eorum est habendus ad summum naturae bonum
optimus beatissimusque comitatus. Haec est, inquam, 8
societas, in qua omnia insunt, quae putant homines
expetenda, honestas gloria tranquillitas animi atque
iucunditas, ut et, cum haec adsint, beata vita sit, et
sine his esse non possit. Quod cum optimum maxi-
mumque sit, si id volumus adipisci, virtuti opera danda
est, sine qua nec amicitiam neque ullam rem expetendam
consequi possumus: ea vero neglecta qui se amicos
habere arbitrantur, tum se denique errasse sentiunt,
cum eos gravis aliquis casus experiri cogit. Quocirca, 8
dicendum est enim saepius, cum iudicaris, diligere
oportet; non, cum dilexeris, iudicare. Sed cum multis
in rebus neglegentia plectimur, tum maxime in amicis

et diligendis et colendis; praeposteris enim utimur
consiliis et acta agimus, quod vetamur vetere proverbio.
Nam, implicati ultro et citro vel usu diuturno vel etiam
officiis, repente in medio cursu amicitias exorta aliqua
86 offensione disrumpimus; (XXIII) quo etiam magis
vituperanda est rei maxime necessariae tanta incuria.
Una est enim amicitia in rebus humanis, de cuius
utilitate omnes uno ore consentiunt; quamquam a
multis virtus ipsa contemnitur et venditatio quaedam
atque ostentatio esse dicitur; multi divitias despiciunt,
quos parvo contentos tenuis victus cultusque delectat;
honores vero, quorum cupiditate quidam inflammantur,
quam multi ita contemnunt, ut nihil inanius, nihil esse
levius existiment! Itemque cetera, quae quibusdam
admirabilia videntur, permulti sunt qui pro nihilo putent.
De amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt, et ei qui ad
rem publicam se contulerunt, et ei qui rerum cognitione
doctrinaque delectantur, et ei qui suum negotium
gerunt otiosi, postremo ei qui se totos tradiderunt
voluptatibus, sine amicitia vitam esse nullam, si modo
87 velint aliqua ex parte liberaliter vivere. Serpit enim
nescio quo modo per omnium vitas amicitia nec ullam
aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui.
Quin etiam si quis asperitate ea est et immanitate
naturae, congressus ut hominum fugiat atque oderit,
qualem fuisse Athenis Timonen nescio quem accepimus,
tamen is pati non possit, ut non anquirat aliquem, apud
quem evomat virus acerbitatis suae. Atque hoc max-
ime iudicaretur, si quid tale possit contingere, ut aliquis
nos deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleret et in
solitudine uspiam collocaret atque ibi, suppeditans
omnium rerum, quas natura desiderat, abundantiam et

copiam, hominis omnino aspiciendi potestatem eriperet. Quis tam esset ferreus qui eam vitam ferre posset cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo? Verum ergo illud est, quod a Tarentino Archyta, 88
ut opinor, dici solitum nostros senes commemorare audivi ab aliis senibus auditum: si quis in caelum ascendisset naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore, quae iucundissima fuisset, si aliquem cui narraret habuisset. Sic natura solitarium nihil amat semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum adnititur, quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est.

XXIV. Sed cum tot signis eadem natura declaret quid velit anquirat desideret, tamen obsurdescimus nescio quo modo nec ea, quae ab ea monemur, audimus. Est enim varius et multiplex usus amicitiae multaeque causae suspicionum offensionumque dantur, quas tum evitare, tum elevare, tum ferre sapientis est. Una illa subeunda est offensio, ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur: nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benevole fiunt. Sed nescio quo modo verum est, quod in Andria fami- 89
liaris meus dicit:

obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.

Molesta veritas, siquidem ex ea nascitur odium, quod est venenum amicitiae, sed obsequium multo molestius, quod peccatis indulgens praecipitem amicum ferri sinit; maxima autem culpa in eo, qui et veritatem aspernatur et in fraudem obsequio impellitur. Omni igitur hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est, primum ut monitio acerbitate, deinde ut obiurgatio contumelia careat. In

obsequio autem, quoniam Terentiano verbo lubenter
utimur, comitas adsit, assentatio vitiorum adiutrix procul
amoveatur, quae non modo amico, sed ne libero quidem
digna est; aliter enim cum tyranno, aliter cum amico
90 vivitur. Cuius autem aures clausae veritati sunt, ut ab
amico verum audire nequeat, huius salus desperanda est.
Scitum est enim illud Catonis, ut multa: melius de
quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri, quam eos amicos,
qui dulces videantur; illos verum saepe dicere, hos
numquam. Atque illud absurdum, quod ei, qui monen-
tur, eam molestiam quam debent capere non capiunt,
eam capiunt qua debent vacare. Peccasse enim se
non anguntur, obiurgari moleste ferunt; quod contra
oportebat delicto dolere, correctione gaudere.

91 XXV. Ut igitur et monere et moneri proprium est
verae amicitiae, et alterum libere facere, non aspere,
alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter, sic haben-
dum est nullam in amicitiis pestem esse maiorem, quam
adulationem blanditiam assentationem: quamvis enim
multis nominibus est hoc vitium notandum levium
hominum atque fallacium, ad voluptatem loquentium
92 omnia, nihil ad veritatem. Cum autem omnium rerum
simulatio vitiosa est, tollit enim iudicium veri idque
adulterat, tum amicitiae repugnat maxime; delet enim
veritatem, sine qua nomen amicitiae valere non potest.
Nam cum amicitiae vis sit in eo, ut unus quasi animus
fiat ex pluribus; qui id fieri poterit, si ne in uno quidem
quoque unus animus erit idemque semper, sed varius
93 commutabilis multiplex? Quid enim potest esse tam
flexibile, tam devium, quam animus eius, qui ad alterius
non modo sensum ac voluntatem, sed etiam voltum atque
nutum convertitur?

Negat quis, nego; ait, aio; postremo imperavi egomet mihi omnia assentari,

ut ait idem Terentius, sed ille in Gnathonis persona;
quod amici genus adhibere omnino levitatis est. Multi 94
autem Gnathonum similes, cum sint loco fortuna fama
superiores, quorum est assentatio molesta, cum ad
vanitatem accessit auctoritas. Secerni autem blandus 95
amicus a vero et internosci tam potest adhibita dili-
gentia, quam omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque
veris. Contio, quae ex imperitissimis constat, tamen
iudicare solet, quid intersit inter popularem, id est
assentatorem et levem civem, et inter constantem et
verum et gravem. Quibus blanditiis C. Papirius nuper 96
influebat in auris contionis, cum ferret legem de tribunis
plebis reficiendis! Dissuasimus nos: sed nihil de me,
de Scipione dicam libentius. Quanta illi, di immortales,
fuit gravitas, quanta in oratione maiestas! ut facile
ducem populi Romani, non comitem diceres. Sed
affuistis, et est in manibus oratio. Itaque lex popularis
suffragiis populi repudiata est. Atque, ut ad me re-
deam, meministis Q. Maximo fratre Scipionis et L.
Mancino consulibus, quam popularis lex de sacerdotiis
C. Licini Crassi videbatur; cooptatio enim collegiorum
ad populi beneficium transferebatur. Atque is primus
instituit in forum versus agere cum populo. Tamen
illius vendibilem orationem religio deorum immortalium
nobis defendentibus facile vincebat. Atque id actum
est praetore me, quinquennio ante quam consul sum
factus. Ita re magis quam summa auctoritate causa
illa defensa est.

XXVI. Quod si in scena, id est in contione, in qua 97

rebus fictis et adumbratis loci plurimum est, tamen verum valet, si modo id patefactum et illustratum est, quid in amicitia fieri oportet, quae tota veritate perpenditur? In qua nisi, ut dicitur, apertum pectus videas tuumque ostendas, nihil fidum, nihil exploratum habeas, ne amare quidem aut amari, cum id quam vere fiat ignores. Quamquam ista assentatio, quamvis perniciosa sit, nocere tamen nemini potest nisi ei, qui eam recipit atque ea delectatur. Ita fit ut is assentatoribus patefaciat auris suas maxime, qui ipse sibi assentetur et se
98 maxime ipse delectet. Omnino est amans sui virtus; optime enim se ipsa novit quamque amabilis sit intellegit: ego autem non de virtute nunc loquor, sed de virtutis opinione. Virtute enim ipsa non tam multi praediti esse quam videri volunt. Hos delectat assentatio, his fictus ad ipsorum voluntatem sermo cum adhibetur, orationem illam vanam testimonium esse laudum suarum putant. Nulla est igitur haec amicitia, cum alter verum audire non volt, alter ad mentiendum paratus est. Nec parasitorum in comoediis assentatio faceta nobis videretur, nisi essent milites gloriosi.

Magnas vero agere gratias Thais mihi?

Satis erat respondere 'magnas.' 'Ingentis,' inquit. Semper auget assentator id, quod is, cuius ad voluntatem
99 dicitur, volt esse magnum. Quam ob rem, quamquam blanda ista vanitas apud eos valet, qui ipsi illam adlectant et invitant, tamen etiam graviores constantioresque admonendi sunt, ut animadvertant ne callida assentatione capiantur. Aperte enim adulantem nemo non videt, nisi qui admodum est excors: callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet, studiose cavendum est. Nec

enim facillime agnoscitur, quippe qui etiam adversando saepe assentetur et litigare se simulans blandiatur atque ad extremum det manus vincique se patiatur, ut is, qui illusus sit, plus vidisse videatur. Quid autem turpius quam illudi? Quod ut ne accidat magis cavendum est:

ut me hodie ante omnis comicos stultos senes
versaris atque illusseris lautissime!

Haec enim etiam in fabulis stultissima persona est 100
improvidorum et credulorum senum. Sed nescio quo pacto ab amicitiis perfectorum hominum, id est sapientium — de hac dico sapientia, quae videtur in hominem cadere posse — ad levis amicitias defluxit oratio. Quam ob rem ad illa prima redeamus eaque ipsa concludamus aliquando.

XXVII. Virtus, inquam, C. Fanni, et tu, Q. Muci, et conciliat amicitias et conservat. In ea est enim convenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia: quae cum se extulit et ostendit suum lumen et idem aspexit agnovitque in alio, ad id se admovet vicissimque accipit illud, quod in altero est, ex quo exardescit sive amor sive amicitia. Utrumque enim ductum est ab amando; amare autem nihil est aliud nisi eum ipsum diligere quem ames, nulla indigentia, nulla utilitate quaesita: quae tamen ipsa ecflorescit ex amicitia, etiam
si tu eam minus secutus sis. Hac nos adulescentes 101
benevolentia senes illos, L. Paulum, M. Catonem, C. Gallum, P. Nasicam, Ti. Gracchum Scipionis nostri socerum dileximus: haec etiam magis elucet inter aequalis, ut inter me et Scipionem, L. Furium, P. Rupilium, Sp. Mummium: vicissim autem senes in adulescentium

caritate acquiescimus, ut in vestra, ut in Q. Tuberonis;
equidem etiam admodum adulescentis P. Rutili, A.
Vergini familiaritate delector. Quoniamque ita ratio
comparata est vitae naturaeque nostrae, ut alia aetas
oriatur, maxime quidem optandum est ut cum aequali-
bus possis, quibuscum tamquam e carceribus emissus
102 sis, cum isdem ad calcem, ut dicitur, pervenire. Sed
quoniam res humanae fragiles caducaeque sunt, semper
aliqui anquirendi sunt quos diligamus et a quibus dili-
gamur: caritate enim benevolentiaque sublata omnis
est e vita sublata iucunditas. Mihi quidem Scipio,
quamquam est subito ereptus, vivit tamen semperque
vivet: virtutem enim amavi illius viri, quae exstincta
non est. Nec mihi soli versatur ante oculos, qui illam
semper in manibus habui, sed etiam posteris erit clara
et insignis. Nemo umquam animo aut spe maiora sus-
cipiet qui sibi non illius memoriam atque imaginem
103 proponendam putet. Equidem ex omnibus rebus,
quas mihi aut fortuna aut natura tribuit, nihil habeo
quod cum amicitia Scipionis possim comparare. In
hac mihi de re publica consensus, in hac rerum priva-
tarum consilium, in eadem requies plena oblectationis
fuit. Numquam illum ne minima quidem re offendi,
quod quidem senserim, nihil audivi ex eo ipse quod
nollem; una domus erat, idem victus isque commu-
nis, neque solum militia, sed etiam peregrinationes
104 rusticationesque communes. Nam quid ego de studiis
dicam cognoscendi semper aliquid atque discendi, in
quibus remoti ab oculis populi omne otiosum tempus
contrivimus? Quarum rerum recordatio et memoria
si una cum illo occidisset, desiderium coniunctissimi
atque amantissimi viri ferre nullo modo possem. Sed

nec illa exstincta sunt aluntarque potius et augentur cogitatione et memoria mea, et, si illis plane orbatus essem, magnum tamen affert mihi aetas ipsa solacium: diutius enim iam in hoc desiderio esse non possum; omnia autem brevia tolerabilia esse debent, etiam si magna sunt.

Haec habui de amicitia quae dicerem; vos autem hortor ut ita virtutem locetis, sine qua amicitia esse non potest, ut ea excepta nihil amicitia praestabilius putetis.

NOTES TO LAELIUS.

LAELIUS DE AMICITIA (LAELIUS ON FRIENDSHIP). The main title is settled by Cicero's own words in *De Officiis* 2, 9, 31 *sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est qui inscribitur Laelius.*[1] There are reasons, however, for supposing that the author intended the treatise to bear also the secondary title, DE AMICITIA. In § 5, addressing Atticus, he says *ut tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic hoc libro ad amicum amicissimus scripsi de amicitia.* In like manner the Cato Maior, thus designated in *De Off.* 1, 42, 151, and in *Ad Att.* 14, 21, 3, is described in *De Div.* 2, 1, 3 as *liber is quem...de senectute.*[2] So the MSS. give to the *Brutus*, called by this name in *De Div.* 2, 1, 4, the second title *De Claris Oratoribus.* Such double titles were not uncommon. They are frequently found in ancient citations of Plato's works and in MSS.; *e. g.* Φίληβος, περὶ τἀγαθοῦ. Varro also wrote a great number of books, called *libri logistorici,* which took their first titles from the names of persons, their second titles from their subject-matter. We may fairly conclude then that the proper complete title of the dialogue is LAELIUS DE AMICITIA.

PRELIMINARY: DEDICATION TO ATTICUS. §§ 1–5.

For summary see Introd. pp. viii., ix.

P. 1.—1. Q. Mucius ... C. Laelio: see Introd. pp. vi., vii. —— **memoriter**: not 'by heart' or 'from memory' but 'with good memory',

[1] By some editors, however, the last three words are regarded as spurious.
[2] See Cato Maior, p. 37.

like μνημονικῶς (Xen. Cyr. 5, 3, 46). Madvig is right in saying (on Fin. 1, 34) *semper hoc vocabulum laudem habet bonae et copiosae memoriae.* —— **nec dubitare** : = *et (solebat) non dubitare.* See note on Cato Maior, 16 *non dubitavit dicere.* —— **sapientem**: see Introd. p. vii. —— **ita eram deductus** etc.: 'had been introduced to Scaevola with this design, that etc.' For this sense of *deducere*, to introduce a young man to a master or guardian, cf. Cael. 9 *ut huic virilem togam dedit... hunc a patre continuo ad me esse deductum.* It was a common practice to attach youths for a time to the society of distinguished jurists or orators; see Tac. Dial. 34; Quint. 12, 11, 6. —— **Scaevolam** : but above (line 1) Q. Mucius, in both cases the same person; Lahmeyer quotes similar changes from Cic. Dom. 115; Sall. Iug. 27, 4; Nep. Hamilc. 1, 3 and 5. —— **virili toga**: called also *toga pura* (as in Att. 7, 8, 5) to distinguish it from the *toga praetexta*, sometimes called merely *praetexta*, the purple-bordered robe worn at Rome by magistrates and children. The toga of the ordinary adult citizen was not dyed. The *toga virilis* was generally assumed at the beginning of the seventeenth year. See Becker's Gallus, Excursus 1, Scene 8. —— **quoad possem et liceret**: cf. Lucr. 2, 850 *quoad licet ac possis;* Cic. Leg. Agr. 2, 19 *quoad posset, quoad fas esset, quoad liceret.* —— **a senis ...discederem**: an exaggerated expression, as in Balb. 5 *accusator fatetur hunc numquam a Memmio discessisse;* Liv. 37, 53, 18 *numquam a consule abscessi.* —— **ab eo...disputata**: Cic. sometimes allows *disputare* in the active to govern an accusative of a neuter pronoun, in place of the usual constr., *de* with abl. In his use of the passive he is more free; thus he says in De Or. 1, 22 *re quaesita et disputata,* though he would hardly say *rem disputare* for *de re disputare.* Cf. 4. —— **prudentia** : this word usually implies not wisdom in general but skill in some special subject; here Roman Law; cf. *prudens in iure* in 6. —— **pontificem Scaevolam**: Q. Mucius Scaevola, Pontifex Maximus, was a relative of Scaevola the Augur. He was a man of exalted character and great abilities both as a jurist and as an orator. He is said to have been the first Roman who wrote a systematic treatise on the Civil Law, and his work on that subject, in eighteen books, had great influence on succeeding jurists. He was consul in 95 B. C., and having been proscribed by the party of Marius lost his life in a riot, B. C. 82. —— **me...contuli**: contrast this with *a patre deductus eram* above. —— **unum...praestantissimum**: this emphatic use of *unus* with the superlative is common in Cic., *e.g.* Tusc. 2, 64; 4, 55;

5, 66; so Verg. Aen. 2, 426 *cadit et Rhipeus iustissimus unus*, and Homer, Il. 12, 243 *εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος*. For the gen. *nostrae civitatis* cf. Tusc. 3, 81 *unum omnium maximum*. The strengthening force of *unus* is also seen in the common phrases *quivis unus*, *quilibet unus*, *unus aliquis*, *unus quisque*. See Kennedy, Gram., 34, vi. A), *b*; Madvig, 310, Obs. 2; G. 317; H. 444, 3.[1] —— **sed de hoc alias**: *sc. dicam;* in the best writers *alias* is always equivalent to *alio tempore*, never to *alio modo*.

2. cum saepe multa, tum etc.: there is a change of construction (anacoluthon) which leaves the clause *cum saepe multa* incomplete; something like *eum dicere* must be supplied. As regards the tense used with *memini*, if the person who recalls an event was a witness of it, he may either (*a*) vividly picture to himself the event and its attendant circumstances so that it becomes really present to his mind's eye for the moment, in which case he uses the present infinitive, or (*b*) he may simply recall the fact that the event did take place in past time, in which case the perfect infinitive is used. If he was not a witness, he evidently can conceive of the event only in the latter of these two ways. As regards (*a*) cf. Verg. Ecl. 9, 52 *longos cantando puerum memini me condere soles* with Georg. 4, 125 *memini me Corycium vidisse senem*. See Roby, 1372; A. 288, *b*; G. 277, Rem.; H. 537, 1. —— **hemicyclio**: a large semicircular bench, not a part of the household furniture, but placed outside in the grounds, and used for conversations, or lessons, the shape enabling the company to see each other's faces. So, at the outset of the discussion in the Academica (1, 14), Cic. says *omnes in conspectu consedimus*. —— **admodum**: qualifies *pauci*, as in Tusc. 4, 6 *nulla fere sunt aut pauca admodum Latina monumenta*, though Cic. nearly always says *admodum pauci* rather than *pauci admodum;* cf. Tusc. 2, 11; Top. 3; N. D. 3, 69; Leg. 3, 32; Phil. 3, 36 and 14, 27. In 16 we have *gratum admodum*. In sense, *admodum* corresponds with our phrase 'to a degree'. See n. on C. M. 46. —— **eum sermonem qui**: = *sermonem de ea re quae...*, like *is timor* = *timor eius rei*, common in Livy. So below, 3 *eam mentionem* = *eius rei mentionem*. Cf. 88 *illam admirationem*, and n. on 38 *ex hoc numero*. —— **tum fere**: 'just about that time'; *fere* nearly always modifies the word which immediately precedes, and is

[1] A. = Allen and Greenough's Grammar; G. = Gildersleeve's Grammar; H. = Harkness' Grammar, 'Standard' Edition; C. M. = Cato Maior. In referring to the works of Cicero the number of the section, not the chapter, is given.

often joined with expressions relating to time, when the time is not fixed with absolute exactness. So Cic. Rep. 2, 56 *decem fere annis;* Pis. 13 *quinta fere hora;* Caes. B. G. 4, 23, 1 *tertia fere vigilia.* The Greek expressions *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὡς εἰπεῖν* (which have a verbal resemblance to the Latin phrase *ut ita dicam*, but do not resemble it in meaning) correspond very closely to *fere.* —— **multis erat in ore:** Cic. uses both constructions, *esse in ore alicui* and *esse in ore alicuius.* —— **P. Sulpicio:** Sulpicius was originally on the side of the aristocracy, but being plebeian tribune in 88 B. C. he became a tool of Marius and proposed some revolutionary laws. His former friend Pompeius was consul and vigorously opposed him. In a fight the son of Pompeius was slain; afterwards Sulla entered the city with an army and Sulpicius was killed. —— **utebare multum:** 'you were much in the society of...' —— **tribunus:** See A. 184; G. 324; H. 363, 3, 2). —— **capitali odio:** 'deadly hatred'. The same phrase occurs in a fragm. of Cic. (Baiter, XIII. 1, 2); cf. also Hor. Sat. 1, 7, 13 *ira capitalis.* —— **quocum:** so 15 and 77, but in 22 *quicum. Quocum* is commonly used when some particular and specified person is meant, as here and 15, *quicum* when the statement is general and the person undefined, as in 22. The MSS., however, vary so much between the two forms that it is often difficult to decide concerning them. —— **querella:** the spelling *querella* seems better attested than *querela.* Cf. Roby, 177, 2.

3. eam ... mentionem: see n. on 2 *eum sermonem.* The reference is of course to the fact that Sulpicius had turned against his former friend. This led Scaevola to the general subject of friendship.

P. 2. — C. Fannio: see Introd. C. is an abbreviation for GAIUS, not CAIUS, the latter form of the name having been absolutely unknown to the Romans of the Republic and early Empire. It appears in an inscription (Vol. III. No. 1178 of Mommsen's Corpus) of the time of Caracalla. On the other hand, it is not uncommon to find in modern books the abbreviation written G. instead of C. (*e. g.* in Gerlach's edition of Sallust throughout, and occasionally in R. Ellis' Catullus; so Kühner, Gram. 1, ed. 2, p. 708 '*C. oder G. Gaius*'). But the Romans always wrote C. not G. In very early times the Latin alphabet contained no letter G, and the letter C represented two distinct sounds, the guttural tenuis and the guttural media. After the introduction of G the Romans still kept up the old fashion of writing C. for Gaius and Cn. for Gnaeus; so they wrote K. for Caeso. See

Wordsworth, Fragments and Specimens of Early Latin, Ch. 2, 4; also Peile, Introd. to Gk. and Lat. Etymology, p. 336 (ed. 3). —— **Africani**: see Introd. p. iv. —— **sententias**: 'the opinions expressed in the discussion', *i. e.* their purport, not the actual words. —— **exposui arbitratu meo**: 'have rendered at my own discretion'. Like very many other nouns whose stems end in *-u*, *arbitratus* scarcely appears except in the ablative singular. The other cases of the sing. are supplied by the corresponding cases of *arbitrium*, and even in the ablative *arbitrio* is commoner than *arbitratu*. —— **quasi ... loquentis**: 'I have exhibited them as speaking in person, if I may say so'. *Quasi* modifies the too strong expression *ipsos;* cf. 27, 55, 6. On *loquentis* see A. 292, *e*; G. 536; H. 535, I. 4. A modern writer would hardly have thought it necessary to indicate that the interlocutors cannot actually appear in person. —— **ne 'inquam'** etc.: this is directly and closely imitated from the introduction to Plato's Theaetetus, p. 142, a dialogue Cic. imitates elsewhere, as in De Or. 3, 47; Tusc. 1, 8. —— **coram**: adverb here, as it is generally throughout the Republican and Augustan Latin. The prepositional use occurs in two passages of Cicero, Pis. 12 *mihi vero ipsi coram genero meo quae dicere ausus es*, and Fam. 13, 6 A, 1, and in one or two of Nepos; but Tacitus is the only writer who uses the word freely as a preposition.

4. cum enim etc.: the triple repetition of *cum* in this sentence seems careless and inelegant, but passages of the sort are not uncommon in Cic. —— **mecum ageres**: 'pleaded with me'; so *tecum agere* in 16; *agere cum populo* in 96. —— **scriberem aliquid**: so C. M. 2 *cum de senectute vellem aliquid scribere*. —— **feci ... ut prodessem**: a roundabout way of saying *profui*. The constr. is a favorite one with Cic.; cf. Vat. 21 *invitus facio ut recorder;* cf. C. M. 42 *invitus feci* and n. Cic. often gives as his reason for writing the desire to serve his countrymen; so Acad. 1, 11; Div. 2, 5; Off. 2, 2. —— **Catone maiore**: see Intr. to C. M. p. ix. —— **qui est ... senectute**: which I dedicated to you ...; cf. C. M. 3; Fin. 1, 8; Div. 2, 3; Att. 8, 12, 6 *Demetri Magnetis librum quem ad te misit de concordia*. For the collocation of the words cf. Tusc. 4, 66 *eam rationem quae ... malis;* also De Or. 2, 61 *libri qui sunt fere inscripti de*. —— **induxi ... persona**: both words are connected with the stage. *Inducere* is literally 'to bring upon the boards' (cf. 59): *persona* properly means a mask, here 'a type of character' as we say. See n. on C. M. 3 *facimus admirantis;* also cf. Lael. 93, 100, and for the general sense of the passage Att. 13, 19,

5 *haec Academica, ut scis, cum Catulo Lucullo Hortensio contuleram. Sane in personas non cadebant;* ib. 13, 16, 1 *ecce tuae litterae de Varrone. Nemini visa est aptior* 'Αντιοχεία *ratio.* —— **loqueretur**: Cic. very frequently uses *loqui* (but not *dicere*) when the subject is an abstract noun, as here *persona* practically is. So Fin. 2, 48 *consuetudo loquitur;* ib. 4, 41 *institutio hominis si loqueretur;* Acad. 2, 101 *conclusio loquitur.* For the mood see n. on *dissereret* below. —— **floruisset**: at first sight this seems a reference to the physical and mental powers for which Cato was famous in advanced age. Cic., however, does not use *florere* in the sense of *vigere;* Nauck therefore is probably right in supposing the word to refer to the general worldly prosperity of Cato, indicated in C. M. 8. On the subjunctive see A. 320, *e*; G. 636; H. 517. —— **maxime memorabilem**: superlatives from adjectives in *-bilis* are rare. In 51 we have *amabilissimum;* Cato has *stabilissimus,* Columella *mirabilissimum,* and *mobilissimus* is common; these are all the instances which appear until post-Augustan times. Several adjectives of this class, as *laudabilis, probabilis, flebilis,* have comparatives, but no superlatives, in pre-Classical or Classical Latin. —— **disputata**: it is not necessary to supply *esse* so as to make this a case of the perfect infinitive after *meminisset. Disputare aliquid* (cf. n. on 1) often means not 'to discuss an opinion', but 'to put an opinion forward in discussion', and so to defend or maintain it. —— **dissereret**: A. 320, *f*; G. 633; H. 503, II. 2. —— **meminisset**: A. 342; G. 631; H. 529, II. —— **genus hoc sermonum**: = *sermones huius generis;* cf. 12 *quo de genere mortis;* 93 *quod genus amici.* —— **positum**: A. 290, *a*; G. 669; H. 549, 1. —— **hominum veterum**: 'men of the olden time'. —— **et eorum**: introduced for sake of emphasis. G. 293, Rem. 2; H. 451, 2. —— **nescio quo pacto**: 'somehow'. See A. 334, *e*; G. 469, Rem. 2; H. 529, 5, 3). —— **mea**: *sc. scripta,* as in Acad. 1, 8 *nihil magno opere meorum miror.*

5. senem senex: at the time the Cato Maior was written Atticus was 65 and Cic. 62. Note the fondness of Cic. as well as of other Latins for bringing into juxtaposition different cases of the same word. So De Or. 2, 310 *rebus res* and Lucr. 1, 359 *res rebus;* cf. also below, 25 *iustitiam iustissimo.* See A. 344, *g*; G. 683; H. 563. —— **hoc libro**: this corresponds to *tum* above; *nunc* would have been more formally correct; so below *tum ... nunc. Liber* is put in the abl. without *in* when the whole book is referred to, with *in* when

reference is made to some particular passage. Roby, 1177; G. 385, Rem.; H. 425, 2, n. 1. With *hoc libro* here cf. C. M. 54 *in eo libro.* —— **scripsi de amicitia**: it is not often that Cic. leaves out the object after *scribere;* above in 4 *aliquid* is added. Sometimes a qualifying adverb takes the place of the object, as Att. 9, 15, 5 *quod scribis me asperius quam mei patiantur mores de Dionysio scripsisse.* Here the phrase *ad amicum amicissimus* softens the construction. Cf. however Fam. 9, 16, 1; 14, 2, 4. —— **senior...excellens**: notice the order of the phrases, *sapiens* corresponding with *prudentior*, and *senior* with *amicitiae gloria excellens;* an instance of chiasmus. —— **tu velim...avertas**: on *velim* see A. 311, *b*; G. 250; H. 486, I. n. 1. When Cic. uses the subjunctive construction after *volo* he nearly always leaves out *ut*, as here. A. 331, *f*, Rem.; G. 546, Rem. 3; H. 499, 2. The subject of the dependent verb, if expressed, always precedes the words *velim*, *vellem*, *malim* and the like, as in the present passage; cf. also Tusc. 5, 20 *nos vellem praemio elicere possemus*, and Fam. 15, 3, 2. —— **Laelium...putes**: the omission of a conjunction to connect two clauses is particularly common in Cic. when two clauses are contrasted, as here and below, *ab his sermo oritur, respondet Laelius;* cf. 49, 69; 13, 19, 22, 90.

P. 8. — **disputatio**: here not 'discussion', but merely 'discourse'; cf. De Or. 2, 233 *disputes quid sentias;* also n. on 4. —— **te ipse cognosces**: 'you will recognize your own likeness'. Cf. 10, *me ipse consolor;* also 59, 80. In these places *ipse*, not *ipsum*, is put for emphasis, because there is an implied contrast between the subject of the verb and other persons, so that *ipse* = καὶ αὐτός; here 'you yourself, as well as others'. Cf. C. M. 4 *a se ipsi* and n. A. 195, *h*; G. 298; H. 452, 1.

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For summary see Introd. p. ix.

6. sunt ista: 'what you say is true'; *sunt ista* (ἔστι ταῦτα) and *sunt ista vera* are almost equivalent expressions. The phrases *esto* ('be it granted') and *verum esto* are frequently interchanged, as in Cic. Flacc. 71, 72, 95. —— **existimare...existimant**: the repetition is a mark of careless writing. —— **oculos...coniectos**: the cause is given at the end of 7. —— **hoc**: *i. e. ut sapiens et appellaretur et existimaretur.* For the tense of *tribuebatur* see n. on 37 *videbamus.*

—— **modo**: 'a little while since'; the expression is somewhat loose since Cato died in 149 B.C.; cf. the use of *nuper* in 13, 24. Cf. n. on C. M. 27. —— **L. Acilium**: supposed to be the person mentioned by Cic. Leg. 2, 59 as a commentator on the XII tables, and probably a contemporary of Cato. By some he is thought to be the person named by Liv. 40, 31, 1 as commander of the left wing of the Roman army at the battle of Aebura in 181 B.C. Some read in our passage *L. Atilius*, a name about which nothing is known. —— **uterque**: *sc. sapiens appellatus est* or *habuit hoc nomen sapientis.* —— **alio quodam modo**: 'in a somewhat different way'; supply in thought *atque tu.* Cf. 25 *aliud quoddam;* 7 and 74 *alio quodam modo. Quidam* (like *quasi* in 3) is often used to indicate that the word to which it is attached does not actually represent the writer's meaning. In the passages quoted above *quodam*, *quoddam* etc. indicate that *alio*, *aliud* etc. are too strong for Cicero's meaning. On the other hand, in 29, 45, 75, 59 the parts of *quidam* used show that Cicero cannot find terms strong enough, and that the terms used are only make-shifts. The indefinite τὶς is used in the same two ways in Greek. —— **prudens in iure**: Seyffert rightly points out that Cic. does not use *prudens* with a genitive. The phrase *iuris prudens* (for *iuris peritus* or *consultus*) is not Latin, though *iuris prudentia* occurs, as in De Or. 1, 256, and though jurisconsults are styled *prudentes.* Cic. has *imprudens* with gen. in De Inv. 2, 95, also *prudens ad* in pro Font. 43; and *prudentia* often both with gen. and with *in* and abl. See Holland, Jurisprudence, page 2, with notes and references. —— **multarum rerum usum**: 'a manifold experience'. Liv. 39, 40, 4 says of him *nulla ars neque privatae neque publicae rei gerendae ei defuit.* —— **multa eius ... ferebantur**: 'many instances where both in the senate and in the forum he displayed either wise foresight, or firm conduct, or shrewdness in reply, were on every tongue'. The chief reference in *responsa* is to Cato's fame as a lawyer. According to old Roman custom he sat at home in the early morning, on purpose to resolve the legal difficulties of all who chose to consult him. This was technically called *ius respondere.* —— **quasi**: 'almost'; cf. n. on 3. —— **iam**: *i. e.* even before his death. —— **sapientis**: the Latins said *nomen iustitiae, vox fortitudinis, appellatio prudentis* etc. where we use apposition—'the name justice', 'the word courage', 'the title skilful'. A. 214, *f*; G. 359; H. 396, VI. Cf. 92 *nomen amicitiae*, and for the sense C. M. 5 *sapientiam ... cognomine!* Note that the same term

cognomen is applied to the inherited third name *Cato* and to the acquired name *sapiens*. In late Latin *agnomen* was applied to the latter to mark the distinction.

7. te ... esse sapientem: this clause was intended to depend on *existimant* below, but owing to the great length of the sentence Cic. made a pause at *iudicatum*, and repeated the gist of the sentence down to that point in the words *hanc ... sapientiam*, which depend on *existimant*. The sentence is an example of anacoluthon. —— **non solum ... doctrina**: here *natura* denotes the intellectual endowments with which a man is born, and *mores* his natural character; cf. 27. *Studium* or devotion to the pursuit of learning depends on *mores*, *doctrina* or attainment on this combined with *natura*. The two words *natura* and *mores* together comprise the natural endowments of a man, while *studium* and *doctrina* indicate his acquirements. Cf. Acad. 1, 20; Arch. 15. *Studio et doctrina* 'by devotion and culture'; not a case of hendiadys. Cf. n. on C. M. 15 *iuventute et viribus*; De Or. 1, 22; Arch. 3. —— **reliqua**: this word is proleptic or anticipative, since its sense is not fully seen till we come to *Athenis* which completes the contrast. So *ceterus* is often used, and λοιπός, ἄλλος in Greek. —— **septem**: 'the seven', *sapientes* being understood, as in 59. So XII alone often stands for XII *tabulae* (Leg. 2, 59, 60), and Asinius Pollio has (in Cic. Fam. 10, 32, 2) XIV for XIV *ordines*. —— **subtilius**: 'with more than usual accuracy'. *Subtilis* is often the exact equivalent of the Greek ἀκριβής. —— **non habent**: Cic. in Off. 3, 16 denies the title *sapiens* not only to the seven, but to Cato and to Laelius himself. —— **unum**: emphatic: 'one only', *i. e.* Socrates. Cic. nearly always leaves the English 'only' unexpressed, but occasionally he uses *modo*, and once (Acad. 2, 74) *tantum*. —— **et eum quidem**: these words add emphasis to *sapientissimum*; cf. 4 *et eorum* and n. —— **Apollinis ... iudicatum**: Socrates in Plato's Apology, p. 21 A merely says that the oracle declared that no one was wiser than himself (μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι). The person who put the inquiry to the oracle, Chaerephon, a pupil of Socrates, was dead when the trial took place, but his brother bore evidence to the facts. Xenophon in his Apology, § 14 (if it be his) makes Socrates speak more definitely about the oracles — ἀνεῖλεν ὁ Ἀπόλλων μηδένα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἐμοῦ μήτε ἐλευθεριώτερον μήτε δικαιότερον μήτε σωφρονέστερον. In another part of the Apology by Plato (33 C) Socrates says that the life he followed

had been enjoined on him by the Delphian god καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων. The Scholiast on Aristophanes' Nubes 114 gives there the actual words of the answer to Chaerephon: σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς, σοφώτερος δ' Εὐριπίδης, ἀνδρῶν δ' ἁπάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτερος. The latter of the two lines is also preserved by Diogenes Laertius 2, 5, § 37. Cic. speaks in four other passages of the oracle, viz. Lael. 10 and 13, Cat. M. 78, Academ. 1, 16. —— **omnia...esse**: the Stoic doctrine is here hinted at, that virtue is the only thing deserving the name of good, and that the happiness of the truly wise man is absolutely unaffected by external circumstances. People were curious to see whether Laelius would try to carry out his philosophy, and to appear careless about the death of his friend. Cf. n. on C. M. 4 *qui...petunt* —— **virtute inferiores**: 'of less importance than virtue'. This (see preceding n.) is not strong enough to express the Stoic doctrine. —— **credo**: merely parenthetic, and without influence on the construction. The verb to be supplied for this clause is *quaerunt*, not *quaerere*. —— **hoc**: 'our friend here'; so 32. —— **quonam pacto**: lit. 'on what conditions', *pactum* (*paciscor*) being properly something agreed on between two persons. The phrase came to be used in exactly the same sense as *quonam modo;* cf. 4 *nescio quo pacto* with 89 *nescio quo modo.* —— **eoque magis**: *sc. quaerunt.* The sentence from *quod* onwards is explanatory of *eo*, which is the ablative of excess dependent on *magis.* —— **proximis**: 'the last'. *Proximus* is used both of the future and of the past. Occasionally a word is inserted to define the meaning more nearly, as Fam. 1, 9, 20 *proximis superioribus diebus;* Tac. A. 1, 77 *proximo priore anno*, and also when *proximus* is used of space, as Cic. Orat. 216 *proximum superiorem pedem;* N. D. 2, 53 *proximum inferiorem orbem.* —— **Bruti**: D. Iunius Brutus, surnamed Gallaecus from his conquest of the Gallaeci, consul in 138 B.C. He appears as augur only in our passage. —— **commentandi causa**: 'with a view to practice', *i. e.* in the augural art. *Commentari* is properly 'to con over a lesson', μελετᾶν. For the custom cf. Cic. Div. 1, 90 *divinant Magi qui congregantur in fano commentandi causa atque inter se colloquendi, quod etiam idem vos quondam facere Nonis solebatis.* As the augurs required for their practice an open space whence they could get an uninterrupted view of the sky they usually met in some gentleman's park (*horti*) outside the city: cf. N. D. 2, 11. —— **qui ...solitus esses**: 'though you had been accustomed'. For this

use of the subj. with *qui*, to express an idea contrasting with, or opposed to that of the preceding clause or sentence, cf. Brut. 127 *hic, qui in collegio sacerdotum esset, iudicio publico est condemnatus.* Cf. A. 326; G. 637; H. 515, III.

8. **C. Laeli**: the addition of the *praenomen*, not usual in familiar conversation, gives formality to the address: cf. 100. —— **animum adverti**: *animum advertere* and *animadvertere* (cf. 27) differ very little in use and not at all in sense. *Animum advertere* is said to be necessary when the construction *ad aliquid* (to turn the mind to something) follows. —— **cum ... amicissimi**: the natural order would have been *viri cum summi tum amicissimi.* A word however which (like *viri* here) stands in the same relation towards two other words or phrases, is often placed thus between the two. The old grammarians called this usage *coniunctio;* cf. Cornificius Ad Herennium 4, 38 *coniunctio est cum interpositione verbi et superiores orationis partes comprehenduntur et inferiores, hoc modo: Formae dignitas aut morbo deflorescit aut vetustate.* G. 682; H. 564, I. II. —— **moderate**: the Stoics, whom Laelius followed, declared all emotion vicious, and therefore not to be entertained by the philosopher either to a moderate or to an immoderate extent; see Tusc. Book 4, particularly § 42 *nihil interest utrum moderatas perturbationes approbent an moderatam iniustitiam, moderatam ignaviam, moderatam intemperantiam.* —— **nec ... tuae**: 'and that to be so (*id*) did not accord with your cultured spirit'. *Humanitas* corresponds in sense almost exactly with our 'culture', *i. e.* education when accompanied by its best fruits, gentleness and refinement.

P. 4. — **quod** etc.: A. 333, *a*; G. 525, Rem. 2; H. 540, IV. —— **collegio**: *i. e.* of augurs. —— **valetudinem**: not to be translated by 'ill-health' or 'sickness', but simply by 'health', the English word being just as undefined as the Latin, which receives its definition from the context; cf. 22. —— **maestitiam**: this is the right spelling, not *moestitiam;* so *maestus* not *moestus, maereo* not *moereo.* —— **recte ... et vere**: *sc. respondeas.* —— **officio**: corresponds to *munus* as *usurpavi* does to *obire. Usurpare* is to say or do something habitually or repeatedly, here 'to perform regularly'. Cf. 28. —— **incommodo**: note the slightness of the expression, as applied to the death of a very dear friend, and cf. n. on 10. —— **constanti homini**: 'a man of strong character'. *Constans homo* (Horace's *iustus ac tenax propositi vir*) is opposed to *mobilis* in Qu. Rosc. 49;

cf. Lael. 64 *constantem, stabilem.* *Constantia* (often coupled with *gravitas, fides* and the like) formed an important part of the character of the ideal Roman. Cic. complains (Flacc. 36) *nullam constantiam in Graecis hominibus esse.* —— **contingere**: here distinctly used of bad fortune, though the old traditional distinction between *contingere* on the one hand and *accidere, evenire* on the other required the word to be used of good fortune only. See n. on C. M. 8.

9. tribui: *i. e.* by people in general. —— **agnosco**: *sc. mihi tribui.* Nägelsbach Stilistik § 114 supplies *tanquam debitum mihi.* —— **facis amice**: a polite expression of thanks, like *bene facis* in Acad. 1, 25. —— **ut videris**: for the personal construction taking the place of the impersonal *ut videtur,* cf. Att. 5, 18, 2 *consiliis, ut videmur, bonis utimur.* The usage is somewhat uncommon. —— **nemo**: the Stoics attached such superhuman excellencies to their σοφός or *sapiens,* that doubts were often expressed whether such a person ever existed in the flesh. Cf. 18 and Tusc. 2, 51 *in quo vero erit perfecta sapientia, quem adhuc nos quidem vidimus neminem.* —— **si quisquam**: like the parenthesis commonly used in Greek, εἰ καί τις ἄλλος. So in Latin sometimes *si quisquam alius,* as in Brut. 126. —— **fili**: cf. C. M. 12 and 84. He was *praetor designatus* when he died and had served with distinction against Perseus, under L. Aemilius Paulus, whose daughter he had married (C. M. 15). On the form of the gen. see A. 40, *b*; G. 29, Rem. 1; H. 51, 5. —— **memineram Paulum, videram Gallum**: *sc. mortem filiorum ferre.* Where *memini* is thus used with the accus. of a person there is an ellipsis of an infinitive; cf. De Or. 3, 133 *meminerant illi Sextum Aelium; M'. vero Manilium nos etiam vidimus.* Paulus (Macedonicus) lost two sons, one immediately before, the other immediately after, his great triumph in 168 B. C. Cf. Fam. 4, 6, 1 *L. Paulus duos septem diebus* (*sc. filios amisit*); C. M. 68 with n. C. Sulpicius Gallus served as *tribunus militum* under Paulus, and was consul 157 B. C. He was famous as an astronomer, and was the first Roman who predicted an eclipse (Liv. 44, 37). —— **sed hi**: *sc. mortem filiorum,* or rather *talem casum tulerunt.* —— **in pueris**: literally 'in the case of boys'. Trans. 'but their sons were boys, while Cato's was, etc.'. —— **perfecto**: this seems here merely to mean 'adult' in opposition to *pueris.*

10. cave...ne...quidem: Cic. here treats *cave* as a negative verb. He frequently follows up negative words with negative, where in English we should use affirmative, expressions; thus *ne...quidem*

strengthens the negation. A. 209, *a*, 1; G. 444; H. 553, 2. For the subjunctive following *cave* see Roby, Gram. 1584, 1608; Kennedy, 197; A. 269, *a*, 3, 331, *f*, Rem.; G. 264, II., 548, 2; H. 489, 2), 499, 2. —— **huius facta, illius dicta**: on *huius* and *illius* see A. 102, *a*; G. 292, Rem. 1; H. 450, 2, n. In *facta*...*dicta* we have the contrast between the life of action, the πρακτικὸς βίος, which the Romans regarded as the only proper life for a man of rank, and the literary or contemplative life, the θεωρητικὸς βίος. The Romans looked on all departments of thought and literature as graceful adjuncts to a life of activity, but nothing more. Cf. n. on 16 *sumus otiosi*. —— **negem**: See G. 598, Rem. 2; H. 509, n. 2. —— **quam id recte**: see n. on C. M. 15. —— **viderint sapientes**: 'how far I am right is for the wise men to consider'. The literal rendering of *viderint* would be 'shall by and by consider', *viderint* being probably not perfect subjunctive, but future perfect indicative. Phrases like this are thoroughly discussed by Roby, Gr., Vol. II. Preface, p. cvi., and § 1593. By *sapientes* no doubt the Stoics are meant, who taught that men ought to be entirely unaffected by any emotions, either of pain or of pleasure. —— **moveor enim**: supply *desiderio* from the preceding sentence. —— **confirmare**: the sense is rather stronger than that of *affirmare*. —— **me ipse**: cf. n. on 5 *te ipse*. —— **decessu**: abl. of cause and time. —— **nihil mali etc.**: the same opinion is expounded at length in Tusc. Disp., Book 1; cf. especially § 111. See also the reflections on the death of Hortensius in Brut. § 5, and Fam. 5, 16, 4 *nihil mali et seq*. —— **incommodis**: the word is here pointedly contrasted with *mali*. There is no doubt a slight reference to the Stoic theory of προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα. Although only virtue is *bonum*, only vice *malum* in the eyes of the Stoics, still there are such differences among other things as will incline the wise men to desire some of them (προηγμένα = *sumenda*) and reject others (ἀποπροηγμένα = *reicienda* or *incommoda*), his real happiness, however, remaining absolutely unaffected. Cf. Acad. 1, 36 and 37; see Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, Ch. 10; Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, § 55; Ritter, Hist. of Ancient Philosophy, Book II. Ch. 5. —— **amicum ... se**: to be construed with *amantis*.

11. cum illo ... praeclare: 'who would say that his destiny has not been glorious'; lit. 'that he has not been dealt with (*i. e.* by the gods or fates) splendidly?' Cf. 15; also Academ. 2, 128 *quaeret noster sapiens ut vereatur temere opinari praeclareque agi secum putet*

si veri simile quod sit invenerit; Fam. 5, 18, 1; 4, 5, 2 *cogita quem ad modum adhuc fortuna nobiscum egerit;* 4, 5, 3; 4, 14, 1; 9, 24, 4; Acad. 2, 80; Verr. 3, 70; Sest. 51. —— **immortalitatem**: of the body is probably meant. —— **optare**: used here of a desire for the impossible; *sperare* would have implied that the fulfilment of the wish was possible. Cf. also n. on 18. —— **vellet**: for the tense see A. 308, *a*; G. 599, Rem. 1; H. 510, n. 2. —— **quod . . . esset**: an instance of the restrictive or defining subjunctive; see Kennedy, § 206, 3); Roby, 1692; A. 320, *a*; G. 634; H. 503, I. —— **iam**: strictly belongs to *habuerunt*. The word is often displaced, either, as here, to add emphasis to it (which it gains by being put close to *puero*) or to make the sentence or clause more euphonious. —— **puero**: for this and other references to Scipio's life see Intr. to C. M. pp. xxi,-xxiii. The appositive = a temporal clause, see G. 324; H. 363, 3, 2) —— **adulescens**: this, not *adolescens* (which is the participle of *adolesco*), is the correct spelling.

P. 5. — **factus consul**: some scholars wish, quite unnecessarily, to strike out the word *consul*, on the strength of passages like Mur. 18 *quaesturam una petiit et sum ego factus prior;* Dom. 52 *consulatum ei petere liceret, cum factus esset*... Cf. however Cic. Leg. Agr. 2, 3 *me esse unum ... qui consulatum petierim, cum primum licitum sit, consul factus sim, cum primum petierim.* —— **ante tempus**: see Intr. to C. M. p. xxii. *Tempus* here = the proper or regular time = καιρόν. The legal age was forty-three; Scipio was only thirty-seven. —— **sibi**: a *dativus commodi;* 'as regards himself'; so 34 *amicitiis;* 18 *sapienti.* —— **suo tempore**: a man is said to gain office *suo tempore* when he is elected to the office at the earliest age which the law allows. On *suo* see G. 295, Rem. 1; H. 449, 2. —— **sero**: because the Numantine war had already continued eight years and had proved disastrous to the Romans. See ref. above —— **duabus**: Carthage and Numantia, in B.C. 146 and 133. —— **non modo ... delevit**: it is cf course inaccurate to speak of blotting out something in the future, but the expression has many parallels in every language. *Delere bellum* for the more usual *conficere* or *profligare b.* is found also in Nepos, Alcib. 8, 6. —— **facillimis**: 'most affable'. —— **de pietate ... bonitate**: it is impossible to give general rules for the insertion or omission of the preposition in the second and subsequent places. If, however, the preposition had been repeated here before *liberalitate*, *pietate*, and *bonitate*, each of these qualities would have

stood out with greater prominence and distinctness, would in fact have been more emphasized; cf. n. on 95 *inter*. Scipio gave a legacy to his mother after her divorce (*pietate*), bestowed it after her death upon his sisters (*liberalitate*), and gave to his elder brother property received from his father's estate (*bonitate*). —— **maerore**: *dolor* is grief as felt at the heart, *luctus* as expressed by material signs, in the dress, for instance, *maeror* as expressed by the condition or action of the sufferer, for example by the gloom on his countenance. The following is a striking passage — Att. 12, 28, 2 *maerorem minui, dolorem nec potui nec si possem, vellem*. —— **quid**: adv. acc. —— **potuisset**: A. 310, *a*; G. 594, 3; H. 507, 3, n. 7. —— **memini...disserere**: n. on 2. Laelius and Scipio are two of the interlocutors in the Cato Maior, and Cic. strives artfully here to give an air of reality to the conversation he relates in that dialogue —— **viriditatem**: 'freshness'. For the metaphorical use of the word cf. Verg. Aen. 6, 304 *cruda deo viridisque senectus*; Tac. Agr. 29 *iuventus et quibus cruda ac viridis senectus*; Verg. Aen. 5, 295 *viridique iuventa*. —— **etiam nunc**: even in the best writers *nunc* occasionally goes with a past tense, as Cic. Verr. 3, 47 *quos ego campos antea nitidissimos vidissem, hos ita vastatos nunc videbam ut*... In that passage *tum* would have been ambiguous after *antea*, so in ours *tum* might have been referred by the reader to the time of the conversation between Scipio, Cato, and Laelius; so in Liv. 3, 19, 8. But often the motive is merely the desire to make the narrative vivid, as in Caes. B. G. 7, 62, 6 *incerto nunc etiam exitu...signa intulerunt*; cf. ib. 6, 40, 6; Cic. Cat. 1, 9; Sallust, Iug. 109, 3.

12. vita...gloria: Cic. means that some would look on Scipio's life as merely showing the effect of luck or chance, while others would think of the renown attending it and assume that Scipio deserved it. *Gloria* here implies *virtus*. *Fortuna* and *virtus* are the two important attributes of the Roman general; cf. Pro Balbo 9 (of Pompeius) *in quo uno ita summa fortuna cum summa virtute certavit ut plus homini quam deae tribueretur*; Fam. 10, 3, 2 *virtute duce, comite fortuna*; De Imp. Cn. Pom. 28. For the ablatives see Roby, 1210; A. 253; G. 398; H. 424. —— **accedere**: *sc. vel ad fortunam vel ad gloriam*. ——**moriendi sensum**: *moriendi* is the act or process of dying; *mortis* would have a different meaning and could not be substituted here. Cf. C. M. 74; Phil. 9, 13 *si quis est sensus in morte*. On Scipio's death see Intr. to C. M. p. xxii. —— **quo de genere mortis**:

i. e. death so sudden as his; for the form of expression cf. n. on 4. —— **vere**: there is a loose contrast with *difficile dictu est*, which implies *nihil veri potest dici.* —— **celeberrimos**: not 'most famous' but (literally) 'most attended by crowds', *i. e.* days on which Scipio was the centre of the popular interest. Cf. Reid's n. on Arch. 4. —— **clarissimum**: for the application of *clarus* to things as well as persons, Nägelsbach quotes Div. 2, 85; Att. 6, 1, 22 *clarissimi iuris iurandi.* Notice the emphasis given by the repetition of *diem* from *diebus.* —— **reductus est**: it was the custom in times of excitement for leading statesmen to be escorted to the senate-house from their homes and back again by their admirers. For the escort away from home *deducere* is generally used, for the escort homewards *reducere.* See C. M. 63, where the two words occur together, as they do in Val. Max. 2, 1, 9. For the mood see A. 336, *b*; G. 630, Rem. 1; H. 524, 2, 2). —— **ad vesperum**: with the prepositions *ad*, *sub*, *in*, the accusative of *vesper* is generally used and not that of *vespera.* —— **populo Romano**: simply = *civibus*, the burgesses, as opposed to the *socii* and *Latini.* —— **sociis et Latinis**: these two words must be taken together as forming one member of the enumeration, parallel with *patribus conscriptis* and *populo Romano.* When an enumeration consists of only two members Cicero, except in certain special cases, never omits the copula; when there are three or more members, he either puts *et* before each member after the first or leaves it out altogether. In our passage, if *sociis* and *Latinis* had each of them been entitled to rank separately in the enumeration, it would have been necessary to strike out *et.* Madvig has most thoroughly discussed this matter in a note on Fin. 4, 56 and in Opuscula 1, p. 333 *seq.* The practice of most other writers of the best period agrees on the whole with that of Cicero in this respect. Cf. n. on 84. —— **superos . . . deos . . . inferos**: the word *deos* is purposely not placed immediately after *superos*, in order to prevent the reader from understanding *inferos* to mean *inferos deos.* With this arrangement *superos . . . deos* means, as Seyffert explains it, *superi, qui dei sunt.*

13. nuper: not quite accurate (cf. 24, n. on C. M. 61, also on *modo* in 6) inasmuch as the knowledge of the Greek speculations which denied the soul's existence after death had begun to spread among the educated classes at Rome long before Scipio's death. The reference is chiefly, but not solely, to the Epicureans. Some of the Peripatetics and some also of the new Academics held or at least sometimes

advocated the same views. —— **mortuis ... iura**: the principal 'reverent rites' paid to the dead are mentioned in Cic. Leg. 2, 55 *seq.*; cf. especially 57 *multa religiosa iura.* The passage resembles Tusc. 1, 26 *seq.* —— **si ... arbitrarentur**: cf. Tusc. 1, 27. For the imperfect in *arbitrarentur* and *haereret*, modern feeling would require the pluperfect. Cic. for the moment realizes the past as present, and so looks on the condition as not wholly past but still continuing. The usage is like the substitution of the present for the past, for the sake of vividness, in historical narratives. Often both protasis and apodosis contain a verb in the imperfect where we should expect the pluperfect (*e.g.* Verr. 5, 89; Sest. 63); but it does not often happen that the apodosis has a verb in the pluperfect, while the verb in the protasis stands in the imperfect, as in C. M. 19 *nisi essent...appellassent.* Irregularities of the same sort are common in Greek conditional sentences. A. 308, *a*; G. 599, Rem. 1; H. 510, n. 2. —— **nihil**: adv. acc. with *pertinere;* supply some word referring to *iura* above. —— **ad eos pertinere**: cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1, 10, 3 *δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.* —— **fuerunt**: = *vixerunt.* See n. on C. M. 21 *sunt.* The followers of Pythagoras are meant. —— **nunc quidem**: 'now, I admit'; for the concessive use of *quidem* cf. 74. —— **tum**: some adversative particle (corresponding to *sed autem vero* or the like) would be inserted in any modern language. This adversative asyndeton is especially common in Caesar, as in B. G. 1, 18, 1 *celeriter consilium dimittit, Liscum retinet;* cf. 5, 55, 59, 62.

P. 6. — **vel eius**: in C. M. 78 Cic. appeals just as he does here to the Pythagoreans and to Socrates as authorities for the immortality of the soul. —— **qui**: *sc. dicebat.* —— **non**: supply *quotiens de hac re diceret.* —— **tum hoc tum illud**: the later Academics, particularly Arcesilas and Carneades, professing to follow Socrates, made a practice of arguing on both sides of every question, and declared that certainty was unattainable, though probable conclusions might be formed. They prided themselves on not being obliged to support dogmatically any set of views; while others were in bondage to doctrines, they only were free to put forward 'now this now that'. Cf. Cicero's Academica *passim*, but particularly 2, 134 *tum hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud videtur;* 2, 121 *modo hoc modo illud probabilius videtur;* N. D. 1, 47 *Cotta meus modo hoc modo illud.* Cf. Intr. to C. M. p. ii. —— **ut in plerisque**: cf. n. on 50 *similium sui;* n.

on C. M. 3 *ceteris.* —— **idem semper, animos etc.**: Cic. is thinking of Socrates as he appears in the dialogues of Plato, particularly in the Phaedo, Apology, Phaedrus, and Timaeus. The principal arguments in favor of the soul's immortality which are put into Socrates' mouth in the Phaedo are many times reproduced by Cicero, especially in Tusc. 1, Somn. Scip. and Cato Maior. In the words *esse divinos* and *reditum in caelum patere* Cic. recalls those arguments in favor of the soul's pre-natal existence which the Platonic Socrates usually joins with his arguments for the soul's life after the death of the body. —— **ex corpore**: used for *corporibus*, since in both Greek and Latin, when a number of persons are mentioned and then some one thing common to them all, that thing is often put into the singular, where our idiom would require the plural. Cf. Tusc. 1, 40 *animos, cum e corpore excesserint;* ib. 1, 72 *animorum e corpore excedentium;* C. M. 81; on the other hand, C. M. 80 *animos, dum in corporibus essent* etc. —— **optimoque ... expeditissimum**: cf. Tusc. 1, 40 *seq.*; also Plato, Phaedo 114 B. On the superlative with *quisque* see A. 93, *c*; G. 305; H. 458, 1.

14. praesagiret: on this word cf. Cic. Div. 1, 65 *sagire enim sentire acute est: ex quo sagae anus quia multum scire volunt, et sagaces dicti canes. Is igitur qui ante sagit quam oblata res est dicitur praesagire, id est, futura ante scire.* —— **Philus**: see Introd. p. v. —— **Manilius**: see Introd. p. v. —— **triduum disseruit**: the discourse is represented by Cicero's work *De Re Publica.* —— **de re publica**: 'concerning the commonwealth', *i. e.* the ideal or best form of commonwealth. —— **extremum**: this neuter adj. is used as a noun frequently by Cic. as below, 20; Div. 2, 91 and 103; also by Lucr. 1, 960, Livy, Tacitus, etc. —— **fuit ... de**: 'treated of'. —— **animorum**: the plural where we use the singular, 'the soul', in the abstract sense. *Immortalitas animorum* also occurs in C. M. 78 where see n., Leg. 2, 68; *aeternitas animorum* in Tusc. 1, 80. —— **quae**: as only the last book of the *De Re Publica* (comprising the *Somnium Scipionis*) discussed the immortality of the soul, the neuter *quae* refers not to the whole work, but merely to the *extremum*. *Quod* would have been correct but inelegant. *Quae* is a sort of explanation of *extremum* 'the conclusion, I mean such matters as'. For the plural relative referred to a singular antecedent cf. the not uncommon phrases *ex eo genere quae* (Fin. 3, 70) and *ex eo numero qui* with plural verb (Arch. 31). The usage is frequently found in Greek, as Plato, Rep. 554

A θησαυροποιὸς ἀνὴρ, οὓς δὴ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος. A. 199, *b*; G. 616, 3, 1; H. 445, 5. —— **quiete**: = *somno*, a somewhat poetical usage, but occurring quite frequently in Cicero. —— **visum**: here the neut. participle used as noun, not the accus. of *visus, ūs*. —— **Africano**: *sc. maiore*. —— **id si ita est, ut**: 'if the truth really is, I mean that'. For the explanatory *ut* cf. 70; also the expression *hoc ita necesse est ut*. —— **in morte**: 'upon death'; *i. e.* immediately after death; cf. Lucr. 1, 111 *aeternas quoniam poenas in morte timendumst*, *i. e.* punishments ensuing upon or after death. —— **facillime evolet**: cf. *reditum expeditissimum* above. *Volare* and its compounds *ad- in- e- praetervolare*, with *volitare* are particularly favorite words with Cic.; see many exx. in Nägelsbach, Stilistik § 132, 2. *Evolo* implies very rapid and sudden motion; cf. Brut. 272 *tantos processus faciebat ut evolare non excurrere videretur;* De Or. 2, 209. —— **e custodia**: cf. Somn. Scip. 14 *ei vivunt qui e corporum vinculis tamquam e carcere evolaverunt;* Tusc. 1, 75 *cum illuc ex his vinclis emissi feremur, minus tardabitur cursus animorum;* so ib. 1, 118; De Or. 2, 22. —— **cui censemus**: the form of the question is like that in 24 *quid arbitramur* etc. *Censetis* would have been more usual. Cf. Fin. 5, 50 *quem enim ardorem studi censetis fuisse in Archimede?* —— **maerere ... eventu**: if the ablative follows *doleo, maereo*, the occurrence is regarded as the occasion for the expression of the sorrow; if the accusative, then as the object of the emotion. *Eventu* here = *fato*, as in Verg. Aen. 11, 758 *ducis exemplum eventumque secuti*, and often in Livy and Caesar. —— **illa**: = *haec* of 13. —— **sensu enim amisso** etc.: the idea is followed out in Tusc. 1, 87 *seq.* —— **laetabitur**: 'will exult'; *laetari* is stronger than *gaudere*.

15. actum optime est: n. on 11. —— **fuerat**: the pluperfect stands here where the perfect *fuit* or imperfect *erat* would have been more usual; *fuerat aequius* implies 'it had always been in our eyes more reasonable to expect'. The substitution is quite common in Latin comedy, as Plaut. Trin. 119 *ei rei operam dare te fuerat aliquanto aequius;* Terent. Adelph. 685 *virginem quam te non ius fuerat tangere*. After *introieram*, *in vitam* must be supplied from *de vita* below. —— **videar**: *sc. mihi ipse videar*. —— **quocum**: n. on 2. —— **publica re**: usages like this show that the phrase *res publica* represented to the Romans two words, not one compound word. Cf. Fam. 1, 9, 12 *res ipsa publica;* ib. 1, 8, 4 *rei totius publicae;* Lael. 64 *reque publica; res privatae* and *res publica* are often contrasted as

in Att. 9, 7, 5; ib. 1, 18, 1. Cf. n. on 42. —— **vis**: 'essence'. —— **voluntatum...consensio**: 'the fullest agreement in policy, taste, and opinion'. The word *voluntas* in Cic. frequently means inclination in politics. For the definition of friendship here given cf. 92; also 61 and n. on 20 *omnium...consensio.* —— **commemoravit**: = *praedicavit*, not *recordatus est*; see n. on C. M. 38. —— **falsa praesertim**: briefly put for *praesertim cum falsa sit*; cf. Off. 1, 137 *deforme est de se ipsum praedicare, falsa praesertim*; Tusc. 5, 19 *propriis argumentis tractanda quaeque res est, tanta praesertim.* H. 442. —— **quam quod spero**: if the former construction had been carried on we should have had *quam spes fore* etc. The change, however, is of a sort common with Cicero, as Fin. 3, 25 *sapientia enim et animi magnitudinem complectitur et iustitiam, et ut omnia quae homini accidant infra se esse iudicet.*

P. 7. — **cordi**: 'agreeable'; for a full discussion of the predicative dative and a list of examples see Roby's Gram., Pref. to Vol. 2, pp. xxv–lv. The name 'predicative' seems unsuitable here, for *cordi* is the one dative on the list with regard to which the substitution of the nominative (in the predicative sense) is inconceivable. Cf. 43 *curae*; 70 *honori.* See also A. 233, and foot-note; G. 350; H. 390, I. —— **vix tria** etc.: so Fin. 1, 65 *quod quam magnum sit, fictae veterum fabulae declarant in quibus tam multis tamque variis, ab ultima antiquitate repetitis, tria vix amicorum paria reperiuntur, ut ad Orestem pervenias profectus a Theseo.* The three pairs are Theseus and Pirithous, Achilles and Patroclus, Orestes and Pylades. The friendship of a fourth pair (Damon and Phintias, of whom perhaps Cic. was thinking in our passage), is commented on in Off. 3, 45; cf. Fin. 2, 79. —— **quo in genere**: *sc. amicitiarum*; see n. on C. M. 4. —— **sperare videor...fore**: this clause simply repeats the sense of the words *amicitiae...fore* above. *Videor* = *mihi videor.*

16. ita necesse est: the *ita* is not pleonastic in phrases of this sort, though often so regarded. The sense here is *istuc necesse est, et eo modo quo tu dicis necesse esse.* Cf. Arch. 2 *hoc ita dici.* A number of similar passages are quoted by Madvig on Fin. 2, 17. So in Plato, Philebus 20 D ἐπειδὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως εἶπες —— **sumus otiosi**: the same reason for the discourse is given in Fin. 1, 14 *quoniam nacti te sumus otiosum.* According to Roman feeling it was not considered proper for statesmen to discuss philosophical questions except as a relaxation from more serious business. Cf. the exordia of Academica

I and II and of Fin. III, also n. on Lael. 10 *huius facta.*—— **pergratum**: cf. C. M. 6; Att. 1, 20, 7. —— **soles**: *sc. respondere.* —— **ceteris**: cf. n. on 7 *reliqua.* —— **disputaris**: cf. n. on 1. —— **qualem existimes, quae...des**: these two clauses are explanatory of *quid.* Taking with them the words *de amicitia quid sentias* the whole may be freely rendered, 'your opinion concerning the theory and practice of friendship'. In cc. V–VII, which correspond to *qualem existimes*, Laelius gives his view of the nature and value of friendship; in cc. XI–XXVI he lays down practical rules and maxims concerning it. —— **mihi vero**: this form of emphatic assent is common in Cicero's dialogues; *e.g.* Academica 1, 14; ib. 25; ib. 41. —— **antevertit**: lit. 'turned in front', or 'thrust in front', *i. e.* his request or his speech. Here trans. 'anticipated me'. —— **gratum admodum**: =*pergratum.*

THE DISCOURSE OF LAELIUS ON FRIENDSHIP. §§ 17–104.

(1) *Remarks upon the Nature and Value of Friendship.* 17–25.

For summary see Introd. p. ix.

17. non gravarer: 'would raise no objection'; cf. Cluent. 69 *primo gravari coepit, quod...* —— **praeclara res**: cf. 4 *digna mihi res visa est; praeclara ... otiosi*, chiasmus. —— **quis ego etc.**: for the almost tautological form of the question cf. Acad. 2, 32 *nec vero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid sibi velint;* Nepos, Dat. 6, 6 *cum quid ageretur aut quare fieret ignorarent.* For the sense, cf. Fam. 9, 18, 3 *ipsa illa si quae fuit in me facultas orationis;* Arch. 13 *oratio et facultas.* The word *facultas* implies readiness acquired by practice. —— **doctorum**: here philosophers by profession as in 21; cf. the words below, *eis qui ista profitentur.* —— **eaque**: Nauck rightly remarks that *Graecorum* is a substantive and not merely an epithet of *doctorum;* otherwise Cic. would have written *eorumque* for *eaque.* *Eaque* = καὶ ταῦτα; see n. on 4 *et eorum.* —— **ut eis ... subito**: the practice belonged first to the sophists and rhetoricians, then to the philosophers of the New Academy. Cf. Fin. 2, 1 *sophistae...quorum e numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quaestionem, id est iubere dicere qua de re quis vellet audire. Audax negotium, dicerem impudens, nisi hoc institutum postea translatum ad nostros philosophos esset;*

De Or. 1, 102; ib. 3, 127. —— **quamvis subito**: = *tam subito quam vis.* —— **magnum opus est**: so in De Or. 1, 103 Cicero says of Gorgias *permagnum quidem suscipere ac profiteri videbatur.* For *magnum opus* = a great task, cf. Academ. 2, 121; Tusc. 3, 79 and 84; Orat. 75. —— **quae ... possunt**: this refers to Fannius' words above *de amicitia disputaris.* There is a contrast between *disputari* and *hortari;* Laelius at first declares himself unable to give a scientific and philosophical discussion of friendship; he can only give some practical directions concerning it. —— **censeo petatis**: *petatis* is directly dependent on *censeo, ut* being suppressed, as it often is with *curo, caveo, sinere, hortari,* and many other verbs; cf. n. on 10 *cave.* —— **anteponatis** etc.: for the sense cf. 104. —— **nihil est enim**: note *enim*, third word in the clause; had it stood second *est* would not have been so emphatic. —— **tam naturae aptum**: the phrases *naturae aptus, ad naturam aptus* are common in Cic. (as Fin. 4, 46; Off. 1, 100) and are of Stoic origin. The Stoics defined virtue as being *τῇ φύσει ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, naturae convenienter vivere.* Cf. below 19 *naturam optimam bene vivendi ducem.* —— **vel secundas vel adversas**: so Cic. says of literature (Arch. 16) *secundas res ornant, adversis perfugium ac solacium praebent.*

18. nisi in bonis: 'except in the case of good men'. Cf. 65, where *inter bonos* corresponds to *in bonis* here. —— **neque ... reseco**: 'nor do I probe the question to its roots', *i. e.* the question whether only good men can be friends. The Stoics had declared that only perfect men (*sapientes, σοφοί* or *σπουδαῖοι* = *boni*, since none but the *σοφός* is *σπουδαῖος*) could be friends. So Diog. Laert. 7, 124 *τὴν φιλίαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς σπουδαίοις εἶναι λέγουσι*, and Aristotle Eth. Nic. 8 and 9 *passim;* also Socrates in Xen. Mem. 2, 6, 20. The phrase *ad vivum resecare*, literally 'to cut back to the quick', is here identical in meaning with the *subtilius disserere* that follows, and with the *subtilius quaerere* of 7. —— **sed ad** etc.: *sc. disserunt.* —— **sit ita sane**: this is a common *formula aegre concedentis.* So Academ. 2, 84 *ne sit sane;* ib. 2, 105 *sint falsa sane.* —— **eam ... interpretantur**: *sc. esse* (cf. 50, 64); 'they understand wisdom to be a thing which ...'; *eam* is by attraction for *id.* A. 195, *d*; G. 202, Rem. 5; H. 445, 4. **nemo**: cf. 7 and 9. The leading Greek Stoic philosophers hardly ever ventured to point out any actual person as having attained to wisdom. Posidonius (Diog. 7, 94) seems to have allowed that Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes had made some advance towards

it. Seneca allows Cato the younger to have been really *sapiens*. —— **optantur**: a philosopher who propounds wild theories is often said by Cicero *optare;* cf. Acad. 2, 121 *somnia Democriti non docentis sed optantis;* Tusc. 2, 30 *optare hoc quidem est, non docere;* N. D. 1, 19 *optata magis quam inventa;* Leg. Agr. 1, 1 *cogitata sapientium an optata furiosorum*. Cf. n. on 11.

P. 8. — **C. Fabricium**: C. Fabricius Luscinus, consul in 282 and 278 and censor in 275 B. C., commanded against Pyrrhus, and was famed for his integrity. One of Pyrrhus' suite is said to have made an offer to Fabricius to poison the king; Fabricius merely sent to inform the king that there was a plot against his life. —— **M'. Curium**: see n. on C. M. 15 *Fabricii*. —— **Ti. Coruncanium**: the close friend of Dentatus (see 39); commanded with distinction against the Etruscans in 280 B. C.; in C. M. 27 he is mentioned as one of those *quorum usque ad extremum spiritum est provecta prudentia*. —— **iudicabant**: *esse* omitted as with *interpretantur* above. —— **normam**: 'standard'. —— **sibi habeant**: cf. the formal expression used by a Roman husband in divorcing his wife — *tuas res tibi habeto*. —— **invidiosum et obscurum**: 'arrogant and unintelligible'. —— **concedant ut**: when *concedere* means to give permission to do something it regularly takes *ut* with subjunctive, but when it means to admit a fact it is regularly followed by the accusative with infinitive. The subjoined passage shows the distinction; Rosc. Am. 54 *concedo tibi ut ea praetereas quae, cum taces, nulla esse concedis*. Sometimes, however, Cicero substitutes the subjunctive construction for the infinitive (but not *vice versa*) as in our passage and Fin. 5, 78 *si Stoicis concedis ut virtus sola vitam efficiat beatam*. In such passages the effect of the admission is rather looked to than the admission itself. The meaning here is 'let them make such an admission as to bring it about that these were good men'. —— **sapienti**: a *dativus commodi*.

19. pingui Minerva: 'with our gross wits'. Another form of the proverb is *crassa Minerva;* cf. also Cic. Off. 1, 110 *invità Minerva;* Hor. A. P. 385. *Minerva* in these phrases stands for 'wits' or 'intellect'. The expressions *ut aiunt* (22), *quod aiunt*, or *aiunt* simply (Hor. Sat. 2, 2, 64), also *id quod aiunt* (Terent. Phorm. 506), *ut dicitur* (Lael. 97 and 101), and *quod dicitur* (67) are often inserted parenthetically (like τὸ λεγόμενον) to indicate a proverb. —— **fides ... liberalitas**: these words must be taken in two pairs with a pause

between the two (*i. e.* after *integritas*), in accordance with a fashion exceedingly common in Cicero. *Fides* and *integritas*, loyalty and uprightness, are cognate qualities, as are *aequitas* and *liberalitas*, reasonableness (or fairness) and generosity. Cf. Sest. 1 *eos qui omnia divina et humana violarint vexarint perturbarint everterint*, where the words *violarint vexarint* go together and refer to *divina*, while the last two words refer to *humana*. Other examples will be found in Mayor's n. on Phil. 2, 89. —— **cupiditas libido audacia**: 'passion, caprice, temerity'. Cic. generally (*e. g.* Tusc. 1, 20) translates ἐπιθυμία by *cupiditas* or *cupiditates*. He always uses *audacia* in a bad sense; cf. De Invent. 2, 165 *audacia...vitium est*. Its use in a good sense is very rare in other authors. —— **constantia**: cf. n. on 8 *constanti homini*. —— **ut**: = *quales*. —— **naturam...ducem**: cf. n. on 17. The sentiment is an echo of Stoicism. The Stoics all said that the true life was life according to nature, but they were not agreed as to the meaning of the word nature. Some took it to mean the natural constitution of man; others the constitution of the universe, from which by contemplation the wise man drew his rules of life. With the words of Cicero here cf. Arch. 15 *ego multos* etc. —— **sic**: the adverb here takes the place of an object to *perspicere*, such as *tale aliquid*. —— **mihi perspicere videor**: a modest way of saying *perspicio*. —— **ita**: 'under this condition'; so 1; Tusc. 3, 59 *ea lege nos esse natos ut...* —— **societas**: this is the doctrine of Aristotle in his Politics (1, 1 φύσει ἄνθρωπος πολιτικὸν ζῷον), which Cicero repeats and expands in many passages. Cf. especially Off. 1, 50 and 51, where the different grades of social union are set forth as here; also Acad. 1, 21; Leg. 1, 23 and 61; Fin. 3, 66 and 5, 66. On the doctrine that social and political organization is not the result of agreement or invention, but has its origin in the essential elements of man's nature, see Woolsey, Political Science, Part 2, Ch. 2, especially § 70. —— **ut...accederet**: *sc. nobis*, *nos* or *ad nos* (all three constructions being found with *proxime accedere* in Cicero). Cf. Off. 1, 50 *optime societas hominum coniunctioque servabitur, si ut quisque erit coniunctissimus, ita in eum benignitatis plurimum conferetur;* also for *ut quisque* cf. Verr. 4, 143; Off. 1, 65; and below, 26, 29, 46. —— **alieni**: 'strangers', whether of our own or of any other country. Observe that *alienus* is never used in good Latin with the sense of the English 'alien'. —— **natura ipsa**: *i. e.* nature and nature only; her efforts not having been seconded by those of men. Cf. Arch.

15 *naturae ipsius habitu.* —— **ea**: *sc. amicitia*, not *natura*; *illa* would have been clearer and more usual. —— **hoc**: = *hac re*; 'herein'. —— **propinquitati**: 'relationship', including the relationship of citizen to citizen as well as that of the members of a family one to another. —— **non potest**: Latin idiom requires the repetition of the verb *potest* in the negative clause, where English idiom would omit it. —— **propinquitatis**: for the omitted adversative particle (*sed* or the like) cf. n. on 5 *Laelium ... putes.*

20. res: as in 17. —— **duos**: while *duo* for *duos* is classical (Roby, Vol. 1, p. 442; Kennedy, § 33, V. 4)), the weight of MSS. evidence is in favor of *duos* as the Ciceronian form. —— **iungeretur**: on the tense see A. 287, *a*; G. 511, Rem. 2; H. 495, I. —— **enim**: the conditions of *amicitia* here given are so difficult of fulfilment that they account for the rarity of *caritas* (as above *inter duos aut paucos*), which is the kernel of friendship. —— **omnium ... consensio**: in 15 it is said that the whole pith (*omnis vis*) of friendship lies in the *consensio voluntatum studiorum sententiarum.* In the present passage the objects towards which the *voluntates, studia,* and *sententiae* are to be directed are so described as to include all things in heaven and earth. The division of all things into *res divinae* and *res humanae* belonged to everyday talk and has no reference to any philosophical system. Cf. the title of Varro's greatest work, *Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum*; also Iustin. Inst. 1, 1, 1, definition of *iurisprudentia, divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia.* Compare with this definition of friendship Aristotle, Rhet. 2, 4 ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλεσθαί τινι ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθά, ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτοῦ καὶ τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων. Cf. Eth. Nic. 2, 7, 13. Also Cic. Invent. 2, 166 *amicitia, voluntas erga aliquem rerum bonarum illius ipsius causa quem diligit cum eius pari voluntate*; Planc. 5 *vetus est lex illa iustae veraeque amicitiae ut idem amici semper velint, nec est ullum certius amicitiae vinculum quam consensus et societas consiliorum et voluntatum*; Sallust, Cat. 20 *idem velle atque idem nolle, ea demum firma amicitia est.* Neither in Eth. Nic. Books 8 and 9, nor in Plato's Lysis, is any very exact definition of friendship attempted. —— **benevolentia et caritate**: 'kindliness and affection'. These words are often thus joined, as in Sest. 6; Phil. 2, 107 and 112; Off. 1, 54. Cf. 32 *benevolentiae caritatem. Cum benevolentia et caritate* qualify *consensio.* —— **haud scio an**: in Cic. and the best writers this phrase is affirmative,

meaning 'probably'; in later writers negative, with the sense 'probably not'. See Roby, 2256; A. 210, *f*, Rem.; G. 459, Rem.; H. 529, 3, n. 2. —— **excepta . . . datum**: cf. Plato, Timaeus 47 B *φιλοσοφίας γένος, οὗ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' ἦλθεν οὔθ' ἥξει ποτὲ τῷ θνητῷ γένει δωρηθὲν ἐκ θεῶν*, which Cic. thus turns in his translation, at the end of the fragment of it which is preserved: *quo bono nullum optabilius nullum praestantius neque datum est mortalium generi deorum concessu atque munere neque dabitur.* Cic. frequently imitates the passage, as below, 47; Academica 1, 7; Tusc. 1, 64; Leg. 1, 58. —— **divitias alii etc.**: cf. closely 86. —— **extremum**: *extremum* here = *finis*, in the sense of *finis bonorum* or *summum bonum*. The passage is aimed a Epicurus and his followers who *pecudis et hominis idem bonum censen* (Academ. 1, 6).

P. 9. — caduca et incerta: 'fleeting and unstable'; cf. De Dom. 146 *caduca semper et mobilia.* —— **illi**: *sc. faciunt. Illi*, the Stoics and Peripatetics. —— **nec sine etc.**: cf. 18 *nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse.* This matter is touched on by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 8, 1, 7; ib. 8, 2, 3 *seq.* —— **esse**: emphatic; 'exist'.

21. iam: = 'to proceed', as often. —— **consuetudine sermonis**: cf. Verr. 4, 109 *cotidiana dicendi consuetudine.* —— **nec . . . metiamur**: not intended to contrast strongly with the first part of the sentence, otherwise *non* would have been written for *nec* and *eam* omitted. The clause is really explanatory = *non metientes.* For the construction of *metiri* cf. n. on 97, and for the expression *μετρεῖν τι τινι* in Aristotle's Ethics. —— **magnificentia**: cf. Plato Symp. 210 D *καλοὺς λόγους καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς.* So *magnificum* in 32. —— **virosque**: "If a negative proposition is followed by an affirmative, in which the same thought is expressed or continued, *que*, *et* or *ac* is employed in Latin where in English we use 'but'". Madvig, 433, Obs. 2; cf. Roby, 2200. —— **Paulos etc.**: the plural in the sense of 'men like P.' etc. For *Paulus*, cf. 9; for Gallus 9 and 10; for Philus 14. —— **omnino . . . reperiuntur**: cf. 9, 18, n. on *nemo.*

22. opportunitates: the word *opportunitas* is 'opportuneness' rather than 'opportunity'. To say that friendship has 'opportunenesses' is equivalent to saying that it shows the characteristic of 'opportuneness' on many occasions. Cicero uses the plural of abstract nouns like this more frequently than any other author. Cf. A. 75, *c*; G. 195, Rem. 5; H. 130, 2. —— **vix queo**: Cic. always says *non queo* or *vix queo*, never *nequeo*, though he uses other parts

of the verb *nequire*. —— **qui**: see n. on C. M. 4, p. 3. —— **vita vitalis**: it is not known to what work of Ennius the quotation belongs. The words are an imitation of *βίος βιωτός*. In his own style, Cic. would have written *vita potest esse ulla;* cf. 86 *vitam esse nullam* = *βίον εἶναι ἀβίωτον*. —— **quae ... conquiescit**: 'which does not find peace in an interchange of kindness with a friend'. Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 9, 9, 3. —— **quid dulcius**: the omission of both *enim* and *est* gives an abrupt emphasis to the question; so in 55, 30, 40, 25, 99. —— **quicum**: cf. n. on 2 *quocum*. For the sense of this passage Seyffert well compares Seneca de Tranquill. Animi c. 7 *quantum bonum est ubi sunt praeparata pectora in quae tuto secretum omne descendat, quorum conscientiam minus quam tuam timeas, quorum sermo sollicitudinem leniat, sententia consilium expediat, hilaritas tristitiam dissipet, conspectus ipse delectet.* —— **qui**: lit. 'what sort of?' *Quis* would have meant merely 'what?' *Tantus* is here only a rhetorical variation for *magnus*, and as *tantus* implies *quantus* there is really an ellipsis. For the context cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 9, 9, 2. —— **fructus**: 'enjoyment'. —— **ac**: see A. 156, *a*; G. 646; H. 554, I. 2, n. —— **sine eo**: takes the place of a conditional clause. See A. 310; G. 594, 3; H. 507, 3, n. 7. —— **quae expetuntur**: 'which are objects of desire'. Cic. commonly uses *expetere, expetenda* to represent the Greek *αἱρεῖν, αἱρετά*, which are technical terms common to all the later Greek philosophical schools. Anything which forms part of the *summum bonum* is *αἱρετόν*. Cf. 46 *expetendas;* 80 *expetita*. —— **valetudo**: = here the *bona v.* of 20; cf. n. on 8. —— **amicitia**: adversative asyndeton. —— **loco**: perhaps abl. of separation with *excluditur*. *Nullo loco* may however have an adverbial sense equivalent to that of *nusquam*. The adverb *praesto* in the preceding clause makes this probable, and the probability is increased by *pluribus locis* below. A. 258, *f*; G. 385, Rem.; H. 425, 2. —— **ut aiunt**: n. on 19. Fire and water were fixed upon as the first necessaries of life in the *aqua et igni interdictio*, which was equivalent to a sentence of exile. Cf. Off. 1, 52 *ex quo sunt illa communia* (*officia*), *non prohibere aqua profluente, pati ab igne ignem capere si qui velit;* Iustiniani Inst. 1, 16, 2; Gaii Inst. 1, 161. —— **quae ... prodest**: a sidelong protest against the theory (18) that only the *σοφοί* are capable of friendship. —— **delectat et prodest**: so Hor. A. P. 333 *aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae.* —— **vera et perfecta**: 'pure and faultless'; the *τελεία φιλία* of Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 8, 6, 2) also *ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλία*

(ib. 8, 5, 3) and ἀληθὴς φιλία in Plato, Lysis 214 D; cf. *vera amicitia* in 23, 58. —— **pauci**: cf. 15. For the use with *qui* see A. 216, *e*; G. 368, Rem. 2; H. 397, 2, n. —— **partiens communicansque**: the two participles differ very little in meaning — no more widely than 'dividing' and 'sharing' in English. In *partiens* the notion of mere division is more prominent, in *communicans* the notion of comradeship or partnership; cf. 24 *in periculis ... communicandis*.

P. 10. — 23. commoditates: very little different in sense from *opportunitates* in 22. *Opportunitas* expresses rather the idea of exceptional appropriateness, *commoditas* rather the characteristic of usefulness as an ordinary fact. —— **cum ... contineat — tum ... praestat**: the normal construction with *cum ... tum* is for both clauses to have the same verb, or for the verbs (if different) in both clauses to be in the same mood and tense. The reason for the variation here is the desire to point out that the fact contained in the clause *cum ... contineat* is one which has been already mentioned and disposed of. 'Seeing that friendship furnishes very many and important advantages ...'. *Continet* would have been appropriate had the fact now been mentioned for the first time. Cf. Madvig, 358, Obs. 3; A. 326, *b*; G. 589; H. 521, 2, 2), n. 1. —— **illa ... omnibus**: *illa*, abl., *sc. commoditate;* cf. 19 *hoc praestat; omnibus = omnibus rebus*, the verbs *praestat* and *praelucet* having the same subject, *amicitia*. Many editors, in order to avoid the exceptional *omnibus = omnibus rebus*, make *illa* (*sc. commoditas*) subject to *praestat* so that *omnibus = o. commoditatibus*, while *praelucet* has for its subject *amicitia*. The neuter *omnibus* used as substantive, though rare, is well attested; cf. N. D. 2, 36; 2, 133; De Fato 14; Liv. 1, 45; 3, 23. —— **spem praelucet**: the verb *praelucere* is rare even in poetry and very rare in prose. The transitive use ('holds up the light of hope') may perhaps be allowed here, though the only passages quoted for it by the editors and dictionaries are Auson. Idyll. 4, 95 *p. lumen*, and Plaut. Casina 1, 30 *p. facem*. Plin. Nat. Hist. 32, 141 has *praeluceat baculum, i. e.* 'sets on fire'. —— **verum amicum**: the word *verus* is to be taken in a less strict sense than in 22 *vera amicitia*. —— **exemplar aliquod**: Seyffert well quotes here the Magna Moralia 2, 15. Cf. also 80. —— **absentes adsunt** etc.: intended contradiction in terms, oxymoron; cf. Mil. 97 *gloriam: esse hanc unam quae efficeret ut absentes adessemus, mortui viveremus*, where edd. quote the epigram of Simonides on the heroes of Thermopylae — **οὐδὲ τεθνᾶσι**

θανόντες, ἐπεί σφ' ἀρετὴ καθύπερθε κυδαίνουσ' ἀνάγει δώματος ἐξ Ἀίδεω. —— **egentes abundant** etc.: St. Paul, Corinth. 2, 6, 10 'As having nothing, and yet possessing all things'; ib. 6, 9 'As dying and behold, we live'. —— **difficilius dictu**: 'a harder saying'. The Latin like the English phrase is inaccurate, since the statement is not hard to make, but hard to believe. Cf. Mark 2, 9 'Whether is it *easier to say* to the sick of the palsy...' Cic. often has *incredibile dictu;* cf. Liv. 3, 5, 12 *difficile ad fidem est affirmare.* —— **tantus eos honos**: for the separation of *tantus* from *honos* cf. n. on C. M. 15 *quam sit iusta.* —— **ex quo**: the antecedent of *quo* is not *desiderium*, but the whole preceding clause; thus *ex quo* = *ex qua re.* —— **beata... laudabilis**: chiasmus. —— **laudabilis**: because the survivors do well in remembering their friends. —— **rerum natura**: *i. e.* the universe. —— **benevolentiae coniunctionem**: 'the bond of good-will'; *benevolentia*, the more diffused and weaker form of affection, is here contrasted with *amicitia*, its more concentrated and intense form. *Benevolentia* here is Aristotle's ὁμόνοια in Eth. Nic. 9, c. 6. —— **ne...quidem**: 'no, nor'; simply a stronger *nec.* —— **id**: explained by the clause *quanta...sit.* —— **minus**: here, and often, scarcely different in sense from *non.* —— **vis amicitiae**: cf. 15. —— **percipi**: a stronger word than *intellegitur* just before. —— **quae enim domus** etc.: cf. Sallust, Iug. 10, 6 *concordia parvae res crescunt, discordia maximae dilabuntur;* Matthew, 12, 25. —— **discidiis**: so rightly written, not *dissidiis.* Most scholars now agree with Madvig (ad Cic. Fin. Exc. II. p. 812 *et seq.*) in denying *dissidium* to be a Latin word.

24. quidem: often used like the Greek γε or γοῦν to introduce a statement confirming a previous statement. —— **doctum quendam**: Empedocles, born about 485 B. C. Cicero is very careful not to make Laelius betray too intimate an acquaintance with Greek literature. Cf. n. on 87 *nescio quem.* —— **vaticinatum**: 'sang in inspired strain'. The *vates* is *divino quodam spiritu inflatus* (Arch. 18); cf. also *vaticini furores* in Ov. Met. 2, 640. The great philosophical poem of Empedocles, περὶ φύσεως, the title of which is borrowed by Lucretius for his poem 'De Rerum Natura', and which he greatly imitates, contained many passages that seemed to sober-minded readers to border on madness; cf. Acad. 2, 14 *isti exclamant quasi mente incitati, Empedocles quidem ut interdum mihi furere videatur;* also Lucr. 1, 727 *carmina quin etiam divini pectoris eius vociferantur.* As the word

vaticinari sometimes means 'to prophesy', there may be a reference to the fact that Empedocles claimed to possess prophetic and magic powers. —— **totoque mundo**: this is merely explanatory of *rerum natura*, which has the same meaning; 'in the constitution of things and the entire universe'. —— **constarent ... discordiam**: Empedocles held that two principles were perpetually at war in the universe, one the principle of love or friendship, attraction, constantly tending to unite the scattered portions of the four elements, fire, air, earth, and water, so as to bring things into existence, the other the principle of hate or enmity, repulsion, tending to decompose bodies into their constituent parts. —— **ea**: object of both the infinitives following. —— **hoc**: 'this principle', *i. e.* that friendship is a uniting force, hatred a destructive force. —— **omnes mortales**: here = simply *omnes homines*. Cicero never uses *mortalis* for *homo* without some attribute, though the usage is very common in Sallust, Tacitus, and the later Latin prose. Caesar altogether avoids the word. Cf. *mortalis nemo* in 18. —— **re probant**: 'approve by their actions'. —— **si quando aliquod**: Cicero, like the other Latin writers, often seems capricious in his use of *quando* and *aliquando*, *quid* (*quod* ...) and *aliquid* (*aliquod* ...) after *si*. It is commonly said that when the words with *ali-* are used after *si* they are more emphatic than the simple forms; the passages, however, do not always bear out the supposition. Cf. Madvig, 493, *a*, Obs. 1. —— **adeundis**: *i. e. pro amico*; in the one case the *amicus* meets the danger alone, and protects his friend; in the other both friends face it together. The use of *in* is the same as that in 9 *in pueris*. —— **M. Pacuvi**: Pacuvius, the greatest tragic writer in Latin (*summus tragicus* — Cic. de Opt. Gen. Dic. 2) was born at Brundisium about 220 and lived till about 130 B. C. See Sellar, Roman Poets of the Republic, Ch. 5. Since Pacuvius probably exhibited no new play after his eightieth year (Cic. Brut. 229), and Scipio died in 129 B. C., the word *nuper* is very loosely used, as in 13. Pacuvius probably never became a Roman citizen, hence Cic. calls him *hospes* as well as *amicus*. So Fam. 9, 12, 2 *hospiti veteri et amico* (of king Deiotarus). —— **nova fabula**: commonly supposed to be a play called the Dulorestes (though Ribbeck and some other scholars deny this), of which a number of fragments are preserved. Cf. Fin. 5, 63. The story was often handled by Greek dramatists. The plays of Pacuvius were all *palliatae* and closely copied from Greek originals, but it

is not exactly known on what Greek play the Dulorestes was founded. It certainly did not follow the Iphigenia in Tauris of Euripides, which treats the same story. The *rex* was Thoas, king of the Tauric Chersonese. —— **stantes plaudebant**: 'they (the audience) rose to their feet and cheered'. It has generally been supposed that Cic. here is guilty of a slight anachronism, because the first permanent theatre at Rome was erected by Pompeius, before which time it is believed that the audience stood throughout the exhibition of the plays. The temporary booths, however, may have contained rough galleries; cf. Tac. Ann. 14, 20 with Nipperdey's n. With Cicero's words cf. Att. 2, 19, 3 *Curioni stantes plauserant;* Phaedr. 5, 7, 28 *in plausus consurrectum est;* Suet. Aug. 56. On the use of *stantes* see G. 667, Rem. 1; H. 549, 5. —— **arbitramur**: n. on 14 *censemus.* —— **possent**: *sc. si facto opus esset.* For suppressed protasis cf. ref. on 5 *velim.*

P. 11. —**hactenus**: contrasted with *si quae praeterea sunt.* —— **de...sentirem**: for the arrangement of the words cf. 14 *de immortalitate animorum quae;* also 16 *de amicitia ... quid sentias. Sentirem,* past tense to suit the tense of *potuisse.* —— **ab eis**: cf. 17.

25. nos autem: *sc. quaeremus.* It very seldom happens in Latin that a verb in the indicative or subjunctive, or indeed a verb at all, has to be supplied from one in the imperative or *vice versa.* —— **saepe quaesivi**: *sc. quid sentirent.* —— **filum**: all languages have metaphors resembling this. Cf. De Or. 3, 103 *filo ipso et genere orationis;* ib. 2, 93 *omnes erant uberiore filo;* Orat. 124 *argumentandi tenue filum;* Fam. 9, 12, 2 *munusculum crasso filo;* Hor. Ep. 2, 1, 225 *tenui deducta poemata filo.* —— **tum...si**: used here like the commoner *ita...si;* cf. 53 *si...intellegitur.* —— **si nuper affuisses**: but in the dialogue De Re Publica 1, 18 Fannius appears as one of the listeners. He may not have been represented as present at the discussions in the subsequent books, which are only preserved in a fragmentary state. In 14 Cic. seems to indicate the absence of Fannius. —— **patronus**: 'advocate'. The question was whether justice is an absolutely necessary foundation for a state. —— **nonne facile**: *sc. est defendere.* —— **servatam**: A. 292, *a*; G. 667, Rem. 2; H. 549, 5, n. 2.

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For summary see Introd. p. x.

26. vim . . . afferre: a form of answer often used in reply to very pressing entreaties; cf. Terent. Adelph. 5, 8, 19 (l. 943) *non omittitis? vis est haec quidem;* Suet. Iul. Caes. 82 *ista quidem vis est* (said by Caesar when first attacked by his assassins). —— **studiis . . . obsistere**: the same kind of excuse for a philosophical discussion is given in Orat. 2; cf. ib. 140. —— **in re bona**: cf. 17 *praeclara res est.* —— **mihi . . . cogitanti**: so the De Oratore begins — *cogitanti mihi saepenumero et memoria vetera repetenti perbeati fuisse, Quinte frater, illi videri solent . . .* So the second book of the De Div. — *quaerenti mihi multumque et diu cogitanti . . . occurrebat.* —— **propter . . . inopiam**: cf. 23 *egentes abundant, imbecilli valent;* Arist. Eth. Nic. 8, 1, 2. —— **meritis**: = *officiis, beneficiis.* —— **quisque**: 'when a relative and a demonstrative proposition are combined, *quisque* almost always stands in the relative proposition, commonly (without emphasis) immediately after the relative, so that even *se* and *suus* stand after *quisque*'. Madvig, 495. Cf. also A. 202, *e*; G. 305, Rem. 1 and 2; H. 569, I. 2. —— **posset**: *sc. habere,* to be supplied from *acciperet.* —— **esset**: was, *i. e.* from the beginning. —— **proprium amicitiae**: *amicitiae* is genitive, not dative; it is doubtful whether Cic. uses the dative after *proprius* at all. —— **alia causa**: *sc. amicitiae;* emphatic position. **amor . . . amicitia**: the same statement in Fin. 2, 78; N. D. 1, 122 and below 100. —— **princeps . . . ad**: 'leads to'; so Arch. 1 *hunc video mihi principem ad suscipiendam rationem horum studiorum exstitisse;* Phil. 10, 24; Sull. 9. —— **ab eis**: 'from those', not 'by those'. —— **temporis causa**: 'to suit the occasion'. —— **fictum**: opposed to *verum* below, as *simulatum* is to *voluntarium.* —— **et**: see n. on 21 *virosque.*

P. 12. — 27. ab indigentia orta: Cic. probably never used *ortus* with abl. without the preposition. —— **potius . . . magis**: the difference in sense between these two words is in use frequently obliterated, but *potius* strictly means 'better', and therefore ought to indicate that of two alternatives one is preferred by some individual to the other, while *magis* strictly means 'more', and ought to have no direct reference to choice. —— **applicatione . . . cogitatione**: abl. of means or instrument. —— **quod etc.**: 'the nature of this principle'. For

quod quidem quale sit cf. Academ. 2, 124 *quod intellegi quale sit vix potest.* —— **quibusdam**: the limitation (for which see n. on 6 *quodam*) is perhaps due to the fact (insisted on in N. D. 2, 129) that many creatures abandon their eggs when laid. —— **ita amant**: cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 8, 1, 3. —— **ad quoddam tempus**: N. D. 2, 129 *usque ad eum finem dum possint se ipsa defendere.* —— **sensus**: 'feeling', or 'impulse', *i.e.* as opposed to the calculation of advantages mentioned above. —— **quae...potest**: this is contrasted with *ad quoddam tempus* above. —— **similis sensus amoris**: *i.e. sensus amoris caritati parentum similis;* for the brevity (common in comparisons) cf. n. on 32 *quam ab imbecillitate.* —— **exstitit**: see n. on C. M. 53. —— **si aliquem**: *si* has almost the same sense as *cum* here, and was perhaps used because the repetition of *cum* would have been awkward. *Aliquem* after *si* is perhaps more vivid than *quem*: 'some actual person'. Cf. n. on 24 *si quando.* —— **moribus et natura**: the collocation *natura et moribus* is more natural and common. Cf. 7 with n. —— **quasi**: serves, as usual, to soften the metaphor (n. on 3), which however is a very common one; cf. Fam. 12, 5, 3 *virtutis tuae lumen;* Off. 1, 103 *probi ingeni lumen;* also Lael. 100 *virtus... ostendit suum lumen;* 48 *si qua significatio virtutis eluceat.* —— **perspicere videamur**: G. 541, Rem. 2; H. 516, II. 1.

28. **nihil...amabilius**: the same words are in N. D. 1, 121, with which cf. Off. 1, 55; 2, 17. —— **quos numquam vidimus**: cf. N. D. 1, 121 *virtute, quam qui adeptus erit ubicumque erit gentium a nobis diligetur*, a Stoic utterance. —— **Fabrici...Curi**: see nn. on 18. —— **memoriam usurpet**: 'goes over his recollections'. *Usurpare* = (*usu-rip-are*, implying a word *usu-rip-us*) is strictly 'to seize on for use'; hence = constantly to put a thing into practice, or, of thoughts, to con them over. —— **quos...viderit**: concessive. —— **Cassium**: *sc.* Vecellinum (cf. 36). Consul in 493 B. C. and concluded a treaty with the Latins; consul for the third time in 486 and admitted the Hernicans to the league, but in the same year, having brought forward a *lex agraria* was suspected of aiming at despotic power, and tried and put to death (Liv. 2, 41). —— **Maelium**: also suspected of aiming at tyranny, because he gave away corn to the poor. In 439 Cincinnatus, having been made dictator, sent his *magister equitum* Ahala, to summon Maelius. When Maelius refused to obey the summons Ahala had him put to death (Liv. 4, 14). —— **altero... alterum**: in Off. 1, 38 Cic. makes the same comparison between

Pyrrhus and Hannibal. The traditional Roman view of Hannibal is expressed by Horace's *abominatus Hannibal* (Epod. 16, 8), yet the charges brought against him can be thoroughly disproved even from the information preserved by Roman historians. See *e. g.* Liv. 21, 21; 25, 17; 27, 28. Cf. n. on C. M. 75 *hostis.* On Pyrrhus consult Liddell, History of Rome, Bk. 3, Ch. 26. —— **oderit**: here fut. ind.; above, subj.

29. maius: 'a more difficult matter'; cf. 69 *maximum;* C. M. 1 *maior.* —— **etiam**: this would naturally come before *in hoste,* but is thrust aside in order to complete as soon as possible the construction *vel in ... vel in.* —— **quid**: see references on C. M. 1 *quid.* —— **est ... si moveantur**: a common form of the conditional sentence in Cicero; cf. Academ. 1, 7 *sive Zenonem sequare magnum est.* The sense here is 'if the supposition be made that etc'. —— **cum videantur**: *cum* referring to the repetition of an action ('as often as' 'whenever', 'every time that') though generally accompanied by the indicative, is sometimes, as here, used with the subjunctive. The subjunctive gives a more hypothetical coloring to the verb statement and has about the force of a general condition. See Madvig, 359; cf. A. 322; G. 585, Rem.; H. 507, 3. —— **coniuncti**: here no participle but a mere adjective; so many other past participles in Cic. lose their participial force, particularly *commendatus.* —— **studio**: *sc. amici.* —— **consuetudine**: 'familiarity'.

P. 13. — motum animi: = *applicationem animi* in 27; a narrower sense than that in 48. —— **et amoris**: for *amor* is *princeps ad benevolentiam coniungendam;* see 26. —— **adhibitis**: in sense almost = *additis.* —— **imbecillitate**: 26, 23; N. D. 1, 122 *ne homines quidem censetis, nisi imbecilli essent, futuros beneficos et benignos fuisse?* —— **quisque**: see n. on 26. —— **generosum**: lit. 'high-born' and so the metaphor is modified by *ut ita dicam,* for which see n. on 49. So Tusc. 2, 16 *quaedam generosa virtus.* —— **volunt**: 'suppose'. —— **minimum ... se**: cf. 26, 46; De Or. 1, 123 *ut in quoque oratore plurimum esset;* ib. 2, 122 *si quid est in me.* —— **ad amicitiam aptissimus**: A. 234, *b*; G. 356, Rem. 3; H. 391, II. 1, (2).

30. ut enim etc.: this question is discussed by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 9, 9. —— **sic ... ut**: a comparison within the comparison introduced by *ut quisque.* —— **munitus est**: cf. the *edita doctrina templa* of Lucretius; also Attius quoted in Cic. Div. 1, 45 *sapientia munitum pectus,* and St. Paul's 'breastplate of righteousness'. Hor. Ep.

1, 1, 60 *hic murus aheneus esto nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa.* —— **nullo**: Cic. uses the abl. and gen. of *nullus* as substantives, to replace the abl. and gen. of *nemo*, which were not in use. He avoids, however, the use of *nullus*, *nulli*, *nullum* as substantives, and even prefers *nemo homo*, *sapiens* etc. to *nullus homo* etc. Nor does Cic. write *nulli* (nom. plur.) by itself, since *nemo* expresses the same sense. Generally the Republican and Augustan writers agree with Cic. in his treatment of *nemo* and *nullus*. See Madvig, 91; G. 304, end; H. 457, 2. —— **suaque** etc.: for the sense cf. 7. For *que* see n. on 21 *virosque*. —— **quid enim?** Like our exclamation 'why, now!' —— **Africanus indigens**: the σοφός or *sapiens* of the Stoic system was αὐτάρκης, sufficient for himself. Chrysippus (Seneca Ep. 9) drew a fine distinction, that there was nothing the wise man needed, though there were many things it was advisable for him to have — *nulla re indigere et tamen multis illi rebus opus esse.* Cf. Plato, Lysis 215 B. —— **indigens**: the omission both of an interrogative particle and of *erat* renders the question more emphatic. —— **ac**: 'and assuredly'; *ac* or *atque* at the outset of a sentence often introduces a statement emphatically. Cic. and the other writers of the best period never use *nec...quidem*, the place of which is often taken by *ac*, or *et*, or *atque* followed by *ne...quidem*. —— **ego**: *sc. dilexi*, to be supplied from *dilexit*. Cf. Phil. 2, 38. —— **virtutis eius**: the use of a genitive dependent on another is commonest in Cic. when, as here, the dependent genitive is a pronoun. Cf. 37 *illius furoris*. —— **opinione...habebat**: a somewhat roundabout mode of expression. Cf. Att. 7, 2, 5 *de opinione et seq.* —— **fortasse non nulla**: mark the show of modesty. —— **habebat...dilexit**: the change of tense should be observed; the imperfect denotes that Africanus was some time in coming to his conclusions about Laelius; *dilexit* points to the moment his decision took effect. —— **multae et magnae**: when two adjectives are in agreement with the same noun Cic. generally connects them with *et*, where English idiom would often require them to be put side by side. When *multus* is one of two adjectives the conjunction is rarely left out (cf. Greek usage — πολλὰ καὶ κακά), but if *multus* is one of three adjectives the *et* sometimes disappears. Cf. Verr. 5, 119 *multi et graves dolores*, but Fam. 5, 17, 3 *multis fortissimis atque optimis viris;* Pro Imp. Cn. Pomp. 6 *multa...magna et gravia bella.* —— **causae diligendi**: a somewhat pleonastic phrase; it would have been enough to say that

love (not the causes of love) starts from hope. Cf. however Fin. 1, 42 *rerum gerendarum* i n i t i a *proficiscuntur a voluptate aut a dolore;* Tac. Hist. 1, 39 *initio caedis orto;* Liv. 32, 34, 7 *ab illis principium belli ortum est;* C. M. 75 *cursum equorum.*

31. faeneramur etc.: cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 8, 6, 4 ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον (φιλία) τῶν ἀγοραίων (*i. e.* belongs to mercenary persons); Fin. 2, 117; N. D. 1, 122; Sen. Ben. 1, 2, 3 *turpis faeneratio est beneficium expensum ferre* (to make kindness a matter of book-keeping); Sen. Ep. 9, 10 *n e g o t i a t i o est non amicitia quae quid consecutura sit spectat.* —— **in ipso amore**: for the change here from *amicitiam* to *amore* cf. 100 *sive amor sive amicitia;* for the general sense Fam. 3, 13, 2 *mihi propono fructum amicitiae nostrae ipsam amicitiam.*

32. his: neuter; = *his sententiis;* cf. 13 *ut in plerisque.* The antecedent of *qui* is the subject of *dissentiunt;* the reference is to the Epicureans. —— **pecudum ritu**: n. on 20; Parad. 1, 14 *quae quidem mihi vox* (*voluptatem esse summum bonum*) *pecudum videtur esse, non hominum.* —— **ad . . . referunt**: a form of expression exceedingly common in Cicero's philosophical works. See n. on C. M. 43. Cf. also *voluptate omnia metiri* (Fin. 2, 56; De. Or. 3, 62), *dirigere omnia voluptate* (Fin. 2, 71). —— **magnificum**: μεγαλοπρεπές; cf. n. on 21. —— **ac**: cf. n. on 54 *atque.* —— **suspicere**: 'look up to'; for the metaphorical sense cf. Off. 2, 36 *eos viros suspiciunt;* Orat. 97 *eloquentia quam suspicerent omnes;* Fam. 10, 9, 2 *honores praemiaque vestra suspicio;* De Or. 3, 22. —— **abiecerunt**: 'have degraded'; cf. Leg. 1, 26 *nam cum ceteras animantes* (*natura*) *abiecisset ad pastum, solum hominem erexit et ad caeli conspectum excitavit.* —— **contemptam**: here, as often, not 'despised', but 'despicable'. —— **benevolentiae**: see n. on 20 *benevolentia et caritate.* —— **facta** etc.: 'when intimation has been given of moral worth'. Cf. 27, last sentence; 48, last sentence, and 100.

P. 14. — **usu**: = *consuetudine;* 'intimacy', 'society'. —— **pares et aequales**: so 56 *pariter aequaliterque;* Orat. 123 *par et aequalis oratio;* De Or. 1, 83 *virtutes esse inter se aequalis et paris.* The word *aequalis* means properly 'even', or 'on the same level', *par* 'having the same quantity or size'; but in their secondary applications the two words become convertible; cf. Orat. 205 *imparibus an aequalibus.* For the expression *in amore pares* cf. Propert 1, 1, 32 *sitis et in tuto semper amore pares* and for the sense § 69 *seq.* with the nn. —— **haec certatio**: for *huius rei* or *de hac re certatio;* cf. n. on 2 *eum sermo-*

nem. —— **quam ab imbecillitate**: = *quam si ab imbecillitate esset;* for the brevity of the expression cf. n. on 27 *similis sensus amoris. Quam* not seldom in Cic. precedes the comparative; *e. g.* Off. 1, 75 *quamvis sit eius nomen quam Solonis illustrius.* —— **gravior et verior**: *gravior*, because resting on ethical grounds; *verior*, 'more real', because those who aim at the expedient love not so much the friend as the benefits to be gained from him. (Lahm.) Cf. 26 *antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura profecta causa.* —— **utilitas**: 'expediency'. —— **conglutinaret**: see nn. on C. M. 72 *coagmentavit, conglutinavit.* —— **eadem...dissolveret**: cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 8, 4, 2. —— **commutata**: see n. on 25 *servatam.* —— **nisi quid ad haec**: *sc. dicere.* Laelius is about to proceed 'now let us turn to another part of our subject' when Fannius interrupts. Cf. Tusc. 2, 42; ib. 4, 46 *exspecto quid ad ista.* —— **tu vero perge**: 'yes, *do* go on'. So Academ. 1, 18 *tu vero, inquit, perge, Varro;* De Or. 2, 124. —— **meo iure**: 'as I have a right to do'; lit. 'by a right that is mine'.

(3) *Duration of Friendship, and the Dangers to which Friendship is exposed.* §§ 33–35.

See Introd. p. x.

33. optimi viri: a form of address commonly ironical, though not so here. In C. M. 39 Cato addresses Scipio and Laelius as *optimi adulescentes.* —— **quamquam ille quidem**: καίτοι ἐκεῖνός γε; cf. 97. *Quamquam* seems to imply that Laelius did not altogether agree with Scipio on this subject. —— **expediret**: *sc. utrique.* —— **sentiretur**: *sc. ab utroque.* —— **saepe**: probably to be taken with *mutari*, not with *dicebat*, so that *alias...alias* is an expansion or explanation of *saepe.* For *alias* see n. on 1. —— **exemplum** etc.: in *exemplum capiebat ex similitudine* there is the same kind of pleonasm as above, *sunt causae diligendi profectae.* —— **praetexta toga**: n. on 1.

34. perduxissent: *sc. pueri amicitiam:* see n. on C. M. 60 *perduxisse* (*sc. studia agri colendi*). —— **condicionis**: = *de condicione. Condicio*, even without the addition of *uxoria*, often means a proposal or agreement to marry ('a match'); Nep. Att. 12, 1 *nullius condicionis non habere potestatem.* —— **labefactari**: *sc. amicitiam*, which is probably also the subject of *dirimi* above, though Seyffert makes the subject of both infinitives to be the same as the subject of *perduxissent.* It would be possible to use *dirimi* of persons, but scarcely *labefactari*

with the sense 'to be rendered changeful'. —— **amicitiis**: a '*dativus commodi*'. Cf. Off. 2, 9 *consuetudo...honestatem ab utilitate secernens ...qua nulla pernicies maior hominum vitae potuit afferri.* —— **optimis quibusque**: so Arch. 26 *optimus quisque gloria maxime ducitur.* The love of fame is 'the last infirmity of noble minds'. In *optimis quibusque* we have a very rare usage. The best writers use the plural of *quisque* only in the neuter, and that with a superlative adjective, not the fem. or, as here, the masc. plural.

P. 15. — 35. iusta: *i. e.* with good reason on one side or the other. —— **libidinis ministri**: Liv. 3, 44, 6 *minister decemviri libidinis.* —— **adiutores ... ad**: the common construction of *adiutor* in Cic. is with a genitive of the thing wherein aid is given, but dative of the person to whom aid is given, as in 42; cf. however Flacc. 1 *adiutor ad rem perficiendam. Adiuvare ad, adiumentum ad* often occur. —— **quod**: conjunction. —— **deserere**: for the infinitive dependent on the personal *arguerentur* instead of the impersonal construction *argueretur eos deserere*, cf. n. on 9 *ut videris;* also Rosc. Am. 37 *occidisse patrem Sex. Roscius arguitur;* also *quaeruntur* in 16. —— **quidvis**: 'anything and everything'. —— **omnia**: not different in sense from *quidvis* above. Cf. Att. 9, 18, 3 *ad omnia descensurum* ('would stick at nothing'). —— **sempiterna**: in contrast to *amicitiae sempiternae* in 32. —— **quasi**: used to soften the metaphor; *fatum* is used often in its poetical sense of *mors* or *interitus.* —— **felicitatis**: 'good fortune'. —— **diceret sibi videri**: these words take the place of *esset*, which would be used if the sentence were entirely logical. Cf. De Or. 2, 278 *illud Siculi cui cum familiaris quidam quereretur quod diceret uxorem suam suspendisse se de ficu...* Similar examples are exceedingly common in Cicero; see Roby, 1746; A. 341, Rem.; G. 541, Rem. 2; H. 516, II. 1. The subject of *videri* is of course *subterfugere.*

(4) *Discussion of Practical Questions connected with Friendship.* §§ 36–100.

a. Friendships of the Wise. 36–75.

See Introd. p. x.

36. quatenus etc.: 'how far affection should lead us to proceed in dealing with friendship'. This paragraph is really inconsistent with 18 where Laelius says *sentio nisi in b o n i s amicitiam esse non posse.* Cf. 56 *qui sint in amicitia fines et quasi termini diligendi;* and

for *progredi*, 34 *in amicitia provecti:* the limits of friendly service are discussed also in Off. 3, 43. —— **numne**: a rare form, found in N. D. 1, 88 *quid? deum ipsum numne vidisti?* The *ne* renders the *num* more emphatic. —— **Coriolanus**: a brave but proud patrician, exiled in 490 B. C. because in time of famine he proposed to give the plebeians no share of the grain, sent by Gelon of Syracuse, until they had given up their tribunes. In league with the Volscians he then marched against Rome, and was dissuaded from taking the city only by the tears and supplications of his mother and other matrons. See Liv. 2, 34–40. The whole account has a legendary coloring. See Ihne, History of Rome, Bk. 2, Ch. 4; Mommsen, Bk. 2, Ch. 2. —— **Vecellinum ... Maelium**: nn. on 28.

37. vexantem: Cicero uniformly speaks of the Gracchi as traitors and *iure caesi.* —— **Tuberone**: son of a sister of Africanus minor; plebeian tribune in 133; a vigorous opponent of Gracchus; a strict Stoic. —— **aequalibus amicis**: 'those of his contemporaries who were his friends'. Carbo and Cato, mentioned at the end of 39, were only *prope aequales* (Brut. 96). —— **videbamus**: the imperfect because referred to *vexantem;* 'we saw him during the whole of his seditious action'; cf. 6 *tribuebatur.* —— **Cumanus hospes**: *Cumae* did not receive the Roman franchise till after the Social War. The Blosii or Blossii were a noble family at Cumae (Cic. Leg. Agr. 2, 93; Liv. 23, 7, 8; 27, 3, 5). This member of the family was a Stoic philosopher and pupil of Antipater of Tarsus. On the incident see Liddell, History of Rome, Ch. 52, § 2. —— **aderam ... in consilio**: 'was present as one of the advisers to ...' The *consilium* was a most important institution in both the public and the private life of the Romans. There was deeply ingrained in the Roman mind a feeling that no person having serious business to transact, whether private or official, ought to proceed without taking the opinion of those best qualified to advise him. The body of advisers is the *consilium.* The senate was the *consilium* of the king, and then became the standing *consilium* of the consuls. Officials exercising judicial functions generally summoned to their aid leading lawyers; in the case here mentioned, as the trials were political, statesmen of experience were resorted to. On this special commission (below, page 16 *quaestione nova*) for searching out the accomplices of Gracchus see Liddell, *ut supra;* Mommsen, Vol. 3, p. 120 (Am. ed.) —— **Laenati ... Rupilio**: consuls of the year 132 when the enquiry into the acts of

Gracchus and his followers took place. For Rupilius cf. 73 and Introd. p. v. Of Laelius Val. Max. 4, 7, 1 says *consilio eius consules* (*Rupilius* and *Laenas*) *praecipue utebantur.* —— **tanti**: see A. 252, *a*; G. 379; H. 404, and n. 1. —— **fecisset ... putaret**: *faceret* could not have been written because Gracchus was dead, but the mind having once been carried back to the past, it is permissible to use the imperfects *vellet* and *putaret* to denote that so long as Gracchus continued to live, the opinion of Blossius continued as here described. On the mood of *fecisset* see Roby, 1744; A. 321, *a*; G. 541; H. 516, II. —— **etiamne**: *sc. hoc putares?* —— **dixit**: *sc. se fuisse facturum.* —— **temeritati**: 'infatuation'. —— **illius furoris**: n. on 30 *virtutis eius.*

P. 16. — **hac amentia** etc.: observe that in this sentence the clauses are not connected by particles. The omission is intentional, suiting the haste of Blossius. *Hac amentia* = 'in this mad state'. —— **quaestione nova**: 'special court of enquiry'. For *nova* is usually written (with *quaestio*) *extra ordinem*, or *extraordinaria.* —— **in Asiam ... ad hostis**: he joined Aristonicus, the pretender to the throne of Pergamus, then in arms against the Romans. When Aristonicus was finally defeated, Blossius committed suicide, as his Stoic tenets permitted him to do. —— **rei publicae**: the country is the offended party, and the penalty is regarded as a *debt* due to it. —— **peccati**: a stronger word than *culpa;* a translation of the Stoic ἁμαρτήματος = sin. —— **peccaveris**: perfect subjunctive in the protasis of a general condition. See references on C. M. 21 *exerceas.* —— **conciliatrix**: Cic. is particularly fond of these feminine nouns in *-trix*, many of which he manufactured himself; he frequently applies them, as here, to inanimate objects; cf. 89 *assentatio adiutrix. Conciliatrix* occurs in Plautus in the sense of 'match-maker'. —— **virtutis**: = *de virtute;* cf. 34 *contentio condicionis.*

38. **si statuerimus ... si simus**: double protasis; less awkward here than in many passages, because the *quidem* marks the second protasis as distinctly subordinate to the first. —— **perfecta ... sapientia** etc.: cf. closely 18, 100. —— **res** etc.: 'the practice would lead to no wrong'. *Vitium* here almost = *culpa.* On the form *viti* see n. on C. M. 1 *praemi.* —— **ex hoc numero**: = *ex horum numero*, the latter being a form of expression which Cic. very rarely uses. In De Or. 2, 56 we have *ex ... numero eorum qui;* Vat. 41 *in illorum numero.* For the attraction cf. n. on 2, *cum sermonem.* —— **et ...**

quidem: here concessive, not affirmative; 'though especially'. —— **qui...accedunt**: these are the persons mentioned in 19 as *viros bonos* etc.

39. videmus: here, as in 56 and often, = *scriptum videmus*. Cf. Academ. 2, 129 *nobilis disciplina, cuius, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes*. See n. on C. M. 26 *videmus*. —— **Aemilium Luscino**: Q. Aemilius Papus and C. Fabricius Luscinus (see n. on 18) were colleagues in the consulship in 282 and 278 and in the censorship in 275 B. C. *Familiaris*, like *amicus*, takes a dative when it is treated as an adjective, and a genitive when it is a substantive. For *Papum Aemilium*, the *cognomen* put before the *nomen* (a practice extremely common in Tacitus and his contemporaries), cf. Q. Fr. 2, 4, 1 *Macer Licinius*. —— **sic**: the clauses *bis...censura* are explanatory of *sic*. —— **patribus**: = *maioribus*, though in 6 (*apud patres nostros*) *patres* has the strict sense. Note the omission of *fuisse*. —— **tum**: this probably has not a temporal meaning here, but = *deinde* 'next in order', as though *primum* had preceded. —— **Curium...Coruncanium**: nn. on 18. —— **memoriae**: see n. on C. M. 63. —— **igitur**: here (like our phrase 'well then') serves to introduce a new step in the statement. The position of *igitur* as first word in the sentence, though regular in Sallust and very common in succeeding writers, is in Cicero exceptional and emphatic. A. 156, *e* and *k*; G. 503 and Rem.; H. 554, IV. 3. —— **ne suspicari quidem**: this implies the contrast 'much less can we believe'. —— **contendisse**: for the construction *contendere aliquid ab aliquo* 'to press some one for something' cf. Planc. 12 *meum beneficium ad eum potius detuli qui a me contenderat*; Verr. 2, 131 *hic magistratus a populo summa ambitione contenditur*. A clause with *ut* often takes the place of the accusative. —— **fidem**: 'a promise', or 'a pledge'. —— **hoc quidem**: 'a request of this kind', dependent on *impetraturum*, not on *dicere*. —— **contendisset**: *sc. aliquis ex eis*; for the omission of the subject to the verb cf. n. on 59 *esset osurus*. —— **sanctissimi viri**: 'the purest of men'. —— **rogatum**: not in agreement with *aliquid*, but with the unexpressed subject (*aliquem* = τινά) of the infinitive *facere*; cf. *rogati* below. —— **at vero**: 'but truly'. Laelius intends this sentence to carry with it the inference that the friendship between Gracchus on the one hand, and Carbo, Cato etc. on the other, was no true friendship. —— **Carbo**: cf. 41, 96. C. Papirius Carbo became, after the death of Ti. Gracchus, one of the commissioners for carrying out

the agrarian law. He was tribune in 131 B.C. and introduced vote by ballot at the passing of laws in the *Comitia*. As consul in 120 he tried to reconcile himself with the aristocrats but failed. In 119 he was prosecuted for his share in the Gracchan troubles and committed suicide. —— **Cato**: a grandson of the censor, and also of Paulus Macedonicus, whose daughter married the son of the censor. This Cato was consul in 114 and condemned for corruption in connection with Iugurtha. —— **minime**: qualifies *acer* to be supplied from *accerrimus*, 'then not very zealous, though now exceedingly so'. *Tum* refers to the period immediately after the death of Ti. Gracchus; *nunc*, to the time of the supposed conversation, 129 B.C. In the word *acerrimus* there is a hint at the suspicion that C. Gracchus had a hand in Scipio's death. See Intr. to C. M. p. xxii. This difficult passage is thoroughly discussed by Madvig, Opuscula, 2, 281. —— **Gaius**: see n. on 3.

40. neque...nec: common in Cic. for *nec...nec*; *nec...neque*, however, is rare (Arch. 29). Cf. 52. —— **minime accipienda**: 'not to be allowed'. So πρόφασιν or σκῆψιν ἀποδέχεσθαί τινος.

P. 17. — **nos**: = *Romani*, not simply Laelius and his sons-in-law. —— **maiorum**: depends on *spatio curriculoque*. Metaphors from racing are common in Cicero; cf. *e.g.* Academ. 2, 112; C. M. 14, 33, 83. Cf. also below, 101. That there is little difference in meaning between *spatium* and *curriculum* (here perhaps 'course and career') is shown by passages like Orat. 12 *Academiae spatia sunt curricula multiplicium variorumque sermonum*. *Spatium* refers rather to the whole ground of the race-course, *curriculum* to the track or portion passed over in running.

41. regnum occupare: 'to establish a monarchy'. In Vell. Pater. 2, 4, 4 Scipio says of Ti. Gracchus '*si occupandae rei publicae animum habuisset*'. —— **vel**: = *vel potius*. —— **is quidem**: = ἐκεῖνός γε, or ὅ γε as in Homer; not needed for the sense, but added in order to point attention more closely to the subject of the verb. —— **audierat**: the modern equivalent for *hearing* of such a matter would be *reading about it in history*. So the Greeks say ἀκούομεν 'we know from history'; ἀνήκοος 'a man ignorant of history'. —— **P. Scipione**: P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio, the murderer of Ti. Gracchus. He is sometimes called *pontifex* (*e. g.* in Cat. 1, 3) to distinguish him from Africanus, but in other passages merely P. Scipio as here; cf. Leg. 3, 20; Planc. 88. His father is mentioned in 101. Nasica Serapio

was a son of a daughter of the elder Africanus, therefore a cousin of the Gracchi. The senate gave him a *legatio* to Pergamus, a form of honorable exile, in order to withdraw him from the fury of the democratic party. He committed suicide at Pergamus. —— **effecerint:** Seyffert rightly points out that *fecerint* could not stand here, since the democratic party had not itself d o n e anything to Nasica, but had forced the senate to punish him. —— **non queo:** n. on 22; cf. also n. on 71 *queant.* —— **nam:** this is elliptic, as often; so γάρ in Greek. The full sense would be 'I need hardly mention Carbo, for etc.' —— **quocumque modo potuimus:** 'we' here = the aristocratic party. —— **propter poenam:** *i. e.* it would have excited the populace too much to attempt to punish Carbo so soon after Ti. Gracchus' death. —— **sustinuimus:** 'we have borne with'. —— **C. Gracchi autem:** but in 69 *Q. vero Maximum.* The latter collocation is regular: here *autem* is put after in order to make the contrast between *Ti. Gracchi* and *C. Gracchi* more striking. —— **tribunatu:** still in the future at the time when Laelius is supposed to be speaking; Scipio died in 129 and C. Gracchus did not become tribune till 123 B. C. —— **serpit:** cf. 87. *Serpere* means here 'to make progress imperceptibly or insinuatingly'. Nägelsbach, Stilistik § 129, has brought together a good many instances of this use, and of other words or phrases similarly used, as *manare, fundi, fluere,* often with *longe* and *late.* For *serpere* cf. Fin. 5, 65 *caritas ... serpit sensim;* ib. 2, 45 *homo profectus a caritate domesticorum et suorum serpit longius;* N. D. 3, 51 *illa autem, Balbe, quae tu a caelo astrisque ducebas quam longe serpant, non vides?* —— **serpit ... labitur:** general in scope, and intended to give the reason why Laelius dreaded to think of the future course of Gaius Gracchus. *Deinde* here is used proleptically, *i. e.* it presupposes *semel* which comes after; cf. n. on 7 *reliqua.* The sentence *videtis ... Cassia* simply gives an actual example of this general principle. —— **proclivis:** see ref. on C. M. 38 *frequens.* —— **coepit:** *sc. labi.* The omission of the infinitive is exceedingly common with both *coepi* and *debeo.* Cf. Cat. 1, 10 *perge quo coepisti.* Observe that Cic. and Caesar do not, as Sallust, Livy, and later writers, use *coepi* absolutely; *i. e.* an infinitive is always either expressed or implied —— **in tabella:** 'in the matter of voting'; lit. 'of the voting ticket'. For the collocation *in tabella quanta sit* cf. 24 *de amicitia quid sentirem.* —— **iam ante:** *i. e.* before the time of C. Gracchus. —— **labes:** 'corruption', *i. e.* of old institutions. —— **Gabinia lege:** this law, entitled *de*

magistratibus mandandis (Leg. 3, 35) was carried by A. Gabinius, tribune in 139 B. C., and introduced into elections voting by ballot, *i. e.* by writing the name of the candidate on a ticket or tablet. —— **Cassia**: this law was carried by L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla, tribune in 137 B. C., and extended the ballot to the juries in the criminal courts. Cassius was afterwards a judge and for his severity called *scopulus reorum*; he was the author of the saying '*cui bono?*' (*i. e.* who gains by it? viz. the offence). The *lex tabellaria* of Carbo introduced the ballot for voting on laws proposed to the *comitia*. His law is commonly placed in 131 B. C., but there is no direct evidence for the date and it may have been several years later. —— **populum ... multitudinis**: the change seems made merely for the sake of variety.

42. quorsum haec: *sc. disputo*, as in post red. ad Quir. 5 *quorsum igitur haec disputo?* Cf. also C. M. 13; Phil. 7, 26; Leg. 1, 63 *sed quorsus hoc pertinet?* —— **igitur**: note its position as third word in the sentence. —— **ignari casu aliquo**: note the two reasons *ignari* and *casu aliquo* placed side by side unconnected by a conjunction. So 3 *praesentibus coram*. —— **ne**: in final clauses where a negative is needed as here and 43, 60, 65, 78, *ne* and *ut ne* are used indifferently by Cicero; in consecutive negative clauses *ut non* generally stands, as below, but sometimes *ut ne* is found 'when precaution, forethought, or restriction is to be indicated, especially with *ita* preceding'. See Madvig, 456, Obs. 4. Cf. Roby, 1636, 1696. —— **in ... peccantibus**: 'when sinning in some public matter of importance'. Cf. the phrase *summa res publica;* also pro Balbo 14 *in tanta re publica versari;* also n. on 15 *publica re*. —— **nec vero**: this phrase, which occurs also in 65, corresponds to the affirmative expression *et ... quidem*, the phrase *nec ... quidem* being rarely used by good writers; see n. on 30 *ac*. —— **Themistocle**: so Acad. 2, 2 *Themistocle quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus*. —— **imperator**: = στρατηγός of the Athenians. The whole Grecian fleet at Salamis was commanded not by Themistocles but by Eurybiades the Spartan. —— **invidiam**: = διαβολήν 'unpopularity'. —— **viginti annis ante**: the ostracism of Themistocles happened in 471 B. C., while the banishment of Coriolanus from Rome is assigned to the year 491. On the banishment of Themistocles, his relations with the king of Persia and death, see Curtius, Hist. of Greece, Bk. 3, Ch. 2; Smith, Hist. of Greece, Ch. 22. —— **Coriolanus**: he is compared with Themistocles in Brut. 42; Att. 9, 10, 3. Varying accounts were current concern-

ing the death of both these men, as Cic. himself states in Brut. 42 and 43, where he refers to Thuc. 1, 138. In Att. 9, 10, 3 he assumes that Coriolanus died a natural death. —— **nemo**: the inference intended is 'so much worse are the Romans now than their forefathers, and than the Greeks of Themistocles' time'.

43. talis: *i. e.* such as that described in 41.

P. 18. — supplicio: a stronger word than *poena* above, 42; in its strict sense *supplicium* means 'summary execution'. For *supplicio omni* = *summo* cf. pro Imp. Cn. Pomp. 11. —— **concessum**: *sc. esse.* —— **haud scio an**: see n. on 20. —— **curae**: n. on 15 *cordi.*

44. haec...faciamus: these words almost exactly repeat the first sentence of 40. Notice that the clauses are put side by side without connecting particles. —— **rogemur**: A. 328; G. 574; H. 519, II. 2. —— **libere**: = μετὰ παρρησίας, 'with all freedom of speech'. —— **aperte**: 'frankly'. Cf. 91 *monere et moneri* etc. —— **adhibitae**: *sc. auctoritati.*

45. nam: 'I say this, for'; slightly elliptic; see n. on 41. —— **quos audio** etc.: cf. n. on 24 *doctum quendam*, and for *audio* n. on 41 *audierat.* Observe that Cic. writes *habitos*, not *haberi.* —— **placuisse**: 'some...have held as dogmas'; the word *placere* has often a much stronger sense than our 'please'. —— **mirabilia**: παράδοξα, a word which Cic. translated sometimes by *mirabilia* (Acad. 2, 136), sometimes by *admirabilia* (Parad. prooem. 4; Fin. 4, 74), sometimes by *admiranda.* —— **sed**: in contrast to *mirabilia* — 'paradoxes indeed, but'. —— **partim**: there is slight anacoluthon here; the sentence is closed without the second *partim* which should correspond to this, and its place is taken by *alios* at the beginning of the next sentence. Both *partim* and *alii* refer to *quibusdam.* Such anacolutha, where only one of a pair of words such as *alter — alter*, *alius — alius* etc. is expressed and the other replaced, in another sentence, by some other expression, are very common in Cic. Madvig has collected a large number of examples in the first excursus to his De Finibus. —— **fugiendas** etc.: Cic. is here evidently imitating a chorus of the Hippolytus of Euripides, 253 *et seq.* The sentiment is the same as that in Sophocles' Ajax 680 *et seq.* —— **nimias**: 'too strong', 'too close'. —— **sibi**: for the almost pleonastic use cf. Tusc. 5, 42 *omnia sibi in se posita censebit,* and the use in comedy of *suus sibi.* —— **laxissimas habenas**: a paraphrase of l. 256 of the passage ref. to above, εὔλυτα δ' εἶναι στέργηθρα φρενῶν. The collocation *habenas habere* seems in-

tentional; cf. 22 *vita vitalis.* Cf. also Lucr. 2, 1095. —— **quas**: here = *ita ut eas.* —— **adducas ... remittas**: for *adducere* 'to draw tight' cf. Verg. Aen. 9, 587 *a. habenas;* Liv. 9, 10 *quin adducis lorum?* For the position of *cum velis* see n. on 8 *cum summi viri tum amicissimi.* —— **caput**: 'the chief matter'; cf. *maximum est* in 69. —— **beate vivendum**: in the Latin of Cicero's time there was no one word to represent the Greek εὐδαιμονία = happiness. Cic. himself in one passage (N. D. 1, 95) coined *beatitas* and *beatitudo,* but did not again use the words, though they became current later. Cf. 84 *beata vita.* —— **securitatem**: Cic. uses this word as well to express the εὐθυμία ('cheerfulness') of Democritus, as the ἀπάθεια ('absence of emotion') of the Stoics, and the ἡδονή of Epicurus. (Seyffert). —— **tamquam parturiat**: a hesitating translation of ὠδίνειν in the passage of Euripides (l. 259); cf. n. on 49 *redamare.*

46. alios: the Cyrenaics and Epicureans; cf. 52 *homines deliciis diffluentes.* —— **dicere aiunt**: see n. on C. M. 27 *dixisse.* —— **inhumanius**: cf. *humanius* in Fin. 2, 82 where Cic. contrasts the sordid view of friendship put forward by Epicurus himself with the gentler views of his later followers. —— **locum**: 'topic'. —— **ante**: 26 *seq.* —— **haberet**: in quotations Cic. often puts the past tense where we should expect the present; *e.g.* N. D. 1, 40 *idemque disputat aethera esse eum quem homines Iovem appellarent.* The change to *quaerant* is odd. See Roby, 1517; Madvig, 382, Obs. 2; A. 287, *h*; G. 519; cf. H. 495, V. —— **appetere**: = ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐφίεσθαι; different from *expetere* = προαιρεῖσθαι. —— **mulierculae**: this diminutive here expresses pity: often however contempt; cf. γύναιον.

P. 19.—47. praeclaram: ironical, as often; cf. in Cat. 1, 28; Tusc. 1, 49. —— **solem enim** etc.: cf. closely 20, 22, and for the metaphor Att. 9, 10, 3 *sol, ut est in tua quadam epistula, e caelo cecidit.* —— **a dis**: *sc. datum.* —— **quae**: almost = *quanti,* 'of what worth?' —— **blanda**: 'enticing': an epithet often applied to the Epicurean ἡδονή (*voluptas*). —— **reapse**: cf. the common contrast between λόγῳ and ἔργῳ. Corssen II[2] 847 quotes from Festus a fragment of a speech by Scipio where *reque eapse* occurs. We have *i-p-se* and in Plautus *eo-p-se, eum-p-se, eam-p-se.* All these words contain the enclitic particle *pe* which appears in *nem-pe, quis-p-iam* etc.: also the remains of a lost demonstrative pronoun once declined *so-s, sa, sum,* the same in fact as the definite article ὁ, ἡ in Greek. The only difference in meaning between *reapse* and the simple *re* is one of emphasis. See n. on C. M.

25 *eumpse.* —— **multis locis**: not different in sense from 48 *multis in rebus.* For *locis* cf. 22 *nullo loco, pluribus locis.* —— **consentaneum**: 'consistent', *i. e.* 'with your other actions'. —— **rem**: = πρᾶγμα; *actionem* = πρᾶξιν 'course of action'. —— **fugimus**: 'intend to avoid'; the continuous sense of the present tense frequently borders on a future meaning. —— **aspernetur**: *sc. ut.* —— **bonitas**: 'kindheartedness'; little different from *benevolentia* in 19. —— **malitiam**: 'evil-heartedness', 'ill-will'. —— **temperantia**: σωφροσύνη, 'self-control', particularly with regard to bodily pleasures. —— **videas**: see ref. on 5 *velim.* —— **modestus**: not 'modest', but 'law-abiding'; here almost equivalent to our 'respectable'.

48. **cadit in**: 'belongs to', 'affects', 'falls within the province of'; a favorite phrase with Cic.; *e. g.* Acad. 1, 42; Tusc. 3, 12 *cadere, opinor, in sapientem aegritudinem tibi dixisti videri;* below, n. on 100. —— **aliquas**: note the difference to the sense which *ullas* for *aliquas* would make — the difference between getting rid of *some actual* troubles (*aliquas*) and *all possible* troubles (*ne...ullas*). —— **motu animi**: to be taken in a wide sense, as the context shows, both of emotions and of intellectual perceptions. The Stoics taught that the wise man should be absolutely unaffected by emotion, which they regarded as sinful. Cf. Tusc. IV, *passim.* Cf. n. on 10 *incommodis.* —— **dico**: this has for its real object the whole phrase *inter pecudem et hominem*, which may be treated as though between inverted commas, as also the whole phrase from *inter hominem* to *eiusdem.* Sometimes Cic. uses *non dicam* for *non dico* in such sentences. Cf. also n. on *ne dicam* in 82. —— **truncum aut saxum**: Cicero was no doubt thinking when he wrote this of the line in the Odyssey (19, 163) οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυός ἐσσι παλαιφάτου, οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης, which he imitates also in Acad. 2, 101. For *truncus* cf. N. D. 1, 84 *qui potest esse in eius modi trunco sapientia?* —— **isti**: the Stoics. —— **quandam**: often used with an adjective to soften the statement. H. 456, 2. Cf. in Greek the use of τὶς as in Xen. Mem. 1, 3, 12 ὡς δεινήν τινα λέγεις δύναμιν τοῦ φιλήματος εἶναι. —— **volunt**: n. on 29; also *volt esse* in 98. —— **cum...tum**: 'as...so'. —— **bonis...incommodis**: = *rebus secundis...adversis* in 17. —— **diffundatur**: *sc. virtus*, put here, after Cicero's fashion, for *vir praeditus virtute.* When the mind is *expanded* it is supposed to feel pleasure, when *contracted*, pain. The Stoics used the terms διαχεῖσθαι and συστέλλεσθαι, διάχυσις and συστολή. —— **non...repudientur**: the sentence is elliptic for *non plus*

quam angor qui capiendus est ex virtutibus valet ut etc. The *non* before *plus* would not be required by good English idiom, though in vulgar English 'not... *no* more than' is common for 'not... *any* more than'. —— **contrahat**: the subject is probably *quis* indefinite, omitted as in De Or. 1, 30 *quo velit* = *quo quis velit.* It may be, however, as Seyffert and Nauck make it, the whole clause *si... eluceat.* The subjunctive is causal. —— **supra**: an expression inadvertently used by Cic., for it implies writing and is inapplicable to a speech. Cf. however 15. In 8 we have *ut est a Fannio dictum.* —— **id cum contigit**: *cum* here simply = *quotiens.* On *contigit* see n. on 8. For *cum* with perfect tense cf. 94.

P. 20.—49. **aedificio**: see n. on C. M. 56 *porco* etc. —— **corporis... animante**: adversative asyndeton. —— **praedito**: as *animans* is exceptionally used of man it is here made masculine, but when it is applied to the lower animals, as in 81, it is generally feminine. —— **redamare**: coined by Cic. here to express ἀντιφιλεῖν and used by him nowhere else: it does not occur again in Latin literature till very late. *Ut ita dicam* is used to soften the harshness of this new word. —— **remuneratione**: this applies to *redamare* only, while *vicissitudine* applies to both *amare* and *redamare.*

50. quid? This little anticipatory question, like τί δέ in Greek, serves to draw special attention to what follows. Its meaning really is 'What do you think of this that I am going to say?' —— **addimus**: n. on *fugimus*, 47. —— **nihil esse** etc.: it will be seen that the comparison is not quite perfect, there being two members in the first branch (*nihil... rem ullam*) and three in the second (*amicitiam... [homines]... similitudo*). —— **similitudo**: properly this should be *similitudinem* in the same construction as *nihil*, but it is attracted into the same case with *quod.* Such attractions of case are common. —— **verum esse ut**: cf. 14 *sin autem illa veriora ut;* also 81 *apparet... ut;* 68 *spem afferunt ut.* When the clause after *verum est* is an infinitive clause, it is regarded as embodying a fact, when an *ut*-clause, a consequence or result. The meaning here may be represented thus: 'this result will be granted as true, so as to lead to the fact that the good love the good'. —— **quasi propinquitate**: 'a sort of relationship'; opposed to actual *propinquitas* (19). —— **natura**: 'natural affinity'. **appetentius**: when present participles lose the notion of time and become adjectives they may take a genitive case. —— **similium**: the *neuter plural of the* adjective in the genitive case used as substantive

is rare. —— **bonis inter bonos**: more emphatic than *bonis inter se*, which would have been more usual. —— **necessariam**: *sc. esse.* —— **qui**: the attraction of the relative in sentences like this is almost regular in Cicero, and indeed in most other writers of the best period; *e.g.* Pis. 57; Phil. 5, 39 *Pompeio patre, quod imperio populi Romani lumen fuit, exstincto.* Cf. n. on 18 *eam* etc. —— **amicitiae fons**: cf. 32. —— **inhumana**: 'unkindly'; *immunis*, 'unserviceable' (literally, free from *munia* or duties towards the state); *superba*, 'egotistic'. The last word is difficult to translate, as it combines the notions 'oppressive', 'proud', 'difficult of approach'. —— **quae**: = *cum ea.*

51. **fingunt**: as in 18 *quae finguntur aut optantur.* —— **amabilissimum**: n. on 4 *maxime memorabilem.* —— **amor ipse**: n. on 19 *natura ipsa.* —— **tum...si**: cf. n. on 25. —— **ab amico est profectum**: the word *proficisci* is often thus used in Cicero's letters of services passing between friends; *e.g.* Fam. 2, 19, 2 *quaecumque a me ornamenta in te proficiscentur*; ib. 3, 1, 1; so Nep. Att. 9, 4. —— **tantumque abest ut...ut**: this clumsy construction is a very favorite one with Cic. Note that with all good writers the verb in such phrases (*abest*, *afuit* etc.) is impersonal. See Madvig, 440, *a* and Obs. 1; A. 332, *d*; G. 556, Rem. 1; H. 502, 3. —— **indigentiam**: a rare word, scarcely occurring out of Cicero, who uses it above, 27, 29, and Tusc. 4, 16 and 21. —— **praesidi**: cf. 46. —— **alterius**: Cic. uses *indigere* far oftener with a genitive than with an ablative, though the latter is commoner in silver Latin. Cf. Roby, 1334–5. —— **atque**: here corrective = καίτοι, 'and yet'. —— **haud sciam an**: a well-attested though rare variant for *haud scio an*; cf. De Or. 1, 255; 2, 72 and 209. On the mood of *sciam* see references on 5 *tu velim.* —— **ne... quidem**: the reason for the negative will be seen by referring to n. on 20 *haud scio an.* —— **nihil...deesse**: Cic. is here striving to represent the Greek αὐτάρκης = self-sufficient, for which there was no one word in Latin. —— **ubi**: here = *qua in re* rather than *quo in loco.* Cf. Tusc. 5, 102 *cur igitur divitiae desiderentur, aut ubi paupertas beatos esse non sinit?* ib. 121 *me conscripturum libros arbitror — ubi enim melius uti possumus hoc ... otio?* —— **studia nostra**: the strength and ardor of my affection.

P. 21. — **Scipio eguisset**: see however 30 *quid enim? Africanus indigens mei?*

52. **homines deliciis diffluentes**: 'men enervated by pleasure';

cf. De Or. 3, 131 *otio diffluentes;* Off. 1, 106 *diffluere luxuria;* Terent. Haut. 5, 1, 73 *d. luxuria et lascivia;* Tusc. 2, 52 *liquescimus fluimusque mollitia;* Liv. 7, 29, 5 *fluentes luxu;* also the phrase *fluxa corpora*, and the uses of *solvi*, *dissolvi*, *frangi*, *debilitari* and the like. *Diffluere* is rather rare, not occurring in Caesar, Nepos, Vergil, Horace or Ovid, and only once in Cicero's speeches. The *homines* meant are of course the Epicureans and Cyrenaics, as in 46. —— **habent cognitam**: see n. on C. M. 66 *sollicitam habere.* In such phrases we have the first step towards the conversion of *habere* into an auxiliary verb, which is completed in the Romance languages. Cf. also 97 *exploratum habeas.* See Brachet, Historical French Grammar, Bk. 2, Part 2. —— **ut**: 'on condition that', 'so as neither to...' Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 9, 9, 3 οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἕλοιτ' ἂν καθ' αὑτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθά. Cicero's words are so near to Aristotle's as almost to look like a translation. Nägelsbach § 96, 2 points out that Cic. here is trying to represent μήτε φιλῶν μήτε φιλούμενος, and gives some instructive remarks on the modes in Latin of replacing the present participle passive. —— **circumfluere**: Verr. 3, 9 *istum rebus omnibus undique ereptis eludentem circumfluere atque abundare.* —— **nulla fides**: cf. Ennius, quoted in Off. 1, 26, *Nulla sancta societas nec fides regni;* Luc. Phar. 1, 92 *Nulla fides regni sociis;* Bacon, Essay on Friéndship, 'Princes... cannot gather this fruit' (of friendship). —— **benevolentiae... fiducia**: in the best prose writers *fides* and *fiducia* nearly always take the objective genitive ('trust in'); the dative, however, is found in the poets, as Verg. Aen. 3, 69 *fides pelago;* ib. 10, 152 *fiducia rebus.* Even with the phrases *fidem facere*, *fiduciam facere*, the construction in good prose is generally *alicuius rei*, not *alicui rei.*

53. quis enim etc.: cf. Off. 1, 97 *si Aeacus aut Minos diceret 'oderint dum metuant';* Phil. 1, 34 *in fabulis ipsi illi qui 'oderint dum metuant' dixerit.* —— **dumtaxat ad tempus**: 'but only for a season'. *Dumtaxat* in the best writers is merely corrective, introducing an exception upon some word or words preceding, here on *coluntur*. *Taxat* is probably a subjunctive of the lost Latin aorist (here the weak aorist) from *tangĕre* a form of *tongĕre* (*denken*, *think*). Oscan forms, *tangino-m*, *tangino-d* = *scitum*, *scito* (or *iussu* or *decreto*) are preserved. The formation of *taxat* will be then practically the same as that of λέξῃ. For the dropping of the nasal cf. σφίγγω, ἔσφιξα; θιγγάνω, θίξω. The original meaning of *dumtaxat* would thus be 'provided one knows the matter'. The verb *taxare* is used only in late Latin. —— **ad tem-**

pus: cf. 27 *ad quoddam tempus.* —— **si...tum**: n. on 25. —— **quod**: 'and this'; the sentence from *tum* to the end is really explanatory of *quod.* —— **exsulantem**: almost parenthetic; explanatory of *tum.* —— **gratiam referre**: 'to make a return'; *gratiam* here includes the notion of disservice as well as that of service. Cf. Att. 2, 9, 1 *ut sciat hic noster Hierosolymarius traductor ad plebem quam bonam meis putidissimis orationibus gratiam rettulerit;* Sull. 47 *nunc tecum sic agam, tulisse ut potius iniuriam quam rettulisse gratiam videar.*

54. illa superbia: for *illa*, 'well-known', see A. 102, *b*; G. 292, 2; H. 450, 4. For *superbia* see n. on 50 *inhumana.* —— **importunitate**: 'wrongheadedness', 'perversity'; cf. Cic. Rep. 1, 62 *non vides unius importunitate et superbia Tarquini nomen huic populo in odium venisse regium?* —— **quemquam amicum**: since the best writers do not use *quisquam* as an adjective, *amicum* must be taken as an appositive of *quemquam.* Cf. n. on C. M. 21 *quemquam senem.* —— **atque**: = καὶ μὴν, καὶ δή = 'now', or 'again'; so *ac* in 32. —— **multorum opes praepotentium**: n. on 30 *multae et magnae.* Note the position of *praepotentium;* put there it introduces a limitation on *multorum*, 'the power of many, I mean of those who are very powerful'. —— **non solum ipsa**: cf. Theocr. 10, 19 οὐκ αὐτὸς (not alone) τυφλὸς... ὁ πλοῦτος ἀλλὰ χὠφρόντιστος ἔρως, where the Scholiast quotes Menander, ὁ πλοῦτος τυφλόν, τυφλοὺς δ' ἐς αὐτὸν ἐμβλέποντας δεικνύει. Pacuvius 366 (Ribbeck) *fortunam insanam esse et caecam et brutam perhibent philosophi;* Plin. 2, § 22 *fortuna...a plerisque vero et caeca existimata.* —— **fere**: n. on 2 *tum fere.* —— **fastidio et contumacia**: the κόρος and ἄτη or ὕβρις of the Greek dramatists. Trans. 'wantonness and stiffneckedness'. Seyffert quotes a curious passage of Plin. N. H. 16, § 134 (of plants) *non omnia in omnibus locis nasci docuimus. Hoc alias fit fastidio, alias contumacia, alias imbecillitate.* —— **insipiente fortunato**: Aristot. Rhet. 2, 16 talks of the ἀνόητος εὐδαίμων. For the words cf. Qu. Fr. 1, 3, 1 *quandam effigiem spirantis mortui;* Phil. 11, 20 *nihil agenti privato;* Att. 12, 21, 5 *fortis aegroti.* On *insipiente*, 'fool', see Madvig, 301, *a*, Obs.; A. 188 and Rem.; G. 195, Rem. 1; H. 441, 2. —— **videre licet**: when used parenthetically these words passed into *videlicet*, which very word Lucret. 1, 210 uses with the ordinary construction of *videre licet.* —— **antea**: proleptic; cf. n. on 7 *reliqua.* —— **commodis**: 'affable'; *commodus* here has very much the sense of *communis* in 65; cf. Mur. 66 *quemquamne existimas Catone commodiorem, communiorem, moderatiorem fuisse ad*

omnem rationem humanitatis? Cornif. ad Herenn. 4, 25 contrasts the *commodus* with the *vir intolerabili superbia.* —— **imperio potestate:** originally *potestas* at Rome had a very wide meaning, denoting all power exercised by public authority and so including *imperium.* Then as certain officers (consul, praetor, dictator) had *imperium,* while others (censor, aedile, etc.) had not, the word *potestas* came to be particularly used in connection with the latter class of officers. Trans. 'by power and office'. —— **sperni:** the words from *sperni* to *novis* are explanatory of *immutari;* in such cases the connecting *et* is often left out — an usage called by grammarians *asyndeton explicativum.* On *novis* (*sc. amicitiis*) dat. after impers. passive, see Madvig, 244, *b*; A. 230; G. 208; H. 384, 5.

55. copiis... opibus: 'riches, resources, prosperity'; the three words differ very little in meaning. *Plurimum posse* 'to be very influential'. —— **cetera:** proleptic.

P. 22. — **amicos:** adversative asyndeton. —— **ut ita dicam:** Cic. is apparently translating κτῆμα in such passages as Xen. Mem. 2, 4, 1 πάντων κτημάτων κράτιστον ἂν εἴη φίλος. For *ut ita dicam* in a translation cf. n. on 49 *redamare;* for the metaphor in *supellex,* Orat. 80 *oratoria quasi supellex;* Sen. Ep. 58, 18 *ideae, propria Platonis supellex;* Acad. 2, 31 and Sen. Ep. 2, 5, 8 *vitae instrumentum.* —— **eius:** A. 214, *c*; G. 365; H. 402, 403. —— **istorum:** = *istarum rerum.* —— **vicit viribus:** the alliteration is evidently intentional; cf. Mil. 30 *vi victa vis,* also Lael. 45. —— **sed haec hactenus:** a common formula for winding up one subject and passing on to another; 'but enough of this'. So Fam. 6, 2, 3.

56. constituendi sunt etc.: for *constituendum est* etc. by attraction to the construction of the clause *qui sint* etc. Cf. 63 *perspiciuntur quam sint leves;* also n. on 35 *deserere,* and De Or. 2, 137 *quaeruntur qualia sint;* ib. 243; N. D. 2, 115. Madvig on Fin. 5, 58 says this kind of attraction is used only by Cicero. —— **fines et quasi termini:** *finis* was very commonly used in the metaphorical sense, *terminus* less commonly; hence the *quasi.* —— **diligendi:** beware of taking this as nom. pl. —— **video:** See n. on 39 *videmus.* —— **ferri:** 'are usually stated'. Cf. 6 *ferrebantur.* —— **unam:** this was an opinion which the Epicureans managed to entertain. Though they based friendship on utility (Diog. Laert. 10, 120) still they said that the full benefit of friendship would not be reaped unless a man loved his friend just as himself. Cf. Fin. 1, 68 *quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga*

amicum, quo in se ipsum; also the whole passage there from 65 to 70. —— **alteram**: this is the opinion of those who regard friendship as a barter of services; see below, 58. —— **pariter aequaliterque**: n. on 32 *pares* etc. —— **quanti**: see n. on 37 *tanti.*

57. prorsus: goes with *nulli,* not with *assentior;* 'to none at all'. —— **faceremus** etc.: for the sense cf. 26. —— **causa amicorum**: the repetition of *causa,* which is often left out in the second place, as in 46, is no doubt due to the desire to complete the chiasmus. —— **precari**: note the omission of *aliquid.* —— **supplicare**: *sc. alicui.* —— **acerbius invehi insectari vehementius**: chiasmus. —— **non satis**: 'not very'. —— **multaeque res sunt** etc.; not for *multaeque a l i a e res sunt* etc., but this clause repeats and gives more exactly the general statement contained in the words *quam multa ... amicorum.* —— **viri boni** etc.: it will be seen that in this section Cicero gives a peculiar turn to the meaning of the first opinion of the three above enumerated. He takes it to imply that a man must always a c t with regard to his friend just as he would in his own case, but the opinion itself probably had regard not to action but to feeling and implied that l o v e between friends should be equal. It is in this sense that Cic. himself understands the opinion in Tusc. 3, 73 *praeclarum illud est et, si quaeris, rectum quoque et verum ut eos qui nobis carissimi esse debeant aeque ac nosmet ipsos amemus.* The opinion in fact was an answer to the question discussed by Aristotle in Eth. Nic. 9, c. 8 πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά and in the words of the next clause it *definiebat amicitiam paribus voluntatibus.*

58. definit: 'restricts friendship to an equal interchange of services and feelings'. —— **exigue et exiliter**: 'with minuteness and exactness'. —— **calculos**: properly the pebbles used in the *abacus* for counting; here 'to an account'. Cf. *faeneramur* in 31. —— **ratio acceptorum**: cf. closely 26, 31. —— **datorum**: the usual contrast to *acceptorum* in the language of Roman book-keeping is *expensorum.* The phrase *accepti expensique ratio* 'a debtor and creditor account' is common. —— **divitior**: Cic. uses this form, not *ditior,* and *divitissimus,* not *ditissimus.* —— **observare** etc.: Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 8, 7 and 8, 13, 1 lays down that there is a class of friendships καθ' ὑπεροχὴν where there cannot be an equal exchange of services.

P. 23. — acceperit: subjunc. with *quam.* A. 332, *b*; H. 502, 2. —— **neque enim** etc.: *i. e.* if the friendship be true all such fears fall to the ground. —— **excidat ... defluat ... congeratur**: the metaphors are all from measuring articles of commerce.

59. se ipse: n. on 5 *te ipse.* —— **quibusdam**: the persons here meant are the 'small-souled men' (μικρόψυχοι) described by Aristot. Eth. Nic. 4, 3, 35. —— **eum**: = *talem virum.* —— **ille**: referring to the same person to which *eum* refers. Had *ille* been left out the subject of *est* might have been taken to be *amicus* supplied from *amici* in the preceding clause. It was necessary therefore to insert a pronoun, and according to Latin usage the change from *eum* to *ille* was needed; to repeat *is* would have been unusual. The following examples are precisely similar: Sest. 7 *et ad eum filiam eius adduxit, ut ille aliquam partem maeroris sui deponeret;* Prov. Cons. 1 *quonam me animo in eos esse oportet, cuius illi salutem pro pignore tradiderunt.* So αὐτός and ἐκεῖνος often refer (in the same sentence) to the same person; *e. g.* Plato, Phaedo 111 B τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι. —— **inducat spem**: cf. n. on 4 *induxi.* —— **vocem**: see n. on C. M. 27 *vox.* —— **inimiciorem amicitiae**: oxymoron; see n. on 23 *absentes adsunt.* —— **esset osurus**: the subject of the verb is the same as the unexpressed subject of the infinitive *amare;* cf. 62; 82 *ipsum.* —— **adduci**: by a common idiom, a positive verb (*dicebat*) must be supplied from *negabat* above. —— **putaretur**: *sc. dictum esse.* —— **Biante**: the saying is ascribed to Bias of Priene by Aristotle Rhet. 2, 13, 23 (whence Cic., who knew the Rhetoric well, probably took it) and Diog. Laert. 1, 87, but to Chilon, another of the Seven, by Gellius, Noct. Att. 1, 3, 30. The sentiment was put by Sophocles into the mouth of Ajax (see nn. on 45), and is repeated by Demosth. Aristoc. p. 660. —— **septem**: n. on 7. —— **impuri**: adversative asyndeton. —— **omnia...revocantis**: cf. 32 *ad voluptatem omnia referunt.* —— **amicus...ei**: n. on 39 *Aemilium Luscino.* —— **peccet**: n. on 37 *peccati.* —— **sibi**: the person meant is the same as the unexpressed subject of the infinitives *cupere* and *optare.* It is rather remarkable to find *sibi* following immediately on a verb the subject of which is a different person. —— **tamquam**: qualifies the metaphor in *ansas.* —— **ansas ad**: the usual construction is *ansam dare,* or *praebere alicuius rei.* —— **ad reprehendendum**: 'for criticism'; it is possible however that *reprehendendum* has here the literal sense 'to catch hold of' as in Acad. 2, 139 *revocat virtus vel potius reprehendit manu.*

60. comparandis: so Fin. 1, 66 *amicitias comparare.* —— **ut ne**: n. on 42 *ne.* —— **minus felices**: euphemism for *infelices;* so *minus iustae* in 61; *nec facillime* in 99. —— **ferendum**: Diog. Laert. 1, 60

quotes a saying of Solon: φίλους μὴ ταχὺ κτῶ· οὓς δ' ἂν κτήσῃ, μὴ ἀποδοκίμαζε. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 9, 3 discusses the causes which may justify the dissolution of friendships. —— **tempus**: καιρόν, an occasion.

P. 24. — 61. sine ulla exceptione: attributive. —— **aut caput agatur aut fama**: for the arrangement of the words cf. n. on 8 *cum* etc. *Caput* is *status*, or condition regarding civil rights, which in the Roman Law was viewed with reference to liberty (*status libertatis*), citizenship (*status civitatis*), and domestic position (*status familiae*). See Hadley's, or Hunter's, Introd. to Roman Law. The cases alluded to are those which might lead to *deminutio capitis*, the loss of civil rights. In *fama* the reference is to trials involving *infamia* as part of the punishment which may result from them. —— **declinandum de via sit**: on the nice question of casuistry, how far one is to condone the wrong doings of a friend, Laelius is conveniently vague, as Gellius in his criticism of this passage (Noct. Att. 1, 3, 14) complains. The passage becomes the more unsatisfactory when we go back to Laelius' first principle in 18 *nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse*. Aristotle's discussion of the matter (Eth. Nic. 9, 4, 3) is more careful though still vague. Roman popular morality required a man to go much greater lengths in assisting a friend than would be allowed even by the popular morality of our time; this is expressed in the words *modo ne summa turpitudo sequatur*. —— **possit**: subjunctive of characteristic. *Quatenus* is here a relative adverb. Roby, 1680, 1686. —— **nec... fama**: *i. e. propter amicum*. —— **res**: here = *publicas res*. —— **telum**: for the metaphorical use cf. the old line quoted by Cic. in Fam. 7, 16, 1: *usquequaque sapere oportet: id erit telum acerrimum*. —— **blanditiis et assentando**: it is not often that Cic. makes the gerund thus range with a noun, though the usage is exceedingly common in Tacitus and his contemporaries. Cf. Fin. 3, 34.

62. cuius... de amicitia: 'from whom entirely proceeded the discourse concerning friendship'; *not* 'whose whole discourse was of friendship'. —— **diligentiores**: 'more painstaking', *i. e.* 'than in friendship'. —— **capras et ovis**: imitated from Xenoph. Mem. 2, 4, 4; 2, 4, 1. —— **non posse dicere**: n. on 19; cf. also 73 *potuit... non potuit*. —— **in amicis**: asyndeton; cf. n. on 13 *tum*. —— **quasi signa quaedam et notas**: a tentative translation of the Greek σημεῖον or κριτήριον, which Cic. elsewhere renders by *iudicium* (Academ. *passim*) or *nota* merely (Acad. 2, 84); cf. also N. D. 1, 12 *certa iudicandi*

et assentiendi nota. In Xen. Mem. 2, 6 Socrates describes the signs that should lead to the choosing of a friend. —— **firmi etc.:** these adjectives describe the *vir gravis, gravitas* being the chief part of the ideal Roman character. —— **expertum:** acc. masc.; almost equals *expertus sis.* —— **praecurrit:** φθάνει, 'outstrips'.

63. sustinere: 'to check'; for *sustinere* 'to pull up' cf. Acad. 2, 94 *ut agitator callidus...equos sustinebo;* Att. 13, 21, 3; Fam. 9, 8, 1 *me sustinebam.* —— **utamur...temptatis:** cf. 68 *utatur...intractato.* Cf. Theognis 119; Aristot. Eth. Nic. 8, 3, 8; *utamur,* 'find'. —— **periclitatis:** used in a passive sense like *meditatus* and a large number of other deponent participles, the usage being quite common in Cicero; see n. on C. M. 4 *adeptam.* —— **perspiciuntur:** see n. on 56 *constituendi sunt qui sint fines.* —— **quam sint leves:** n. on C. M. 15. —— **movere non potuit:** 'could not have changed'. For this sense of *movere* (= *de statu movere*) cf. pro Scauro fragm. 45 *quem purpura regalis non commovit, eum Sardorum mastruca mutavit?* —— **sin vero:** a rare combination of particles; Cic. nearly always says *si vero.* —— **honores magistratus:** not essentially different from *imperia potestates,* for which see 54.

P. 25. —**obscuratum iri:** 'they think their fault will be forgotten' (*i. e.* in the blaze of their prosperity). —— **amicitia:** the repetition is made for the sake of emphasis.

64. ubi invenias: *i. e. si quaeras;* but above, *ubi inveniemus;* with the future the search is looked on as likely to take place, with the subjunctive, as not likely. —— **quid:** n. on 50. —— **haec ut omittam:** observe the fondness of Cic. for placing *ut* second word in the clause or sentence. He nearly always says *nihil ut, non ut, sic ut* and the like and not *vice versa.* —— **descendant:** cf. *descendere in certamen,* also *in causam* (Cic. Phil. 8, 4), and the similar uses with *decurrere, devenire.* —— **Ennius:** see n. on C. M. 1; also, Sellar, Roman Poets of the Republic, Ch. 4. —— **recte:** the omission of a *verbum dicendi* is particularly common in quotations. —— **amicus etc.:** the line is known only from this passage. It appears to be imitated from Euripides, Hecuba 1226 ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ σαφέστατοι φίλοι. —— **aut si...aut:** the omission of the second *si* is awkward; possibly *cum* has fallen out after the second *aut;* cf. Fin. 2, 15 *si aut...aut cum.* —— **in bonis rebus:** *sc. suis.* —— **contemnunt:** *sc. amicos.* —— **in malis:** *sc. amicorum.* —— **utraque in re...in amicitia:** somewhat careless writing. —— **ex...genere:** *sc. esse.*

65. eius: goes with *constantiae.* —— **simplicem**: 'frank', 'open'. —— **communem**: 'sociable'; cf. Nep. Milt. 8, 4 *summa humanitas, mira communitas;* so κοινός in Greek. —— **consentientem** etc.: 'sympathetic'. —— **par est**: = *aequum est* in 26. Cf. 82. —— **fidelitatem**: = *fides* above. —— **multiplex**: here 'deceitful', but often a word of praise, as in Acad. 1, 17 *Platonis qui varius et multiplex* ('many-sided') *et copiosus fuit.* Cf. Plato Repub. 397 E διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς, where πολλαπλοῦς has the same meaning as *multiplex* in our passage. Cf. also below 88. —— **tortuosum**: this word is generally used of complicated logical arguments, as in Acad. 2, 98; cf. Tusc. 3, 22 *contortius;* ib. 2, 42 *contortis conclusiunculis.* —— **neque vero**: n. on 42. —— **inferendis...oblatis**: chiasmus. —— **fit**: 'is shown to be'. —— **quod...dixi**: in 18.

P. 26.—**boni viri...sapientem**: cf. 18, 100. —— **fictum...simulatum**: the same words in 26. —— **aperte vel odisse**: 'to go openly the length of hatred'; for *vel* cf. 43 *vel bellum.* —— **ingenui**: here in the same sense as in Vergil's line *ingenui voltus puer ingenuique pudoris*—'frank'. —— **occultare**: stronger than *celare;* implies deliberate and habitual concealment. —— **semper...violatum**: the clause is an explanation of the one word *suspiciosum.*

66. suavitas: cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 8, 6, 1. —— **in omni re**: attributive. —— **illa quidem**: see n. on 41 *is quidem.*

67. quaestio: here like the ἀπορία of Aristotle, a problem to be solved. —— **vetulis**: this word usually expresses something of contempt, as when applied to a woman (*vetula*). —— **indigna homine dubitatio**: in apposition to all of tne sentence that precedes; cf. 71 *odiosum genus;* 79 *rarum genus.* —— **veterrima quaeque**: n. on 34 *optimis quibusque.* For the comparison cf. C. M. 65 *sic se res* etc. —— **quod dicitur**: n. on 19 *crassa Minerva.* —— **modios salis**: cf. Eth. Nic. 8, 3, 8; Eth. Eudem. 7, 2. —— **ut...sit**: *i. e.* to achieve friendship.

68. spem afferunt ut: cf. n. on *verum est ut* in 50. —— **herbis**: here = the green shoots of corn. Seyffert quotes Ov. Her. 17, 263 *sed nimium properas et adhuc tua messis in herba est.* —— **fallacibus**: so Horace, Od. 3, 1, 30 calls an unproductive farm *mendax.* Cf. also Tibullus, 2, 1, 19 *et seges eludit messem f a l l a c i b u s h e r b i s.* —— **fructus appareat**: *sc. futurus.* —— **illae quidem**: see above, 66. —— **vetustatis**: *vetustas* is often used alone for *vetustas amicitiae;* cf. Acad. 1, 1 *vetustate amicitiae coniunctum* with Fam. 13, 32, 2 *vetustate*

coniunctos; so below, 74. —— **ipso equo**: 'even in the case of the horse'. —— **quin**: A. 319, *d*; G. 556, Rem. 6, 550, Rem. 3; H. 504, 1. —— **quo consuevit**: *sc. uti.* —— **montuosis etiam**: the ancients generally felt little or no admiration for wild and mountainous scenery. Cicero had more feeling for wild picturesqueness than most Romans.

69. maximum: = *caput est* in 45; cf. 29 *quod maius est.* —— **superiorem** etc.: *superiorem* is explained by 70 *praestantiam virtutis, ingeni, fortunae.* Cf. 32 *sintque pares in amore et aequales;* also 56. Like Cicero, Aristotle accepts equality as essential to the highest kind of friendship, as in Eth. Nic. 8, 5, 5 λέγεται φιλότης ἡ ἰσότης; 8, 7, 3 ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ. He discusses elaborately the question how this equality is to be understood and secured in friendships of different kinds, but he admits that there are friendships, such as that of parents for children, in which it cannot be secured (8, 13, 1 τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχήν).

P. 27. — **excellentiae quaedam**: 'certain superiorities' = ὑπεροχαί τινες; cf. 73 *quamvis excellas;* Aristot. Eth. Nic. 8, 13, 1. —— **grege**: the word *grex* was often applied to philosophical schools, as in De Or. 1, 42 *philosophorum greges*, with which cf. Acad. 1, 34 *Polemo et Crates unaque Crantor in Academia congregati.* Trans. 'in our flock, if I may so call it'. For *ut ita dicam* used like *quasi, tamquam, quidam* etc. to qualify expressions either too strong or unusual cf. 49 with n. —— **Philo ... Rupilio ... Mummio**: see Introd. p. v. —— **Maximum**: *i. e. Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus*, the eldest son of Paulus Macedonicus, and adopted into the family of the Fabii. Africanus gave up to him his share in the inheritance of their common father. See Paradoxa 48 *liberalitatem Africani qui* (*Pauli*) *hereditatis Q. Maximo fratri partem suam concessit.* —— **omnino**: here = 'no doubt', 'indeed', 'it is true'; so in 98, where however the contrast is introduced by *autem*, as in C. M. 45 by *sed*, and in C. M. 28, Tusc. 2, 35 by *sed tamen.* —— **is**: the insertion of a pronoun was necessary, otherwise the subject to *anteibat* might have been supposed to be Africanus, supplied from *sibi.* —— **suosque omnis** etc.: see 11 *liberalitate in sorores.*

70. si: note *si* followed by *si*, the suppositions being parallel, and not contrasted with each other. Had they been contrasted *sive — sive* or *si — sin* would have been needed. In one sentence in Livy (4, 5, 5) *si* is thus eight times repeated. —— **imbecilliore animo vel fortuna**: these are the persons mentioned in 59 *in quibusdam ... fractior.* ——

opes...dignitati: chiasmus, since *opes* refers to *fortuna*, *honori et dignitati* to *animo*. If one's friend is *imbecillo animo* (μικρόψυχος), *i. e.* thinking meanly of himself, one must try to confer distinction on him; if he is poor, wealth. —— **honori**: n. on 15 *cordi*. —— **fabulis**: 'legends', such as that of Romulus and Remus, to which the words *deorum—pastores* rather point. —— **ignorationem**: some of the inferior MSS. have *ignorantiam*, a word which is now found in only one passage of Cicero in good editions, viz. Acad. 1, 42, and even there it cannot but be suspected, as we now possess no MS. of that portion of Cicero older than the fifteenth century. The only other passages in good prose where *ignorantia* occurs are Caes. B. C. 3, 68, 2 and Nep. Ages. 8, 5; Pelop. 1, 1. —— **stirpis et generis**: 'stock and family'; the only difference being that *stirpis* is the wider word of the two. How slight the difference is may be seen from the following passages: Verg. Aen. 4, 622 *stirpem et genus omne futurum exercete odiis;* ib. 8, 628 *illic genus omne futurae stirpis ab Ascanio;* ib. 9, 603 *durum ab stirpe genus;* Seneca, Oedip. 124 *stirpis invictae genus interimus;* Attius 208 (Ribbeck) *summum periclum contaminari stirpem ac misceri genus*. —— **famulatu**: = θητείᾳ, free service, as opposed to *servitute* = δουλείᾳ.

71. **coniunctionisque**: the *coniunctio* is the natural association produced by kinship and the like, mentioned in 19. —— **superiores**: for the construction *superior esse in aliqua re* cf. pro Balbo 35 *in foedere inferior*. —— **non dolere**: the true friendships, Aristotle says, are free from offence (ἀδιάβλητοι, Eth. Nic. 8, 6, 7; ἀνέγκλητοι, ib. 9, 2, 7). —— **queant**: *queo* is rarely used in affirmative sentences by good writers, but the usage is well attested within narrow limits; cf. Tusc. 5, 108; C. M. 32; De Rep. 2, 6; also found in Sallust and Columella. See n. on C. M. 32. —— **odiosum genus**: in apposition with *plerique;* cf. 67, 79. —— **officia exprobrantium**: Seyffert quotes Demosth. De Cor. 316 νομίζω...ὀνειδίζειν; Ter. Andr. 1, 1, 16 *nam istaec commemoratio quasi exprobratio et immemoris benefici;* Seneca, De Beneficiis 2, 10, 4 *inter prima praecepta et maxime necessaria sit, ne umquam exprobrem, immo ne admoneam quidem. Haec enim beneficii inter duos lex est: alter statim oblivisci debet dati, alter accepti numquam.* **commemorare**: n. on 15.

72. **submittere**: *i. e.* 'to be modest'. —— **sic etc.**: *i. e. sic debent ei qui superiores sunt extollere eos qui sunt inferiores.*

P. 28. — **contemni**: 'slighted' or 'neglected'. *Contemnere* is

hardly ever so strong in meaning as our word 'despise', which is commonly used to translate it. See n. on C. M. 43 *spreta et contempta.* —— **contingit**: n. on 8. —— **qui**: 'and they'.

73. ille: *sc. possit.* —— **non...neque**: cf. n. on 10. There is a slight anacoluthon, the form of the sentence being changed; for the proper clause introduced by a second *neque* the clauses introduced by *ut* are substituted. Cf. n. on 45 *partim.* The unemphatic *tu* should be noticed; it is our English 'you' for 'one'. —— **excellas**: cf. *excellentiae* in 69. —— **perducere**: *i. e.* through all the various grades. *Producere* (which some editions have) is simply 'to advance', without the notion of gradation. —— **potuit...non potuit**: cf. n. on 19. In Tusc. 4, 40 Rupilius is said to have taken his brother's defeat greatly to heart; and Pliny, Nat. Hist. 7, § 122 enlarges the story by making him die immediately on hearing the result of the election. —— **efficere**: *facere* would not do here, since *facere aliquem consulem* means 'to vote for some one's election as consul'.

74. corroboratis...aetatibus: the *confirmata* or *corroborata aetas* is the time of life immediately succeeding youth, the καθεστηκυῖα ἡλικία of Thucydides; cf. pro Caelio 41 *qua varietate non modo haec aetas sed iam corroborata caperetur.* The opposite expression is *infirmissimum tempus aetatis* in Acad. 2, 9; Flacc. 5. —— **habere**: the construction is carried on as though *oportet iudicare de amicitiis* or something similar had preceded; old edd. indeed insert *oportet*, which is unnecessary. In Fin. 2, 103 *quod si dies notandus fuit, eumne potius quo natus an eum quo sapiens factus est* the words *oportet notare* have to be supplied from *notandus.* In his n. there Madvig excellently illustrates the usage both from Latin and from Greek. —— **isto modo**: 'on that principle'. —— **nutrices et paedagogi**: at Rome these were generally slaves. —— **vetustatis**: n. on 68. —— **quidem**: here concessive, 'I admit', as in 13. —— **alio quodam modo**: n. on 6. —— **mores** etc.: *mores* is probably in the accusative, not, as Lahm. suggests, in the nominative = *homines disparibus moribus; homines sequuntur studia* is certainly not Latin. For the *morum similitudo* as a necessary condition of friendship cf. 15, 27, 33 (*mutari...mores*), 50; also Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 8, 1, 6; 8, 3, 6; 8, 8, 5; 9, 3, 3. —— **boni...possunt**: cf. 18. —— **nisi quod**: used after negative statements to introduce a limitation or exception. Madvig, 442, *c*, Obs. 3; G. 592, Rem. 3; H. 555, III. 1. —— **distantia**: a *vox Ciceroniana.* The word is in good Latin never used of distance in space. Aristotle several times dis-

cusses the question how great a difference in character or other circumstances is required to render friendships impossible. Cf. Eth. Nic. 8, 7, 4.

75. quaedam: n. on 6 *alio quodam.* —— **nec enim**: followed by *et saepe* instead of *nec;* for the slight anacoluthon cf. 79, 104. —— **fabulas**: n. on 70; cf. Off. 3, 94 *ut redeamus ad fabulas.* —— **Neoptolemus**: or Pyrrhus, son of Achilles by Deidamia, daughter of Lycomedes, king of Scyros. He appears in the Philoctetes as an ambassador to that hero, without whose bow it was fated Troy should not fall. Welcker thinks that Cicero here refers to a scene in a lost play of Sophocles entitled αἱ Σκύριαι. —— **impedientem**: see n. on C. M. 11 *dividenti.*

P. 29. — **mollisque**: the *que* merely connects *infirmus* with *mollis* and does not correspond with the first *et.* In Cicero and the best writers *et* and *que* do not correspond. Trans. 'is not only weak and effeminate, but also...'. —— **parum iustus**: 'far from reasonable'; *parum* almost = *non*, as *minus* in 23.

b. Friendships of Common People. 76–100.

76. atque... impetrari: this is a little summary of 73–75. Such summaries are often introduced by *atque* = 'now', as in Acad. 1, 42. —— **in omni re**: 'on every occasion'. —— **iam enim etc.**: the *verae amicitiae* or *perfectae* are *sempiternae;* see 32 and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 8, 3, 7. The question of the dissolution of friendships was partially discussed in 32 *seq.* and is considered by Aristotle in Eth. Nic. 9, 3. —— **sapientium**: = *virorum bonorum* as defined in 21. —— **volgaris amicitias**: these differ only in degree from the *verae amicitiae,* being based on a less degree of *virtus,* since *virtus a caritate volgi non abhorret* (50), hence they must not be confounded with the φιλίαι based on τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ ὠφέλιμον which Aristotle so often discusses. These latter friendships Cicero refuses to deal with; see 58 etc. —— **oratio delabitur**: so 100 *oratio defluxit;* cf. Qu. Fr. 1, 1, 18 *ad praecipiendi rationem delapsa est oratio mea.* For the sense also 100 is to be compared. —— **tum... tum**: here purely temporal, 'at one time, at another'. —— **alienos**: n. on 19. —— **quorum**: = *talium ut.* —— **usus**: = *consuetudinis,* κοινωνίας, as in 32; cf. 2 *utebare multum.* —— **eluendae**: the word *eluere,* lit. 'to wipe out', is particularly used of disgrace or crime; *e.g. eluere maculam* in Sest. 63; Verr. 5, 121;

scelus in Verg. Aen. 6, 742. —— **ut Catonem dicere audivi**: 'as I have been told Cato used to say', not 'as I have heard Cato say' which would require *dicentem* or *cum diceret*. See ref. on C. M. 3 *admirantis*. —— **dissuendae** etc.: cf. Off. 1, 120 *amicitias magis decere censent sapientes sensim diluere quam repente praecidere;* below, 78 *exstinctae potius quam oppressae*. Observe *magis* in the one place and *potius* in the other, for which cf. n. on 27. —— **exarserit**: from *exardescere*, the verb *exardere* occurring only in very late Latin, as in the Vulgate. The metaphorical use is exceedingly common in Cicero; cf. 29. —— **statim**: cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 9, 3, 2.

77. aut morum aut studiorum: the first *aut* corresponds to *aut* before *in rei publicae*. It is exceedingly likely that the second *aut* should be changed into *et;* cf. 74 *morum studiorumque*. —— **commutatio...solet**: 33 *mutari etiam mores hominum saepe*. —— **in rei publicae partibus**: *i.e.* 'in connection with political parties'. —— **communibus**: = *volgaribus* in 76. —— **Q. Pompei** etc.: the grandfather of the Pompeius mentioned in 2; he raised himself to the consulship as a *novus homo* in 141 B.C. (Brut. 96; Verr. 5, 181). Laelius was a candidate and Pompeius was said to have promised Scipio that he would not stand himself but support Laelius. —— **Metello**: *i.e. Macedonico*, the praetor of 148, who commanded in Greece till 146, when he returned and was the leader of the anti-Scipionic party. The quarrel, which was very famous, began with the despatch of Mummius, who was connected with the Scipios, to command in Achaia. Metellus became consul in 143 after two failures, and commanded against Viriathus. In 131 he was censor and lived till 115. He was an augur; hence *collega* of Laelius. —— **et**: this does not correspond with *ac*, but *graviter ac moderate* go together and form one expression. *Et* and *ac* do not correspond in Cic.; cf. n. on 75 *mollisque*.

78. quam ob rem...iniuriam: these sentences summarize and emphatically repeat the sense of the two preceding sections. —— **ut exstinctae** etc.: cf. C. M. 71.

P. 30. —**quae**: agrees with the last only of the three words *iurgia, maledicta, contumeliae*. —— **honos...tribuendus**: so Aristot. Eth. Nic. 9, 3, 5. —— **omnino**: here = 'to sum up'; 'looking at the matter as a whole'. —— **una cautio est**: for the form of expression cf. Acad. 2, 51 *omnium inanium visorum una depulsio est*. In both passages the verbal noun in *-tio* conveys the notion of possibility. —— **ut ne**: see n. on 42. —— **non dignos**: put for *indignos*, apparently because of *digni autem* following.

79. quibus in ipsis: probably not put for *in quibus ipsis; quibus* is rather a *dativus commodi.* —— **rarum genus**: cf. n. on 67 *indigna homine dubitatio*; Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 8, 3, 8. —— **omnia praeclara rara**: the omission of the copula is particularly common in proverbs, where also assonance (*praecl-ara r-ara*) is much sought after. For the ellipsis cf. Acad. 1, 18 *sus Minervam* (*docet*); Pis. 69 *claudus pilam* (*iacit*). So in Greek χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά. —— **in suo genere perfectum**: so Tusc. 5, 37 *natura quidquid genuit... in suo quidque genere perfectum esse voluit.* —— **amicos tamquam pecudes**: the same comparison is used by Plato in the Theaetetus 174 D. Cf. the trite line of Ovid, Pont. 2, 3, 8 *volgus amicitias utilitate probat.*

80. naturali: cf. 31, 32. See n. on 4 *maxime memorabilem.* —— **expetita**: n. on 22 *quae expetuntur.* —— **haec vis**: *i. e. vis huius naturalis amicitiae.* —— **et... et**: after the negative (*nec*) *aut... aut* would have been more usual. Cf. *que* for *sed* in 30. —— **quod... idem**: these words go together, as in 13. —— **alter idem**: cf. 23 *verum amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui;* Arist. Eth. Nic. 9, 4, 5; Fam. 2, 15, 4 *alterum me.*

81. bestiis etc.: for the arrangement of the epithets in two groups, one of three and another of two, Nauck well compares Tusc. 1, 64 *omnia, supera infera, prima media ultima.* Nägelsbach quotes Fam. 13, 29, 5. —— **se ipsae etc.**: the principle that self-preservation is the first instinct of animals formed the starting-point of the Stoic Ethics. Cf. Fin. 3, 16, *seq.* —— **pariter... nascitur**: 'is born with every creature in an equal degree'. —— **misceat**: subjunctive of purpose. —— **unum ex duobus**: cf. 92 *ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus.*

82. ne dicam: the phrase is elliptic = *hoc dico ne dicam*, and *impudenter*, which may be regarded as in inverted commas, stands as object of *dicam.* Cf. n. on 48 *dico.* —— **habere talem amicum etc.**. the theory that friendship is based on want of resemblance and not on resemblance is found in Plato's Lysis 215 C *seq.* Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 8, 8, 6 *seq.* decides that it is almost entirely the lower kind of friendship which is based on lack of resemblance.

P. 81. — **par est... quaerere**: cf. 32, 51. —— **ipsum**: in agreement with *aliquem* unexpressed. Cf. 59 *ut si* (*quis*) *esset osurus.* —— **quam... tractamus**: cf. 65 *eam quam iam dudum tracto constantiam.* **cupiditatibus**: those mentioned in 61, 62 as frequently bringing destruction to friendships. —— **aequitate iustitiaque**: *aequitas* is the

view of justice taken by a man of high principle and honor, *iustitia* the legal or technical view. —— **neque quicquam** etc.: cf. 36–40. —— **inter se**: = *alter alterum;* cf Roby, 2306; A. 99, *d*; G. 212; H. 448, n.

83. virtutum...comes: Aristot. Eth. Nic. 8, 1, 1; Plato, Lysis 214 D. Beier quotes Pythagoras' saying *συνδεσμὸν πασῶν τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι τὴν φιλίαν.* Cf. 19. —— **a natura data est**: in Cic. *a natura* and *natura dari* both frequently occur. In the former phrase *natura* is personified, in the latter *natura* is used adverbially = *φύσει.* —— **solitaria**: cf. 30, 87, 88. —— **ea quae summa sunt**: 'the highest moral views'; cf. Arch. 14. —— **altera**: as *virtus* above = *homo virtute praeditus;* so *altera* here = *alterius hominis virtute.* Cf. *virtutem* in 48. —— **quos inter**: as a rule, only dissyllabic prepositions follow the cases to which they are attached, except when some attribute is attached to the noun or pronoun, *e. g. multis in rebus* below, 85. Cf. Roby, 1038; A. 263, n.; G. 414, Rem. 2; H. 569, II. 1.

84. honestas...iucunditas: the enumeration consists of three branches, the last of the three being subdivided (*tranquillitas atque iucunditas*). Had *iucunditas* and *tranquillitas* occupied in the enumeration the same place as the other two things mentioned, Cicero must have left out *atque.* See n. on 12. For *expetenda* see n. on 22; for the collocation *tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas*, n. on 8 *cum summi viri tum amicissimi.* —— **ut et...possit**: this clause seems to contain a tacit protest against the Stoic ethics which made *honestas* (*τὸ καλόν* = virtue) everything; Laelius asserts that perfect happiness (for *beata vita* cf. n. on 45 *beate vivendum*) contains other things as well, and that the perfection of friendship and the perfection of happiness are inextricably connected. —— **quod**: this refers back to the last sentence and not forwards to *id.* —— **experiri**: cf. 53, 64. Seyffert quotes from Plutarch a saying of Euripides *τὸ φίλων πεῖραν λαβεῖν οὐ σμικρὸν κακόν*, and from Stobaeus one of Philemon *εὔχου μὴ λαβεῖν πεῖραν φίλων.*

85. cum...iudicaris: these words can be shown to be taken from Theophrastus *περὶ φιλίας* (see Introd.), for Plutarch *περὶ φιλαδελφείας* c. 8 quotes as from Theophrastus the words *τοὺς γὰρ ἀλλοτρίους οὐ φιλοῦντα δεῖ κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ κρίναντα φιλεῖν*; so Sen. Ep. 3 *isti vero praepostere officia permiscent qui contra praecepta Theophrasti cum amaverint iudicant, et non amant, cum iudicaverint.* Ammianus Marcellinus 26, 2, 9 puts Cicero's words, slightly altered, into the mouth of Valentinian,

in a speech made by him on being raised to the throne. —— **tum maxime** etc.: cf. 62.

P. 82. — **acta agimus**: an oxymoron (so 'to slay the slain') for which Seyffert compares Plaut. Mil. 3, 1, 41 *nota noscere;* Poen. 4, 2, 48 *doctum docere;* Cic. Fam. 14, 1, 5 *puerum perditum perdere.* As to the proverb, Donatus on Terent. Adelph. 2, 2, 24 not improbably conjectures that it originated in the law courts, *ubi quod semel iudicatum est frustra iterum agitur.* Cf. n. on 23 *absentes adsunt.* —— **vetamur**: *sc. facere.* —— **ultro et citro**: here = 'mutually', as in the common phrase *data ultro citroque fide* (Liv. 29, 23, 5). —— **cursu**: cf. 63.

86. **una**: by attraction for *unum* ('the one thing'; for this usage see nn. on 50 *qui,* 18 *eam.* —— **quamquam**: elliptic, the full sense being 'most men agree about virtue yet etc.' —— **multis**: chiefly the Epicureans. —— **quam multi** etc.: not exactly in accord with 63 *ubi eos inveniemus* etc. Observe *quam multi;* no good writers use *quot* as a substantive. So in 57 *quam multa.* Cic. however often prefers to use *quam multi, tam multi* where *quot, tot* would be permissible; so 35 *haec ita multa quasi fata.* —— **ad unum**: 'to a man'. —— **et ei ... et ei**: those who follow the πολιτικὸς βίος and those who follow the θεωρητικὸς βίος. One of the main questions which divided the later Greek philosophers was that of the comparative value of these two lives. Cf. n. on 10 *huius facta* etc. —— **otiosi**: here, as often, implies merely the freedom from public duties; cf. 16. —— **vitiam esse nullam**: for the phrase cf. n. on 22 *vita vitalis;* for this Epicurean opinion cf. n. on 56. —— **liberaliter**: = *libero digne;* cf. 89.

87. **serpit**: n. on 41. —— **Timonem**: the misanthrope (μισάνθρωπος) a contemporary of Socrates, the subject of Shakspere's well-known play. He is also the subject of one of Lucian's most famous dialogues. —— **nescio quem**: Cicero often inserts *quidam, nescio quis* and the like, when it is necessary, in mentioning some Greek, to avoid the appearance of too great a familiarity with Greek literature. The Roman statesmen of the dialogue could not be presumed to know Timon except by vague report. In telling a story of Xenocrates to a Roman jury (who objected to Greek learning in an advocate), Cicero calls him *quidam* (Balb. § 12); so of the Stoics *non nulli litteris ac studiis doctrinae dediti* (Balb. § 1). *Nescio quem* here has the same purpose as *ut opinor* below, 88. Cf. n. on 24 *doctum quendam;* also ref. on C. M. 82 *nescio quo modo.* —— **possit**: potential subjunctive.

—— **evomat**: the metaphorical use is common, as in *eructare*, *ἐξεμεῖν*.

P. 33. — **tam esset ferreus**: for the arrangement n. on 10 *quam id recte;* for *ferreus* cf. 48, and for the sense Aristotle, Politics 1, 2, 14.

88. **commemorare**: cf. n. on 76 *ut... audivi.* For a similar traditional saying of Archytas see C. M. 39 and n.; cf. ib. 43 *saepe audivi a maioribus* etc. —— **illam**: = *eius rei;* cf. n. on 2 *eum sermonem.* —— **quae fuisset**: Nauck takes these words as being those of Laelius, and not part of his report of Archytas; otherwise, he says, Cic. would have written *quam fore.* —— **si aliquem**: n. on 27. —— **semperque**: see n. on 21 *virosque.* —— **tamquam**: so in 45. —— **una illa** etc.: 'there is one grievance to which we are to submit'. For the explanatory *nam* succeeding *illa* cf. N. D. 2, 138 *illa potius explicetur incredibilis fabrica naturae: nam* etc.; also Madvig on Fin. 5, 86. —— **et monendi... et obiurgandi**: so 44 *et adhibeatur... postulabit;* below, 89 *monitio... obiurgatio.* —— **accipienda**: n. on 40.

89. **familiaris meus**: Terence; cf. Introd. pp. iii., iv. —— **obsequium** etc: Terent. Andr. 1, 1, 41 (l. 68). *Obsequium* here in a bad sense = flattery; often however used in the good sense of 'deference', as below. For the metre of the line see C. M. 25 and nn. —— **siquidem**: 'inasmuch as'. —— **fraudem**: often means, as here, 'harm', 'injury'. On the sense cf. Off. 1, 91. —— **habenda** etc.: Cicero says both *habere rationem* and *adhibere rationem* (Leg. Agr. 2, 2) but only *adhibere diligentiam,* so that there is here a slight zeugma (unless *adhibenda* is to be substituted for *habenda*). —— **monitio**: said to occur only here in Cicero, who commonly uses *admonitio.*

P. 34. — **in obsequio**: 'in the payment of deference'. —— **adiutrix**: n. on 37 *conciliatrix.* —— **non modo... sed ne quidem**: see n. on C. M. 34. —— **libero**: adjective for substantive. The edd. say that the use is rendered permissible by the proximity of *amico,* but the phrase *libero dignus* is commonly used without any such restraint; *e. g.* De Or. 1, 17, 72; cf. also ib. 137 *id quod est homine ingenuo liberaliterque educato dignum.* See ref. on 54 *insipienti.* —— **tyranno**: cf. 52 *tyrannorum vita.*

90. **cuius autem** etc.: Cicero was very likely thinking of Hesiod's lines, Works and Days 293, *et seq.* —— **scitum**: 'a neat saying'. Cf. Div. 2, 51 *vetus illud Catonis admodum scitum est.* —— **illud Catonis**: like τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος etc. in Greek. —— **ut multa**: cf. Fin. 1, 7 *facete is quidem sicut alia.* —— **non capiunt... capiunt**: n. on 19 *non potest.*

—— **quod contra**: *quod* is merely a connecting link between the clauses, like the 'which' in vulgar English and ὃ sometimes in Thucydides and Plato at the beginning of sentences or clauses; the use is the same as that in *quod si* at the beginning of a clause or sentence. Cf. C. M. 84 and n.

91. proprium est amicitiae: n. on 26. —— **libere**: n. on 44. —— **sic habendum est**: *sic* corresponds with *ut;* 'as...so we must consider that etc.' —— **pestem**: cf. 34 *pestem...amicitiis.* —— **adulationem blanditiam assentationem**: 'fawning, wheedling, and flattery'. *Adulatio* is the worst fault, and corresponds to the Greek κολακεία: cf. Tac. Hist. 1, 1, 4 *adulationi foedum crimen servitutis inest;* Cic. uses it of dogs in N. D. 2, 158 *canum...tam amans dominorum adulatio. Blanditia* is more like the Greek 'αρεσκεία, an excessive desire to please. This is one of many words commonly used only in the plural, but by Cic. also in the singular; in 61 *blanditiis. Assentatio* is the fault of those *qui omnia ad voluntatem loquuntur;* 98. —— **multis nominibus**: cf. Fin. 3, 14 *erit enim notius quale sit pluribus notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus.* —— **levium**: the opposite would be *constantium.* —— **voluptatem**: cf. Orator 38 *ad voluptatem aurium scribere;* De Or. 3, 177; also πρὸς ἡδονὴν λέγειν.

92. iudicium veri: 'our power to judge of truth'. Cic. often uses *iudicium veri* in another sense to translate the Greek κριτήριον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς; cf. Acad. 2, 29. —— **idque**: *id = verum*, not *iudicium veri.* —— **valere non potest**: 'can have no meaning'. Cf. 19 *nomen amicitiae tollitur.* —— **amicitiae vis**: cf. 15 etc. —— **qui**: adv. as in C. M. 4. —— **quoque**: this is *quŏque* not *quŏque.* For the sense cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 9, 4, 8; Plato, Lysis 214 C.

93. devium: 'erratic'. —— **convertitur**: De Or. 3, 177 *orationis genus ad omnem aurium voluptatem et animorum motum mutatur et vertitur.*

P. 85. — negat quis: this is no hypothesis; *i. e.* it must not be supposed that there is an ellipsis of *si;* there is rather a picture of very common occurrences in Gnatho's life; 'a man says no, I say no' etc. The line is in the Eunuchus of Terence, 2, 2, 21. For the metre see C. M. 20 and nn. —— **omnia**: used adverbially. —— **persona**: n. on 4. —— **quod genus amici**: = *amicum cuius generis;* n. on 4.

94. cum: concessive. —— **loco**: 'origin'; *i. e. loco quo nati sunt.* **vanitatem**: lit. 'emptiness'; *i. e.* 'worthlessness'.

95. secerni...internosci: for the arrangement of the words see n.

on 8 *cum summi* etc. Plutarch wrote a tract entitled πῶς ἄν τις διακρίνειε κόλακα τοῦ φίλου. —— **imperitissimis**: superlative adjective as substantive; so often in Cicero *familiarissimi*, *inimicissimi*, *iniquissimi*. The substantival use of the comparative adjective scarcely occurs. Seyffert quotes Xen. Mem. 3, 7, 5 where Socrates calls the voters in the Athenian ecclesia ἀφρονεστάτους καὶ ἀσθενεστάτους. —— **inter ... et inter**: the repetition of the preposition is not required by modern idiom; it is adopted here for the sake of clearness. Cf. n. on 11 *de pietate* etc.

96. C. Papirius etc.: in 130 B.C. Carbo (see n. on 39) proposed a law *ut eundem tribunum plebi quotiens vellet creare liceret* (Livy, Epit. 59). The proposal failed, but at some date before 123 B.C. a law was carried which allowed the re-election of outgoing tribunes when the number of candidates was not sufficient to fill all the places (Appian, Bell. Civ. 1, 21). —— **influebat**: so *irrepere*, *illabi* and *insinuare* (below, 99) are often used. Cf. Off. 2, 31 *in universorum animos tamquam influere;* Fin. 1, 39 *si ea sola voluptas esset quae quasi titillaret sensus ut ita dicam et ad eos cum suavitate afflueret et illaberetur.* —— **ferret**: here 'was trying to carry'; so *transferebatur* below. A. 277, *c*; G. 224; H. 469, 1. —— **nihil de me** etc.: Acad. 2, 66 *non de me sed de sapiente;* De Or. 3, 74 *non de memet ipso sed de oratore.* —— **ducem ... comitem**: Scipio appeared to be the leader of the nation, though then not a magistrate but only a *homo privatus.* —— **est in manibus**: see n. on C. M. 12 —— **popularis ... populi**: intentional contrast. —— **Q. Maximo**: n. on 69. —— **et L. Mancino**: the insertion of *et* is due to the interposition of the words *fratre Scipionis:* otherwise Cic. would have written *Q. Maximo L. Mancino consulibus.* L. Hostilius Mancinus served in the third Punic war, and was one of the first who entered Carthage when it was stormed. He is said to have gained the consulship by having war-scenes painted and exhibited in the forum, where he attended and explained the pictures to the multitude (Plin. Nat. Hist. 35, § 23). —— **quam ... videbatur**: notice the indicative; *meministis* is regarded as parenthetical. —— **lex ... Crassi**: C. Licinius Crassus, tribune in 145, proposed to make election to all priesthoods go by popular vote. When a vacancy occurred in a priestly college the remaining members filled up the vacancy as they pleased. A measure like that of Crassus was carried in 104 by Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, a tribune. In opposing the law of Crassus, Laelius (whose oration is mentioned in Brut. 83; N. D. 3, 5 and

43, in which last passage it is called *aureola*) maintained that the state had no right to control the order of religious observance. A curious method was adopted to get over this objection. The election to priesthoods was at an assembly of a minority (17) of the 35 tribes, the particular tribes which took part in it being determined by lot. While, theoretically, a resolution of the minority of the nation had no binding effect, and therefore could not be offensive to the gods, still in practice the colleges were bound to appoint the persons so nominated, though the form of *cooptatio* was gone through. The colleges of priests had great influence in politics, hence the aristocrats desired to keep the offices in their own hands. —— **ad populi beneficium**: magistracies are often called *beneficia populi Romani.* —— **primus instituit etc.**: the interpretation of this passage is difficult. Plutarch, Life of C. Gracchus, c. 5, tells the tale of C. Gracchus, and assigns to the act a democratic purpose. Our passage certainly seems to countenance Plutarch in this, but Lange, Römische Alterthümer II², 443, denies that the act had any political aim. He connects it with a change in the voting at public assemblies. This originally took place in the *comitium*, which formed a small part of what was ordinarily called the *forum*. Lange thinks that when the voting was transferred from the *comitium* to the *saepta* (enclosures) the speakers naturally turned their backs on the *comitium* and faced the *saepta*, the *rostra* being placed between them. The matter is far from clear, and Lange's explanation seems scarcely to be consistent with this passage. —— **agere cum populo**: the technical phrase for the laying of matters before the people in their assemblies. —— **vendibilem**: 'plausible'; lit. 'salable'. So Brut. 174 *vendibilis orator;* Fin. I, 12 *nam ut sint illa vendibiliora, haec uberiora certe sunt.* —— **praetore me**: as the regular age for the praetorship was 40, Laelius was probably born about 186 B.C. —— **re ... auctoritate**: since Laelius was not consul, he carried his case on its merits and not from the *auctoritas* conferred by office, which was then not *summa.*

P. 86. — 97. adumbratis: *adumbrare* is 'to give in outline, or incompletely'; the reference here is to misleading the people, not by actual lies, but by partial presentation of the truth, *quod valet si modo illustratum est.* —— **illustratum**: contrasts exactly with *adumbratis* above. —— **tota**: *totă* not *totā.* —— **perpenditur**: 'is judged'. *Perpendere* is here the equivalent of *metiri* in 21; the ablative construction similarly follows on *metiri* there and on *iudicare* in 74. ——

ut dicitur: n. on 19. —— **exploratum habeas**: n. on 52 *habent cognitam*. —— **amare ... amari**: objects of *habeas*. *Id* refers to both verbs *amare* and *amari*. For *id quam vere fiat*, cf. *quam id recte faciam* in 10, and *quámvis honeste id facerent* in 35. *Id* is object of *ignores*, not subject of *fiat*. —— **quamquam**: = καίτοι, 'and yet'; so 29, 33 and often. —— **patefaciat**: so Off. 1, 91 *cavendum est ne assentatoribus patefaciamus auris, neve adulari nos sinamus, in quo falli facile est. Tales enim nos esse putamus, ut iure laudemur.* —— **se ... ipse**: n. on 5 *te ipse*.

98. **omnino**: n. on 69. —— **virtutis opinione**: 'supposed virtue'. The same phrase occurs in a different sense in 37. —— **esse quam videri**: Lahmeyer quotes Aeschyl. Sept. 574 οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει, and Sall. Cat. 54, 5 *esse quam videri bonus malebat.* —— **vanam**: here = 'false'; so κενός. —— **laudum suarum**: 'of their own merits'; so Arch. 31 *aeternum se testimonium laudis daturum esse profitetur*. For *laus*, meaning not praise but that which deserves it, cf. Verg. Aen. 5, 355 *primam merui qui laude coronam.* —— **nulla est**: cf. 86 *vitam esse nullam.* —— **verum audire non volt**: cf. 90. —— **essent**: the subject of this verb is unexpressed = *ei quibus parasiti assentantur.* —— **milites gloriosi**: like the well-known *miles gloriosus* of Plautus, and Thraso in Terence's Eunuchus, from which the line that follows is taken (3, 1, 1 or l. 391). Thraso has sent by his parasite Gnatho a present to Thais, and is listening to Gnatho's report of the manner in which she received the present. —— **magnas agere**: the line in Terence is really not in the form of a question but of an exclamation: 'to think that, etc.' The remark of Gnatho is therefore not the answer to a question, as Cicero supposes, but is a correction of the word *magnas*: 'great? you ought to have said enormous'. —— **volt esse**: n. on 29 *volunt*.

P. 37.—99. **nec facillime**: litotes, euphemistic for *difficillime*; so De Or. 1, 115 *non optima*; ib. 2, 7 *non doctissimum.* —— **det manus**: 'gives in'; from the signal used in asking for quarter on the field of battle. Sometimes *tollere manus* (ἀνατείνειν τὰς χεῖρας) is used for *dare manus*. Seyffert quotes Att. 2, 22, 2 *aiebat illum primo sane diu multa contra, ad extremum autem manus dedisse et affirmasse nihil se contra eius voluntatem esse facturum*; Caes. B. G. 5, 31, 3. —— **plus vidisse**: 'to have been more farsighted'. Cicero often uses (especially in the letters) this and similar phrases, as *nihil, multum, plurimum, parum, tantum videre* (sometimes *sapere*). Cf. Phil. 2, 39 *cum*

me vidisse plus fateretur. —— **magis**: 'all the more', *i. e.* because *illudi* is *turpe.* —— **ut**: the expression is elliptic = *num credibile est ut.* —— **comicos senes**: 'old men in comedy'. For *comicos stultos* cf. n. on 30 *multae et magnae.* Cf. C. M. 36 and nn. The lines are by *Caecilius Statius* (about B.C. 219–166). For the metre see C. M. 25 and nn. —— **illusseris**: in Latin down to Cicero's time *ss* was often written after a long vowel. Quint. 1, 7, 20 instances *caussa, cassus, divissiones.* —— **lautissime**: 'most richly'; cf. our expression 'a rich joke'.

100. **in fabulis...senum**: in nearly every Latin comedy there is a young man who, by the aid of a clever slave, cheats his father out of a sum of money. —— **sapientia**: cf. closely 18, 38. —— **in hominem cadere**: 'to fall within a man's province'; cf. 48, also Tusc. 5, 28 *quos dicam bonos perspicuum est; omnibus enim virtutibus instructos et ornatos tum sapientis tum viros bonos dicimus.* —— **levis**: = *volgaris* in 76, *communibus* in 77. —— **ad illa prima**: see 18.

(5) *Conclusion.* §§ 100–104.

conciliat...conservat: so 20 *virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet.* —— **convenientia rerum**: = *consensio omnium rerum* in 20. —— **stabilitas...constantia**: see 62, 65. —— **quae**: *virtus*, not *constantia.* —— **lumen**: so in 27 *lumen aliquod probitatis et virtutis.* —— **agnovit in alio**: see 48 *seq.* —— **admovet**: so 32 *applicant sese et propius admovent;* cf. 48. —— **amor...amicitia**: cf. 26. Aristotle distinguishes φίλησις and φιλία (Eth. Nic. 8, 5, 5 and elsewhere) but his φιλία includes both *amicitia* and *amor*, his φίλησις being that lower degree of affection which may be felt for the brute creation or for things inanimate. —— **nulla indigentia**: this is shown in 26, 27, 29, 46. —— **quaesita**: goes only with *utilitate.* —— **ipsa ecflorescit**: this is stated repeatedly elsewhere in the dialogue; cf. 30–32, 51. —— **ecflorescit**: a favorite metaphor with Cicero, as in De Or. 1, 20 *ex rerum cognitione efflorescat et redundet oportet oratio;* also ib. 2, 319; Fin. 1, 69. The form of the preposition *ec* for *ex* is well attested in compounds by both MSS. and inscriptions. It was probably somewhat old-fashioned in Cicero's time.

101. **Paulum**: n. on 21. —— **Catonem**: the old censor. —— **Gallum**: n. on 21. —— **P. Nasicam**: surnamed *Corculum*, and father of Nasica Serapio mentioned in 41. This Nasica was son-in-law of the

elder Africanus; was consul in 162 and 155, censor in 159. —— **Ti. Gracchum**: father of the tribunes; also son-in-law of the elder Africanus; father-in-law of the younger Africanus; as praetor won victories over the Celtiberi in 179; was consul in 177 and conquered Sardinia; censor in 169. Cicero often contrasts him with his sons, greatly to the disadvantage of the latter. —— **Scipionem etc.**: see Introd. to Cato Maior, pp. xxi.–xxiii.

P. 88. — in caritate acquiescimus: so 22 *vita... conquiescit.* —— **Q. Tuberonis**: n. on 37. —— **P. Rutili**: this P. Rutilius Rufus was a pupil of Panaetius (Off. 3, 10; Brut. 114, 116, 118) and studied law under P. Mucius Scaevola the consul of 133 B. C. He served as military tribune under Scipio before Numantia, and as *legatus* under Metellus Numidicus in the war against Iugurtha (Sall. Iug. 50). In 105 he was consul; in 100 was among the opponents of Saturninus; in the same year accompanied Q. Mucius Scaevola (*pontifex*) to Asia, which he governed himself for some time after Scaevola's departure. The severe integrity and purity of his government gave offence to the *publicani*, and on his return to Rome he was unjustly arraigned for extortion and condemned, whereupon he went into exile at Smyrna, from which he declined to return, though Sulla offered to reinstate him (pro Balbo § 28). Cicero De Or. 1, 229 calls him *exemplum innocentiae quo nemo neque integrior fuerit in civitate neque sanctior*; Vell. Pat. 2, 13, 2 *vir non saeculi sui sed omnis aevi optimus.* —— **A. Vergini**: mentioned by Pomponius Dig. 1, 2, 40, along with Rutilius, as being a good lawyer. Nothing else is known of him. —— **carceribus ... calcem**: *carceres* are properly the enclosures in which the chariots are kept while awaiting the start. *Calx* was a chalked line marking the goal (Seneca Ep. 108, 32 *hanc quam nunc in circo cretam vocamus, calcem antiqua dicebant*); it is the *linea* of Horace in '*mors ultima linea rerum est*' (Greek γραμμή). With this passage cf. C. M. 83 *nec vero* etc.

102. res humanae: 'human possessions'; cf. 17 *ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis.* —— **fragiles caducaeque**: 20 *caduca et incerta.* —— **omnis ... iucunditas**: cf. 47 *solem e mundo tollere videntur ei qui amicitiam e vita tollunt.* —— **mihi**: 'for me', 'in my view'; cf. *sibi* in 11. —— **vivit ... vivet**: cf. 13. —— **in manibus habui**: 'had at hand'. A somewhat different use from that in 96. Cf. Caes. B. G. 2, 19, 7 *in manibus nostris hostes viderentur.*

103. fortuna aut natura: the distinction between good things

given by fortune and good things given by nature is involved in 20, 22. —— **de re publica**: but in 20 *consensio* is followed by the genitive instead of the ablative with *de*. So here *rerum consilium* = *de rebus*. —— **plena**: Cic. generally uses *plenus* with the genitive, not the ablative. —— **numquam . . . ne quidem**: cf. nn. on 48 *non . . . repudientur;* 10 *cave* etc. —— **senserim**: the subjunctive is used to express a limitation or restriction. Roby, 1692; G. 629, Rem.; H. 503, I. n. 1. —— **isque**: cf. n. on 4 *et eorum*. —— **militia**: with this whole passage cf. 15 *Scipione . . . communis*. —— **peregrinationes**: we hear much of Scipio's travels (Rep. 6, 11; Acad. 2, 5) but it is only here mentioned that Laelius accompanied him. —— **rusticationes**: cf. De Or. 2, 22 *Laelium semper fere cum Scipione solitum rusticari eosque incredibiliter repuerascere esse solitos cum rus ex urbe tamquam e vinclis evolavissent.*

104. nam: n. on 45. —— **de studiis etc.**: in 86 *cognitio* and *doctrina* come together as *cognoscendi* and *discendi* do here. —— **recordatio et memoria**: these two words frequently come together thus, as in Tusc. 5, 88; Brut. 9; De Or. 1, 228; Tac. Dial. 1 and in De Or. 1, 4 even *memoriae recordatio*. *Memoria* indicates the fact that a past event is present to the mind; *recordatio* properly means the act or process of summoning back past impressions; *cogitatio* is substituted for it below — *cogitatione et memoria*. —— **possem**: the imperfect gives the sense 'I should not now be able'.

P. 89. — nec . . . et: see n. on 75. —— **alunturque potius**: the *que* is corrective as in the common phrase *potiusque*, 'or rather'. For *aluntur* 'are strengthened', cf. De Or. 2, 123 *si hunc oratorem quem nunc fingo, ut institui, crearo, aluero, confirmaro;* Tusc. 1, 4 *honos alit artis;* Vell. Pat. 1, 17, 6 *alit aemulatio ingenia*. —— **essem . . . affert**: for the indicative in the apodosis, though the subjunctive is in the protasis, cf. n. on 29 *est* etc. —— **aetas ipsa**: 'the mere lapse of time'; cf. 19 *natura ipsa*. —— **brevia tolerabilia**: cf. the maxim of Epicurus, Fin. 1, 40 *dolor in longinquitate levis, in gravitate brevis;* ib. 2, 94 *magnum dolorem brevem, longinquum levem*. —— **haec habui etc.**: so Cicero makes Cato conclude in the Cato Maior 85. —— **hortor**: cf. 17 *ego . . . anteponatis*. —— **ita . . . locetis**: cf. 40 *eo loco locati*.

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